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Abstract
This is a qualitative study of friendships among people with intellectual disability labels
in two countries – the United States and Japan. As a field to study friendships among
adults with intellectual disability label, I gained access to two sheltered workshops (“The
Farm” in the U.S. and “The Kapu Kapu” in Japan) and conducted participant observation,
through which I wished to identify broader, multiple, and more humane ways to define
competence and human value that could validate people labeled intellectually disabled
whose humanity and citizenship are often doubted by dominant standards in
industrialized societies. In addition to resisting social standards and presenting broader
meanings of participation and competence, the informants of this study seemed to try to
resist giving significant authority to the concepts of competence and utility in relation to
human worth and to build community that does not question who should or should not be
the valid members of the community. The observed communities helped me to imagine a
different, more just world, and were characterized as “co-vivial” (a term coined by a
Japanese philosopher to mean “live with different others convivially”). The informants of
this study cultivated co-vivial communities by staying connected, seeing others as
irreplaceable individuals, being responsive to others, being open to interdependent way of
life, and affirming every existence unconditionally.
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Introduction
It has been quite a while – a lot more than I had originally planned – since I first
started my field work at the Farm (a pseudonym 1), an organization located in the state of
NY, in September 2005. The Farm provided day habilitation programs for young adults
who had been given a label that made them eligible for services funded by the New York
State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (at the time of my research, it
was called the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities [NYS-OMRDD]; therefore, it is referred to as such throughout this
dissertation). Completing the year-long fieldwork at the Farm in August 2006, I then flew
to my home country, Japan. I wanted to study and collect data in Japan as well as in the
U.S. for two reasons: First, I personally wanted to learn more about the life situations of
disabled adults in Japan because my pre-U.S. experience focused on teaching and
interacting with young children with disability labels. Second, I expected that collecting
data from countries with different histories, cultures, and societal organizations would
allow me to examine the contextually influenced construction of various concepts such as
ability/disability and human value as well as to identify themes that transcend cultural
differences. Additionally, I expected that doing fieldwork in Japan would encourage me
All names but the name of the research site in Japan (Kapu Kapu) used in this
dissertation are pseudonym.
1
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to read Japanese literature in addition to the English-written literature that I have been
fortunate to be able to learn from during my study in the U.S. and thus to incorporate
insights gained from Japanese thinkers as well into my discussion.
So I began my fieldwork in Japan in September 2006. The research site, Kapu
Kapu (using an autonym with permission), was a sheltered workshop, though it is more
accurately referred to as a café open to and grounded in the local community where it is
located. Completing my engagement with Kapu Kapu for a research purpose in August
2009, I decided to stay and remain to this day involved with Kapu Kapu as a part-time
worker. Though I do not collect data any more in a formal sense, I am sure that my
understandings, interpretations, and writings are influenced by my ongoing interactions
with the people and the community of Kapu Kapu.
My research focus has been shaped and reshaped through the time spent in the
field. The unchanged fundamental drive throughout the course of research, however, was
to identify perspectives or relationships that could validate the existential value of all
living things, including myself who will likely become disabled, aged, frail, demented,
and dependent at some points in life. As a part of this larger inquiry, in this study I
particularly concentrated on the construction of human value of people with intellectual
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disability labels2.
On pursuing this core interest, I followed the trend of the “optimistic approach”
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2003, pp. 216-218), which frames issues “in ways that people can
visualize the future” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003, p. 217) instead of posing a “skeptical
question” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003, p. 217); Thus I sought close, humanizing
relationships, in which the humanity and human value of a labeled person is positively
constructed, and asked “How does it occur?” instead of “Can it occur?”
I also found one of the theoretical frameworks for my research in Bogdan and
Taylor’s call for “a sociology of acceptance” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1987) as well as in
Hanasaki3’s call to establish “ethics of co-viviality” (1993, p. 158). Bogdan and Taylor
argued that negative reactions and exclusions were not inevitable outcomes in the life of
people regarded as social deviants. Rather, they argued that an accepting and caring
relationship can indeed exist between “people who are different and typical people”
Historically and culturally, various terms have been invented and accepted as a label to
indicate that a person’s intellectual faculty is disabled. Past terminology includes
“imbeciles,” “feebleminded,” “idiots,” “mentally retarded,” and “morons.” While those past
labels have been found to be degrading and prejudicial, new terminology has been
invented and accepted as more neutral and objective, such as “intellectual disability,”
“developmental disability,” and “learning difficulty” (preferred in the U.K.). Mostly
following the terminology and definitions imported from the U.S., Japanese terminology
adopts the labels of “intellectual disability” and “developmental disability.” In this
dissertation, I collectively call those labels as “intellectual disability labels” while I also
use other past and current terms depending on the contexts.
3 A Japanese writer and philosopher who met, had dialogue with, and worked alongside
2

many oppressed people since the 1960s, particularly indigenous people in Japan as well
as in a wider Asian region.
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(Bogdan & Taylor, 1987, p. 35) and that such a relationship deserves sociological study
rather than to be dismissed as a form of deviance. Bogdan and Taylor (1987) defined an
accepting relationship as follows:
An accepting relationship is one between a person with a deviant attribute and
another person, which is of long duration and characterized by closeness and
affection and in which the deviant attribute does not have a stigmatizing, or
morally discrediting, character. Accepting relationships are not based on a denial
of difference, but rather on the absence of impugning the different person’s
moral character because of the variation. (p. 35)
Quite similarly, Hanasaki (1993) defined a term “co-viviality,” which he coined to
represent a Japanese word Kyosei4, as to live with others who are different by embracing
“relationships in which differences do not generate discrimination” (Hanasaki, 2007, p.
187). Working alongside with various groups of oppressed minorities for many years,
Hanasaki (1993) reached a conclusion that what we needed beyond finding against
oppression for a single cause was to derive a manner of life, or ethics of co-viviality, from
the lived experiences of those various movements.
Aligning also with other pioneer studies in which accepting relationships between
Kyosei literally means “live together” and tends to be used rhetorically as a fine slogan
for a discrimination-free, inclusive society.
4
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the labeled and the non-labeled were highlighted (e.g., Biklen, 1992; Bogdan & Taylor,
1989; Edgerton, 1967/1993; Goode, 1994; Kliewer, 1998; Linneman, 2001; Taylor &
Bogdan, 1989), I had originally planned to study a humanizing relationship between a
person with an intellectual disability label and a person without a disability label.
However, my plan got gradually modified due to several factors, the first of which was
when my potential informant, Lois, proposed that I do my research at the Farm where
she worked instead of studying her and her relationship with another person with an
intellectual disability label. I was introduced to Lois by one of my classmates in a
research class that I took in Spring 2005. My classmate recommended a friend of hers,
Lois, as a potential informant for my research as Lois worked for “mentally challenged
adults” and had “really grown attached to her client” who was “a young mildly retarded
woman who still lives at home, and is in her thirties” (personal communication, May 24,
2005). Visiting Lois at the Farm for the first time after the summer in 2005, I explained to
her that my research focused on studying close relationships between a person with an
intellectual disability label and a person without a disability label where a labeled person
is accepted, appreciated, and valued regardless of societal assessment of disability.
Although she welcomed me and was excited about the study, Lois sounded as if she was
rather uncomfortable being a primary focus of the study and proposed that I should
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instead keep my options open and explore other potential informants at the Farm who
enjoy positive relationships. Lois’s proposal sounded appealing to me because the staff of
the Farm seemed to care a lot about and to enjoy working with the labeled program
participants of the Farm and therefore I expected to be able to observe many examples of
close relationships and intimate moments that I was interested in observing.
In addition, there was yet another, focus-shifting motivation for considering
Lois’s proposal. During the summer before I first visited the Farm, I had started to
question my almost automatic decision to focus on the relationships between a person
with a label and a person without. Of course, given the history of discrimination that
segregated labeled individuals and deprived them of opportunities to live ordinary lives,
including opportunities to meet and develop relationships with non-labeled others, the
pioneer research that studied accepting relationships between the labeled and the
non-labeled were, and still are, a paramount need in order to help the world envision
unimagined inclusive ways of living. However, I felt it inadequate to justify my research
interest only on this point. I felt I needed to delve into my motivations. As I questioned
myself about what might be making me hesitate to study relationships that involved only
labeled individuals, I was reminded of one scene from the days when I worked in Japan
as an early childhood special education professional and visited regular preschools as an
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itinerant advisor on including and teaching children with disability labels. In the class I
was observing, there were three labeled children: two with Down syndrome and one with
a mild paralysis. When the classroom teacher announced that it was a time for free play,
everyone but the three labeled children went outside. As I looked at the three children
remaining in the classroom and playing happily together by themselves, I remember I
saw their relationships mostly as problematic, as “evidence of failure to integrate into the
non-disabled community” (Chappell, 1994, p. 424), as locked in “the confines of mental
handicap sub-groups” (Atkinson, 1983, p. 20, cited in Chappell, 1994, p. 424), or as
“protection from feelings of inferiority, rather than as a positive choice” (Chappell, 1994,
p. 424).
Such prejudiced perspectives still lurk deep down in myself, ready to jump in
anytime and formulate my quick impressions toward various things. For example, when
my classmate in the research class who recommended Lois as a potential research
informant casually mentioned that Lois also had some kind of learning disability and
therefore she, my classmate, was often discouraged by her parents in childhood to hang
around with Lois, I instantly felt hesitation to pursue her recommendation. As soon as I
was made aware that a person who I assumed to be a representative of non-disabled
population had in fact one of her legs in the disabled circle herself, all of a sudden, Lois’s
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relationships with the labeled woman or her motivation behind maintaining close
relationship with the person seemed questionable or a bit different in kind than the
relationships involving a non-labeled person, just like I doubted the validity of
friendships among the three labeled children in the class I observed.
As much as it was disappointing, disgusting, and disturbing to admit such
prejudice within myself, I knew that I could not ignore it. I must squarely face the
possibility that my hesitation in considering close relationships between labeled
individuals as a focus of my research might reflect to some degree a personal, or even
social prejudice as Chappell (1994) warned. Chappell (1994) critically examined the
impact of the normalization principle, particularly Wolfensberger’s version of social role
valorization theory, which argued that socially devalued people should not follow a
vicious circle of deviance, that devalued people should try instead to engage themselves
in socially valued roles, and that “grouping together disabled people reinforces their
deviancy and stigmatized identities” (Chappell, 1994, p. 423). Chappell warned that such
arguments that implicitly or explicitly suggest it is better to be associated with
non-disabled people are “very damaging” (p. 425). She further explained:
It implies that the problem for disabled people is other people who are disabled,
particularly those who have severe impairments. The solution is to become
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distanced from other disabled people and aligned with non-disabled people.
Discouraging disabled people from associating together as friends undermines
the basis for political action. The relative lack of interest in and the low value
placed on relationships between disabled people damages their perception of
themselves and each other. (pp. 425-426)
As such, Lois’s proposal to study at the Farm instead of focusing only on Lois’s
relationship with one of the labeled persons she worked for was appealing to me as it
would allow me to keep my options widely open and to observe relationships between
and among labeled individuals as well as labeled/non-labeled relationships.
Once I began my fieldwork at the Farm, I soon decided to shift the priority of my
research and to focus on the relationships between and among the labeled individuals as I
noticed the glimpses of what might be only or advantageously understood by those who
shared the societal location as a person labeled intellectually disabled. Williams, a
disability rights activist and a poet with cerebral palsy, has once called such insider
sensitivity as “the subtleties of the moments” (Williams, 1989, p. 13) that the
non-disabled people often don’t pick up on5. Furthermore, it was rather evident right

In his poem, Dick and Jane, Williams (1989) described two disabled lovers, who were
laid by an institutional staff on a same mat but in a way that they faced in opposite
directions of one another to avoid “any funny stuff” and who nevertheless gave caress to
each other by “spasmodic strokes of her arm” and by “running his whiskers through her
5
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from the outset of the fieldwork that the institutional division of staff versus program
participants (i.e., labeled individuals) had significant, and often time restraining impacts
on the life at the Farm. For example, the labeled program participants were often careful
about what to talk about and what not to say when the staff was around. At the beginning
of my fieldwork at the Farm, there was also a conversation about “Who is Maho?” among
several labeled individuals. When they reached a conclusion that I was a volunteer and
not a staff, one of the program participants further assured them as, “No, she’s not a staff!
She doesn’t keep an eye on us. She’s good.”
By the time I finished the fieldwork at the Farm, my research focus was once
again reshaped: I became wanting to study the community as a whole much more than
dyadic relationships. Eventually, as such, the research questions that guided data analysis
were formulated as follows:
1.

How do labeled friends see each other?

2.

How do they work and communicate with each other? How do they negotiate and
maintain their friendship community?

3.

How do they validate others and themselves?

toes” (p. 13) under the ignorant staff ’s surveillance.
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4.

How do they resist societal standards that work to invalidate others in the community
or themselves?

5.

And what can the non-disabled others learn from their friendship community in
terms of achieving a more just, inclusive society?
By foregrounding and seeking the relationships between and among people who

are categorized as “intellectually disabled,” I do not mean to endorse categorical
separation of those so labeled or to submit to pessimistic and easy resignation that
building genuinely equal relationships that cross social division of intellectual disability
is impossible (though I do think that it should not be envisioned as easily achievable).
Rather, I value the “situated knowledges” (Haraway, 1988) and “shared perspectives”
(Young, 1997, p. 385) of people who are socially positioned as intellectually disabled. I
believe that the situated knowledges of marginalized people are an invaluable source of
challenging the dominant oppressive structures and of conceptualizing alternatives
precisely because of their lived experiences of being marginalized and invalidated by
current standards. In other words, I believe that the perspectives of devalued “outcasts”
contain crucial knowledge, ideas, and visions for the realization of a different, more just,
inclusive world. As Young (1997) has stated: “acquiring the social knowledge needed to
formulate the best solutions to conflict and collective problems requires learning from the
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social perspectives of people positioned differently in structures of power, resource
allocation, or normative hegemony” (p. 401). Thus, in this dissertation, I focus on the
humanizing relationships between and among people who share and bear the first-hand
experiences of living with the intellectual disability labels, their perspectives that validate
others and themselves, and their strategies toward building and sustaining community
that does not reject idiosyncratic others.
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CHAPTER 1
Literature Review on the Social Construction of Mental Retardation
What is “Intellectual Disability”? The least disturbing (thus most popular) way
to answer this question from the perspective of the majority is by safely referring to the
definitions developed and authorized by various professional organizations and framed as
scientific and objective facts. However, this certainly is not the only way or even the most
authentic way to answer the question. As Pollner and McDonald-Wikler (1985/2001)
stated, the world is a “continuously developed and sustained construction” (p. 393) and
“[t]he maintenance of a collective construct requires work – information must be selected,
edited, and interpreted; anomalies must be explained; heretics from within and critics
from without must be discounted, dissuaded, managed, or avoided” (p. 393). As such, we,
as members of the privileged dominant group without intellectual disability labels, have
worked to develop and to sustain the concept of intellectual disability, which as Kliewer
(1998) maintains, is “a cultural illusion” (p. 18).
Sociological Analysis of Deviance
Though it never formed a mainstream trend of the time, cultural workings
defining “normal/abnormal” and creating “deviance” have long been the subject of
anthropological and sociological analyses. For example, Ruth Benedict (1934), an
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American anthropologist, wrote an article titled, Anthropology and the Abnormal, in
which she questioned the “customary modern normal-abnormal categories” (p. 60) that
had been formulated through the standardizing process of modern civilization according
to Western beliefs and habits. Based on her analysis of various studies on diverse cultures,
such as a study of American Indian tribes where “homosexuals” were regarded as
“leaders in women’s occupations, good healers in certain diseases, or among certain
tribes, as the genial organizers of social affairs” (Benedict, 1934, p. 65) and a study of an
island of northwest Melanesia whose culture was built on traits “which we regard as
beyond the border of paranoia” (p. 65), Benedict argued that “normality is culturally
defined” (p. 72). Moreover, Benedict not only recognized the relativity of normality and
morality in terms of understanding cultural differences (i.e., not judging other cultures by
the standards of our own) but she also discussed individuals who “betrayed [the person’s]
own culture” (p. 74) and therefore were regarded in their particular community as “the
deviants” (p. 74). Similar to the tenets of the later-emerging social model of disability
that resists understanding disability as individual deficits (e.g., Oliver, 1990), Benedict
contended as follows:
The relativity of normality…suggests that the apparent weakness of the aberrant
is most often and in great measure illusory. It springs not from the fact that he is
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lacking in necessary vigor, but that he is an individual upon whom that culture
has put more than the usual strain. (Benedict, 1934, p. 75)
Sociological attempts to understand deviance continued after Benedict and, by
the 1960s, enough analyses had accumulated to develop sociological theories of deviance,
most notably labeling theory. Labeling theorists contended that “deviance is not a
property inherent in certain forms of behavior” (Erikson, 1962, p. 308, cited in Burbach,
1981, p. 365); rather “it is the responses of the conventional and conforming members of
the society who identify and interpret behavior as deviant which sociologically transform
persons into deviants” (Kitsuse, 1962, p. 253). Moreover, “social groups create deviance
by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying these rules to
particular people and labeling them as outsiders” (Becker, 1963, p. 9, cited in Burbach,
1981, p. 365). Carried to its logical conclusion then, even neurological differences among
human beings could not ‘naturally’ equate with ideas of normal and abnormal. The binary
notion of identity requires social construction.
Early Efforts of Critically Analyzing Mental Retardation
Gaining insights and impetus from the attempts to deconstruct the concept of
deviance as well as from the emerging trends to critically analyze “social problems” in
ways that challenge naturalizing explanations and instead highlight social factors working
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to legitimate the inequalities, a critical analysis on the category of “mental retardation”
has also emerged and slowly developed. The works of Lewis Anthony Dexter, a political
scientist who wrote a book titled “The Tyranny of Schooling: An Inquiry Into the Problem
of 'Stupidity'” in 1964, is one example of such early efforts. Using an analogy of an
imaginative society in which graceful movements are so valued that clumsiness is
discriminated as a social defect, much like our modern societies value the concept of
intelligence and “abhor stupidity” (Dexter, 1962, p. 222), Dexter illuminated “the
sociological nature of the problem of retardation” (p. 226). He suggested that efforts be
made to rethink the problems of mental deficiency, paralleling the efforts that clarified
that “the 1929 type of depression is a consequence of systems and institutions, rather than
a necessary product of the nature of man in industrial society” (p. 222). Dexter further
asserted that “the common-sense assumptions about mental deficiency” (p. 227), or what
Josiah Royce had described as “regulative principles of research” (1921, cited in Dexter,
1962, p. 222) need more criticism.
Similarly, Wolfensberger (1969) explained that deviancy was socially
constructed and therefore could be prevented by not attaching negative value to certain
types of differentness, using an example of “medieval Catholicism and the more
contemporary Hutterites [that] did not place excessive value on intellectual achievement,
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and therefore were less likely to view the retardate as a deviant” (p. 67). In his essay, The
Origin and Nature of our Institutional Models, Wolfensberger (1969) further presented an
analysis of societal “role perceptions of the retardate” (p. 68), such as a view to regard a
labeled person as sick, as a subhuman organism, as a menace, as an object of pity, as a
burden of charity, as a holy innocent, and as a developing individual, and discussed how
these role perceptions had shaped societal management of those so labeled, including the
architecture of institutional buildings and operations.
In much the same vein, Dorothea and Benjamin Braginsky (1971) were early
critics of the dominant conception of mental retardation. In their earlier work published in
1969 on inmates of mental hospitals, the researchers closely examined the patient’s
pre-hospital lives, finding that they were “rootless and rejected rather than defective”
(Braginsky & Braginsky, 1971, p. 36) and that “the incarceration is primarily a function
of society’s wish to keep its house in order rather than the result of any defects of the
mind” (p. 35). This earlier study led the researchers to anticipate that “similar social
sanitation problems exist with respect to children” (Braginsky & Braginsky, 1971, p. vi),
thus to find “rootless and rejected, rather than defective, children in institutions for the
retarded” (p. 36). In short, the researchers suspected that:
the diagnosis of cultural-familial (or educable, origin unknown, and so on)
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mental retardation was to the child what the diagnosis of mental illness
(functional psychosis) was to the adult: a myth which conveniently and
effectively serves society, enabling it to misconstrue completely the nature of its
needed reforms. (Braginsky & Braginsky, 1971, p. vi)
In addition, drawing on Sarbin (1967) who critically analyzed a historical process of
“metaphor-to-myth transformation” (p. 448) in regard to the label of “mental illness,”
Braginsky and Braginsky (1971) argued that “[t]he term mental retardation is simply a
metaphor” (p. 15) and that “retardation exists, from our perspective, only to the extent
that certain people persist in calling certain other people retarded” (p. 30). Mercer (1971)
shares this “social system perspective,” defining mental retardation as “an achieved social
status” (p. 191). To illustrate this point, she examined the clinical referral, measuring, and
labeling process, which she believed to be a key mechanism that produced
overrepresentation of persons from lower socioeconomic statuses and/or ethnic minorities
in the mental retardation category (For contemporary discussions on this issue of
overrepresentation, see Losen & Orfield, 2002; Parrish, 2002; Connor & Ferri, 2005;
Ferri & Connor, 2005; and Harry & Klingner, 2006). Mercer (1971) analyzed data from
one school district in California and found that, while at the time of study approximately
81% of students in the district were “Anglo,” the proportion of “Anglo” students among

19

those who received an IQ of 79 or below (and thus were considered eligible for
placement in a special education class) was only 47.4%. The “Anglo” students
represented only 37.9% of those who were recommended by psychologists for special
education placement and only 32.1% of those who were actually placed in the status of
mentally retarded. In contrast, students from ethnic minority groups, such as
Mexican-American and Black students, as well as those with low socioeconomic status
(SES) significantly increased their visibility throughout the referral, measuring, and
labeling process (e.g., Black students, who comprised approximately 8% of the student
population, represented 19.8% of those found eligible for special education placement,
21.2% of those whom psychologists recommended for placement, and 22.6% of those
who got placed in the status of mentally retarded). Along with a different set of analysis,
which revealed “persons from nonmodal sociocultural backgrounds are systematically
handicapped” (Mercer, 1971, p. 202) in the process of being measured by socio-culturally
standardized intelligence tests, Mercer concluded that people “from low socioeconomic
level and ethnic minority groups were more vulnerable to the labeling process” (p. 198),
highlighting the socio-culturally constructed nature of mental retardation category.
Meanwhile, what normalcy is inevitably defines and in fact creates a category of
what it is not. For example, Salvia (1978) astutely pointed out that age appropriateness of
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behavior was not judged by absolute standards, but rather “[o]ne’s behavior is ‘delayed,’
only and obviously, in comparison with the behavior of others” (p. 27). In other words,
there must be always a group of people considered as “delayed” or “abnormal” as a
comparison point in order to establish, sustain, and operationalize the categories of
normal. This is a definitional proposition, Salvia (1978) contended; “just as 50 percent of
the population is always below the median, there is always a bottom 5 percent of the
population” (p. 28). Salvia also maintained that the prevalence of mental retardation is
subject to social manipulation as “it can be increased or decreased simply by redefining
normality” (Salvia, 1978, p. 30).
Burton Blatt, who was a national leader of the deinstitutionalization movement
in the U.S., discussed the arbitrary nature of defining and counting persons with mental
retardation (Blatt, 1987). Noting the definitional changes (from a general agreement in
the field prior to 1959 that about 3% of the general population were mentally retarded
with the cut-off point being 1.5 standard deviations from the mean on a normal curve; to
the 1959 redefinition of the American Association on Mental Deficiency, or AAMD, by
which the cut-off point moved to 1 or more standard deviations, resulting in the
prevalence of mental retardation increasing to 16%; to the 1973 further redefinition by
AAMD to shift the cut-off point to 2 or more standard deviations, dramatically
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decreasing the volume of the mental retardation pool down to about 2%), Blatt expressed
the irony that the committee ‘cured’ thousands of people overnight with a stroke of the
pen (Blatt, 1977/1994, p. 71, cited in Linneman, 2001, p. 188). Based on such analysis,
Blatt (1987) presented a view that mental retardation is essentially “an administrative
category” (p. 79). He continued: “People are mentally retarded because, at this particular
time, society has deemed it necessary to identify them as such and treat them (or not treat
them) because they are so identified. Mental retardation is nothing more and nothing
less” (Blatt, 1987, p. 79).
Category of Exclusion
As Ferguson (1987) pointed out, most of the early reformers and critical
theorists explicitly or implicitly limited their analysis to milder categories of intellectual
disability referred in such terms as “the cultural-familial, educable, unknown-origin
retardates” (Braginsky & Braginsky, 1971, p. 11) or “morons” (Gelb, 1987, p. 254),
creating a new “category of exclusion” (Ferguson, 1987, p. 52). Researchers took for
granted the reality and validity of mental retardation as a concept for individuals deemed
to belong in this excluded category by describing them in naturalizing language, such as
suffering “from a known physiological defect” and “abnormal in the orthodox sense”
(Zigler, 1967, p. 292). Other descriptions that justified the application of mental
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retardation concept included: “organically impaired” (Braginsky & Braginsky, 1971, p.
179); “profoundly and severely brain-damaged or genetically impaired” (Braginsky &
Braginsky, 1971, p. 12); being “literally able to do nothing more than vegetate” (Edgerton,
1967/1993, p. 2); “so delayed in their development – so incompetent – that any person,
professional or lay, would recognize and classify them as abnormal” (Salvia, 1978, p.
42); having “real, severe, cognitive limitations” (Ferguson, 1987, p. 54), or, looking quite
close to “the absence of agency” (Ferguson, 1987, p. 54).
While most researchers simply ignored the members of the excluded category
and remained silent about how their analysis of the concept of mental retardation
excluded “the most extreme cases” (Salvia, 1978, p. 43), Braginsky and Braginsky (1971)
starkly made explicit the scope of their attempts to challenge the traditional concept of
mental retardation. While noting that “[o]ne’s pity for the profoundly retarded is
tempered somehow by the obvious nature of their defects, and one is relieved that
institutions exist which assume this human burden” (Braginsky & Braginsky, 1971, p.
11)), the researchers expressed their confusion and sympathy for the “thousands and
thousands of mildly retarded children living in the same institutions, children who in
many ways so much resemble children on the outside” (p. 11). Braginsky and Braginsky
(1971) then announced: “It is this group of mentally retarded children, the

23

cultural-familial, educable, unknown-origin retardates…, rather than the profoundly and
severely brain-damaged or genetically impaired persons, with whom this book is
concerned” (pp. 11-12).
Ferguson (1987) pointed out that the “category of exclusion” (p. 52) had always
been maintained in disability analysis and social reform movements regarding disability
policy. Ferguson painfully admits that a socio-cultural understanding of disability
unintentionally justifies the continued exclusion of those categorized in a severe range of
intellectual disability, as the theoretical weakness of the social construction perspective
emerges, so he argues, at those examples “where culture seems beside the point; where
physiology has gone so far awry that it threatens to overwhelm the social context” (1987,
p. 54). Borrowing the phrase of the historian E. P. Thompson, Ferguson called this
challenge a “poverty of theory” (Ferguson, 1987, p. 52).
Understanding Intellectual Disability as a Social Construct
Despite the challenge, there remains much theoretical potential in
re-conceptualizing intellectual disability, not as an intrinsic biomedical problem that “we
cannot sociologize” (Chappell, 1998, cited in Goodley, 2001, p. 211), but rather as a
social phenomenon regardless of assumed severity (Biklen, 2005; Blatt, 1987; Bogdan,
1974; Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994; Carey, 2003; Chappell, Goodley, & Lawthom, 2001;
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Goode, 1994; Goodley, 2001; Kliewer, 1998; Linneman, 2001; Taylor, 1996). For
example, Bogdan (1974) proposed that the theory of symbolic interaction, which suggests
that meaning is not intrinsic to objects, experiences, and phenomena but rather conferred
upon them through the process of interaction, interpretation, and defining, offers “a fresh,
comprehensive and challenging, if not revolutionary, approach to the field of mental
retardation” (p. 260) as it clarifies that “mental retardation is not a characteristic of the
individual but a characteristic of the definers” (p. 258). Adopting this theory, Bogdan and
Taylor (1982/1994) put forth a non-exclusive analysis of the concept of mental
retardation as follows:
[W]e believe that the crucial issue in regard to the concept of mental retardation
is not that some people (the poor, minority group members) are falsely labeled,
or that the ‘mildly retarded’ are unfairly grouped with the severely or profoundly
retarded. Rather, we dispute the efficacy and validity of the concept ‘retarded’
for any person, including those with the most profound organic neurological
impairments. (p. 5)
Symbolic interaction theory points to there being multiple truths. That is, those
labeled as intellectual disabled may present “a different view of the concept than those
who have judged them” (Bogdan, 1980, p. 77). Competing views of intellectual disability,
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however, are rarely sought or treated seriously by professionals in the field (Bogdan,
1980). In order to better understand the making and working of the intellectual disability
concept as a social construct, the perspectives of those who so labeled must be sought
out.
Perspectives of Those Who are Labeled Intellectually Disabled
A small collection of literature that either has been written by individuals
classified as mentally retarded themselves, or has documented the orally delivered
accounts of those who live with the label is beginning to develop. For example, Inside
Out: The Social Meaning of Mental Retardation (Bogdan & Taylor,1982) documents the
autobiographical accounts of two “mentally retarded” persons; Raise my eyes to say yes:
A memoir (Sienkiewicz-Mercer,1989) was written by a person labeled “imbecile,” with a
help of her friend and many other professional staff; Know Me As I Am: An anthology of
prose, poetry and art by people with learning difficulties (edited by Atkinson & Williams,
1990) collected various stories of labeled individuals in the U.K.; and seven authors with
a label of autism contributed their own stories in Autism and the Myth of the Person
Alone (edited by Biklen, 2005). Below, I review the perspectives of labeled individuals
concerning the social practice of labeling someone as “intellectually disabled” and
present them in the following five themes: (a) abusive effects of labeling, (b) the issue of
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power differences, (c) invaded personal dignity, (d) resisting/avoiding the intellectual
disability labels, and (e) toward a moral commitment not to label anyone.
Abusive effects of labeling. What is it like to be labeled as “intellectually
disabled”? Murphy, an ex-resident of a state institution and one of two narrators in the
life history research conducted by Bogdan and Taylor (1982/1994), states, “The problem
is getting labeled as being something. After that you’re not really a person” (p. 33). Seen
as a non-human, it follows that a labeled person is justifiably subjected to inhumane
treatment. One of the contributors to an anthology (Atkinson & Williams, 1990) of life
stories of people labeled as having learning difficulties (a U.K. terminology to refer to an
intellectual disability), described such inhumane treatment as being “treated like dirt” (p.
152). Sienkiewicz-Mercer, who had cerebral palsy, could not speak, and was labeled
“imbecile” upon commitment to an institution, also echoed this. In her own book,
Sienkiewicz-Mercer recounted using word boards, how she had been handled “like a sack
of flour” (Sienkiewicz-Mercer & Kaplan, 1989/1996, p. 40) in the institution. Essentially,
the label attached to Sienkiewicz-Mercer had determined how the nurses and attendants
were to treat her, and no matter how hard she tried to use her sounds and facial
expressions to communicate and to correct staff’s evaluation of her, the staff simply
“ignored any and all evidence [she] could present to the contrary” (Sienkiewicz-Mercer
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& Kaplan, 1989/1996, p. 39). Despite her desperate efforts, “any sound or expression I
made to attract attention, or to vent my frustration, was perceived as a nuisance and
nothing more” and “nobody on the staff took the time to talk to me or get to know me” (p.
47). Given the professional diagnosis of “imbecile,” it was simply beyond the belief and
imagination of the institutional staff that Sienkiewicz-Mercer had thoughts and feelings
and a desire to communicate.
Thus, the accounts of the labeled reveal that the authoritative power of a label
works to abuse the rights and humanity of the labeled individual as their rich
communicative intents are interpreted as meaningless, or as confirmatory evidence of
assumptions connoted by the label. Sienkiewicz-Mercer had not yet understood this when
she decided to “go on strike” and refused to eat in order to be kicked out of the institution
and return home. When she saw that the attendants simply opened her mouth and forced
the food down her throat, she realized that such “problem behaviors” were “what they
expected from me” and merely “reinforced the image that Dr. Soong’s evaluation had
established” (Sienkiewicz-Mercer & Kaplan, 1989/1996, p. 42). Murphy, the informant in
the life history research of Bogdan and Taylor (1982/1994), must have figured this out
too from his experiences. He advised others that you “can’t give in to that mental
retardation image. You strive to be extra careful. You struggle to be not what the image of
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the retarded is. You can’t look the way they say you are if they call you retarded”
(Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 91).
The issue of power differences. Murphy also spoke of the issue of power, or
lack of it, in relation to being labeled and institutionalized as something like a permanent
spell he could never break: “One thing that’s hard is that once you’re in it, you can’t
convince them how smart you are. And you’re so weak you can’t convince them how
smart you are. And you’re so weak you can’t really fight back” (Bogdan & Taylor,
1982/1994, pp. 29-30). Rubin, a self-advocate with a label of autism who types to
communicate, agrees with Murphy and expresses the desperately heavy weight of the
label imposed on her as follows: “Being looked upon as feebleminded is something I
have been forced to endure my entire life. What an extremely difficult hole to have to
climb out of, to fight for your own intelligence and capabilities” (Rubin, 2005, p. 107).
Sienkiewicz-Mercer, too, soon became aware of the power that institutional staff had over
her. She wrote, “As long as these people considered my brain useless and my facial
expressions and sounds meaningless, I was doomed to remain ‘voiceless’”
(Sienkiewicz-Mercer & Kaplan, 1989/1996, p. 42).
Such power differences between “the judged” and “the judges” (Bogdan &
Taylor, 1976) did not disappear in a less-controlling environment that explicitly aimed to
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build a reciprocal community between people with and without a disability label. Felt
(2000) who wrote about her life in L’Arche reflected on her relationships with
non-labeled house assistants and critiqued the power differences that existed between her
and them, particularly in relation to the structure of decision making, which often
excluded labeled house residents. Felt expressed: “What I like is to make decisions and
figure out house rules either on my own or together with people, but not with them doing
it for me. (p. 222)
Felt (2000) also highlighted the complexities involving developing friendships
with the non-labeled assistants by reflecting on the moments when they acted on the
power differences and behaved toward her in a way that deviated from her general
expectations of behaviors based on friendship. Felt expressed her confusion caused by an
ambiguity over the boundary and the power line that seemed to be conveniently removed
and then restored at the will of the non-labeled assistants as follows:
One thing that’s hard is having assistants who act like friends sometimes and
staff other times…. It’s confusing. In my mind, I’m thinking they are my friends,
then all of a sudden they go and do something where I’m not sure. (Felt, 2000, p.
223)
Felt continues, “All in all, I do know that there are some assistants who are my friends.
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They may say or do things I don’t like sometimes, but I do know they’re my friends”
(Felt, 2000, p. 223). Felt does not deny the possibility of building genuine friendships
beyond the label, nor does she mean that it is a matter of agreeing with her all the time.
The embodiment of power differences can be subtle and nuanced yet often has real
consequences that “the judged” could not afford to ignore. Once the society sorts its
members into two kinds and a wide array of social operations rely on the label, the
created boundary could not be erased simply by trying to make friendly faces or to act
radical. Murphy, the informant in the life history research (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994),
also attested to the die-hard, staining consequences of labeling on relationships as
follows:
You get the feeling that they love you but that they are looking down at you. You
always have that sense of a barrier between you and the ones that love you. By
their own admission of protecting you, you have an umbrella over you that tells
you that you and they have an understanding that there is something wrong –
that there is a barrier. (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 86)
We may gain a hint at achieving the difficult ideal of developing equal relationships
beyond the boundary of intellectual disability labels from the following comment made
by a young man with Down syndrome named Mitchell Levitz on his friendship with
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Jason Kingsley who shares the experience of living with Down syndrome: “to me the
very important thing about our friendship that makes it special is how we help each other
out. The way we listen to each other [emphasis added]” (Kingsley & Levitz, 1994, p. 33).
Invaded personal dignity. Kennedy (1994), an ex-resident of a state institution
for the “mentally retarded,” published an article, The Disability Blanket, in which he
analyzed based on his own experiences what happens when a person gets labeled and
thrown under “the disability blanket” (p. 75). Kennedy particularly highlighted three
consequences of being designated as a disability service recipient, the first of which was
that “your privacy is invaded” (p. 75). Kennedy described how there were monthly team
meetings while he resided in an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded
(ICF/MR) where staff and professionals discussed his progress or failure on goals that
had been set with only limited or no inputs from him. When asked why he was not
properly working on the goals, Kennedy responded that “the goals were degrading, for
example, having to tell them every time I went to the bathroom and what I did there”
(Kennedy, 1994, p. 75). Kennedy continued:
Don’t get me wrong, I set personal goals for myself, and I think this is a good
thing to do. But the goals I have are in my head and my heart, not on paper
where everyone can see them. (p. 75)
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An invasion of privacy was also evident in Murphy’s life story: Murphy was
furious and disgusted when he saw that a social worker “zips in and zips out” of the
house next to his, calling the house residents “boys,” and brings community people and
professionals to the house and gives them a tour without even a hint of awareness that she
was invading the residents’ privacy and dignity. Capturing the nature of the social
worker’s disrespectful attitude, which swept away the individual humanity of the labeled
residents, Murphy depicted her demeanor and rebuked it as “It’s bad enough when they
own you, that they own your ass and mind. They own body and soul” (Bogdan & Taylor,
1982/1994, p. 78).
The sense of being owned by someone else rather than being trusted and
respected as an owner of one’s own life damages trusting relationships with others. Felt,
who wrote about her life in the L’arche community, expressed her anger as follows:
I didn’t feel some of them trusted me. The family talked for you; it wasn’t you
talking for yourself. They made lots of decisions for me without asking. The
biggest one was sending me to the institution. Also, in the institution I was in, I
only trusted a very few people. It’s hard to trust people who act like they don’t
trust you. (Felt, 2000, p. 223)
At the same time, being labeled and institutionalized damages the sense of
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self-confidence as well. Murphy said, “The whole idea of having been in a state school
makes you nervous about why you were ever put there in the first place” (Bogdan, 1980,
p. 78). Once a person is burdened by the label of intellectual disability, the struggle for
the labeled person is “to realize that she or he is a human being” (Bogdan & Taylor,
1982/1994, p. 57). Indeed, as Murphy asserted, labeling and institutionalization would
“take the human character – you’ve heard of raping a girl – they rape the character”
(Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 89).
Resisting/avoiding the intellectual disability labels. Mukhopadhyay, a person
with a label of autism living in India who types to communicate and who contributed a
chapter in Biklen’s (2005) edited book, rebuffed the label of mental retardation as “the
most disgraceful label” (Mukhopadhyay & Biklen, 2005, p. 136). Similarly, Burt, the
other of the two informants in the life history research done by Bogdan and Taylor,
disclosed that “the worst word that I hate to be called is retarded. That’s because I am not
retarded” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 200). Thus, not surprisingly, resentment
against the label (“I am not retarded”) and against the condemnation of abnormality (“I
am normal”) is prevalent and repeatedly heard in the accounts of labeled individuals (e.g.,
Atkinson & Williams, 1990; Attfield, 2005; Heshusius, 1981; Kingsley & Levitz, 1994;
Worth, 1988).
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Edgerton (1967/1993) interpreted such negation of the mental retardation label
observed in his study of ex-state school residents as an attempt to pass as normal and to
deny the reality. He stated as follows:
And so, again and again, the process of denial continues by employing this
excuse. By attributing their relative incompetence to the depriving experience of
institutionalization, and by insisting that the institutionalization itself was
unjustified, the ex-patients have available an excuse that can and does sustain
self-esteem in the face of constant challenge. (p. 153)
To this, Bogdan (1980) argued that Edgerton’s interpretation stemmed from a clinical
perspective, which assumed that the real reason why the ex-patients had been
institutionalized was “because they were ‘mentally retarded’” (Bogdan, 1980, p. 75) and
which treated the ex-residents’ explanations on their unjust institutionalization as “lies, as
fabrications” (Bogdan, 1980, p. 76). Treating the concept of mental retardation as “an
administrative category, a metaphor rather than a tangible phenomenon” (Bogdan, 1980,
p. 75) and treating the labeled informants who participated in interview research
conducted by Bogdan and his colleague, Taylor, as “experts on what it is like to be
labeled retarded” (Bogdan, 1980, p. 75), the researchers presented a different
interpretation of the declaration, “I am not retarded” as follows:
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Ed and Pat are saying something more profound, more sophisticated, than can be
revealed by treating their viewpoint merely as a defense mechanism. What they
are denying is not just they are retarded, their claim is not just for them, or not
just based on misdiagnosis – rather it is grounded in an analysis that the system
used to classify people as retarded or normal is misleading. (Bogdan, 1980, p.
77)
Toward a moral commitment not to label anyone. Ed Murphy sharply
criticized the practice of judging and assigning people a label by observing
verbal/nonverbal outward behaviors and performance on intelligence tests because “you
can never really tell what is inside the person” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 91).
Recalling one of his institutional friends, P. J. Tommy, who “was locked into what the
other people thought he was” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 91), Murphy described
him as follows:
I’ve watched that guy and I can see in his eyes that he was aware. He knows
what’s going on. He can only crawl and he doesn’t talk, but you don’t know
what’s inside. When I was with him and I touched him, I know that he knows.
(Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 91)
Murphy’s humble, insider truth “generated in a different place in the service delivery
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system” (Bogdan 1980, p. 77) echoes with Donnelan’s “criterion of the least dangerous
assumption” (Donnelan, 1984, p. 142), which asserts that educational decisions should be
based on assumptions that will make the least dangerous effects on students in case the
assumption was incorrect, as well as with a principle of Presuming Competence, which
was coined and theorized later by Biklen (Biklen & Cardinal, 1997; Biklen, 2005).
Murphy argued:
We have to assume that the mind is working no matter what it looks like on the
outside. We can’t just judge by appearance. The people can’t see what it is like
inside…. If you take away the label they are human beings. (Bogdan & Taylor,
1982/1994, p. 56)
As Worth, a Canadian self-advocate, once declared, “It is demoralizing to see someone as
a label instead of [as] somebody. I am somebody. My name is Patrick Worth. I am not
retarded. I don’t think anyone is. I think labels are unnecessary” (Worth, 1988, p. 48,
cited in Biklen & Duchan, 1994, p. 174), and as Murphy advocated to presume
competence for everyone, the insightful knowledge of those who know firsthand what it
is like to be labeled intellectually disabled seems to be condensed as a moral commitment
not to label anyone. We find one of the clearest declarations against labeling in the
account of Ruth Sienkiewicz-Mercer. She wrote:
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When you’ve spent as much time as I have with people who have been totally
rejected by society, when you have been written off by nearly everyone around
you, it becomes very difficult to draw the line at which life is no longer
worthwhile. I choose not to draw that line at all [emphasis added].
(Sienkiewicz-Mercer & Kaplan, 1989, p. 92)
Impairment as a Social Construct
Targeting the deconstruction of disability as a form of social oppression, the
social model of disability does not deal with “the personal restriction of impairment”
(Oliver, 1996, p. 38). While defining disability as a social phenomenon, it distinguishes
and defines impairment as “lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb,
organ or mechanism of the body” (Oliver, 1996, p. 22). Though the model treats
impairment as if it is simply an objective, de-politicized fact of biology, the term
impairment “is not a neutral” (Davis, 2002, p. 23) one, deeply rooted in “medicalised
discourses” (Goodley, 2001, p. 208) of normal/abnormal. Such a naturalizing way of
talking about impairment hinders our ability to understand the phenomenon of certain
disabilities, such as what we call intellectual disability, as a social construct and makes it
seem as if it is inevitable that a personal tragedy perspective must be accepted for those
cases. Simone Aspis, a self advocate of London People First, testified to this as follows:
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People with ‘learning difficulties’ face discrimination in the disability movement.
People without ‘learning difficulties’ use the medical model when dealing with
us. We are always asked to talk about advocacy and our impairments as though
our barriers aren’t disabling in the same way as disabled people without
‘learning difficulties’. (cited in Goodley, 2001, p. 210, emphasis is Goodley’s)
In critiquing the limitations of the British social model of disability, Shakespeare and
Watson (2001) exemplify the view of intellectual disability that Aspis resented in the
above quote as follows:
It is impossible to remove all the obstacles to people with impairment, because
some of them are inextricable aspects of impairment, not generated by the
environment. If someone has an impairment which causes constant pain, how
can the social environment be implicated? If someone has a significant
intellectual limitation, how can society be altered to make this irrelevant to
employment opportunities, for example? (pp. 18-19)
Goodley (2001) agrees Koegel (1986) that “[h]owever much we pay lip service to the
influence of socio-cultural factors, we do primarily see mental retardation as a biomedical
phenomenon and do, as a result, tend to attribute incompetent behavior exclusively to
physiological causes” (cited in Goodley, 2001, p. 211). Goodley (2001) further highlights
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“a worrying omission” (p. 209) of intellectual disability in the emerging arguments to
“re-socialise impairment” (p. 208) by abandoning it as “the category of naturalized,
irrational ‘other’” (p. 211) that is “devoid of meaning and history, presocial, inert and
physical” (p. 211). If we believe that intellectual disability marks “the biological we
cannot sociologise” (Goodley, 2001, p. 211), Goodley (2001) questions, “this raises real
concerns about the starting points of disability theory (and its impact upon politics and
policy)” (p. 211).
To say that impairment is socially constructed is not to deny the experiential
realities of living with physiological differences. For example, Robert Bogdan (1974),
who argued for an application of symbolic interaction theory to the concept of mental
retardation, clarified that symbolic interaction perspective “does not deny the fact that
there are some demonstrable differences in the physiology of some individuals placed in
the category of mental retardation” (pp. 258-259). When symbolic interaction theory
argues that intellectually disability is a creation of society, it suggests examining “the
meaning these differences come to have in specific settings” (Bogdan, 1974, p. 259) as
well as the defining process.
As such, the cultural nature and significance of bodily differences depend on
“how we view and interpret them” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1996, p. 7). In his excellent
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analysis of cultural meanings of Down syndrome, Kliewer (1998) called physiological
differences that have been demarcated as impairments and associated with “the idea of
defect” (p. 10) as “differences that matter” (p. 3). For example, in relation to the bodily
differences often experienced by children with Down syndrome, Kliewer (1998)
particularly highlighted what he called “the dilemma of movement” (p. 64) and “the
dilemma of speech” (p. 68). Kliewer argued that both controlled motion and ability to
speak “are important performance modalities when one wants to be taken seriously as a
student and as a useful human being” (p. 67). When conforming to these standards of
movement and of speech are difficult, Kliewer continued, “children are often interpreted
as incompetent, and generally this incompetence is inferred to be due to a low level of
intellect” (p. 67). Individuals with a label of autism often express similar dilemmas where
their performative differences culturally matter and get interpreted as evidence of
intellectual deficits. Tito Mukhopadhyay, for example, wrote, “You know that your
intelligence or stupidity would be measured by that performance of yours. You tend to get
very clumsy…. The person says, ‘Come on, I am waiting,’ which means ‘You are a stupid
person’” (Mukhopadhyay & Biklen, 2005, p. 122).
Under the naturalizing perspective of impairment, pathologizing interpretations
abound: For example, there was a pediatrician who examined a child deemed to have
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impairments, observed physical symptoms of sexual abuse (e.g., vaginal injuries, anal
scars, and a sexually-transmitted disease), and yet concluded that those symptoms “could
be due to an obscure syndrome” (Goodley, 2001, p. 213). Kliewer (1998) similarly
described a scene where an assistant teacher of an inclusive classroom instinctly
interpreted the behavior of Lee Larson, a second-grader with Down syndrome, as ineptly
trying to eat glue, although the unrecognized whole story would have revealed that Lee in
fact was diligently working on the assignment and trying to manage his movement
difficulties. As Goodley (2001) cautioned, “We are allowed to view behaviour, at
convenient and conventional times, as an indicator of embodied impairment, precisely
because the residue of thinking associated with impairment-as-natural remains” (p. 214).
Uncritically accepting the concept of impairment as natural and neutral reinforces a
personal tragedy perspective, exemplified in such comments as: “There is something
profoundly unfortunate about severe cognitive limitations” (Ferguson, 1987, p. 54).
In the midst of such a dominant view, labeled individuals have felt it dangerous
to talk about their realities of living with impairments, or bodily differences, especially
the difficult and distressing aspects of their lives. For example, Jenny Morris (2001), a
disabled feminist in Britain, wrote:
Indeed, I worry myself that if we do start talking about the negative aspects of
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living with impairment and illness, non-disabled people will turn around and say,
“there you are then, we always knew that your lives weren’t worth living.” (p.
10)
Similarly, Liz Crow (1996) succinctly expressed this pressure as, “Impairment is safer not
mentioned at all” (p. 209). Resisting silence and defying the medicalized interpretation of
the accounts of people labeled autistic, who have been known to “complain about an
unruly body that will not always comply with intention” (Biklen, 2005, p. 66), Biklen
(2005) cautioned himself and others not to “enter this discussion through the framework
of pathology” (p. 66). Similarly, Shinohara (1980), a Japanese psychologist who has long
been a keen critic against educational policy of segregating labeled children, tried to
listen to the words of a wheelchair-using woman with a self-critical attitude.
Commemorating her 26th birthday, Emiko Iwadate, a woman living with cerebral palsy,
wrote a poem part of which reads (in English translation) as follows:
I will soon be twenty six.
But I have never walked.
At least once, I dream, before I die.
Of walking on my own feet.
I would have had a wonderfully romantic life.
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If I had not had such a body.
I am tired of living in a wheelchair.
And what is more, I am tired of living in an institution. (Iwadate, 1978, cited
in Shinohara, 1980, pp. 169-170)
Faced with her aching desire to be able to walk, Shinohara (1980) strictly refrained from
interpreting her words through the dominant and oppressive perspective of “It is better to
be able to walk than not.” Shinohara then read in her words a story of social oppression
than of a personal tragedy: “We must rather recognize in her words that her yearning to
walk becomes more and more inflamed not only by the reality of having the non-walking
body but also by being subjected to the oppressive treatments of institutionalization
because of it” (p. 172).
Liz Crow (1996), a disabled artist and activist in the UK, affirmed that
impairments (or I would reframe as bodily differences as the term “impairment” connotes
“damage”) carry “no intrinsic meaning” (Crow, 1996, p. 211) and thus are not
categorically and inevitably undesirable, highlighting the importance of autobiographical
narratives of those living with differences and of paying attention to the specific nature of
individuals’ experiences. Biklen and Kliewer (2006) also argued that “such accounts
suggest how these differences can be negotiated in social and cultural contexts and how
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others can make performance easier” (p. 183). That is, the meanings of impairments, or
bodily differences, as well as of “suffering” get constructed and shaped in relational
contexts. For example, Frugone (2005), a person labeled autistic in Italy who became
able to communicate via typing, insightfully and effusively wrote how the meanings of
his life with autism changed in communicative relationships with friends as follows:
Communication freed me from the pain of compressing the human dimension
into empty silences. Examples of what life should be came to me from real
relations with my classmates…. Less today I would modify myself. I am no
longer so maniacal with the obstacles of my disabilities. I show an objective,
modified property of answer to the depressive states known. By this I mean that
I can fight depression when I confront myself with my peers. (Frugone, 2005, p.
196)
Frugone’s testimony resonates with Naoki Higashida, a Japanese young man
with a label of autism who also types to communicate. In his book, Higashida (2007)
responded to questions posed from the perspectives of non-autistic readers, one of which
was “Do you want to be cured of autism and become normal?” In response to this
question, Higashida shared an analysis based on his own experiences: That is, what was
needed to be liberated from the agony of living with the differences socially considered
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as “deviant” is not to be cured of autism, but to be in relationships where he could feel
accepted for who he is. Resonating with Frugone’s account, Higashida (2007) concluded:
“To me, it’s not that important any more whether I am ‘normal’ or ‘autistic’ as long as I
can be who I am” (p. 63).
The accounts of Frugone and Higashida testify that even the experience of
killing pain – emotionally or physically – can be turned from unmanageable to
manageable if its meaning is negotiated in an accepting relational context, thus rejecting
the naturalizing view to define pain as a personal and immutable misfortune. Heshusius, a
long time disability studies scholar who survived a near-fatal car accident and since then
has been living with severe and chronic pain for more than a decade, also described how
being in a relational space where she could feel that she did not have to hide her pain and
that “I am not a stain” (Heshusius, 2009, p. 115) allowed her “to let me hear my own
deepest thoughts, fears, and longings, which in turn adjusts my perception of the
parameters of my present life” (Heshusius, 2009, p. 115). It was a time spent with one of
her “paid friends” (Heshusius, 2009, p. 113), a psychotherapist named Dr. Grady who
embodied a kind of empathy that Heshusius explained as requiring “a deliberate ethical
stance that desires to imagine the other’s pain, to listen, to be present” (Heshusius, 2009,
p. 128). Heshusius (2009) described with wonder how it was “miraculously freeing to be
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with a professional who really wants to understand – my devastating experience is
worthy of being understood” (p. 114).
Kingsley, a man labeled as Down syndrome, also has spoken of “suffering” in
relation to living as a person with a disability, stating “How I want [disability] to get
away” (Kingsley & Levitz, 1994, p. 39). He explained further:
When kids are busy and teachers are marking grades, I’m alone with no other
people to help. I’d like to have more friends – to share and get together with and
have fun and even to help me study more. I want this disability have to go away.
I want to be just like everybody else. (Kingsley & Levitz, 1994, p. 40)
Similar to the poem written by Iwadate (who dreamed of being able to walk on her feet),
Kingsley’s accounts reveal his critical analysis of his “suffering,” ultimately
understanding it not as an inevitable consequence of his biological makeup but more as
the consequence of a societal institution called school where standardizing principles of
competition, efficiency, and productivity dominate and the “differences that matter”
(Kliewer, 1998) get penalized as burdensome deficiencies. Moreover, Kingsley further
proposed a solution: “The only way to make the disability go away is to have people treat
me differently” (Kingsley & Levitz, 1994, p. 39). In other words, in order to “cure” his
disability, nondisabled others must change, perhaps by developing a deep realization that
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“we are all impaired” (Shakespeare & Watson, 2001, p. 24) and that the bodily
differences called impairments are part of the “inherent nature of humanity” (Shakespeare
& Watson, 2001, p. 24). With this realization, a challenge posed by Morris (2001) of
creating space “for recognizing the negative aspects of impairment without undermining
the values of our lives” (p. 10) would be overcome.
Contextual Understanding of Competence
Another critical element in understanding the concept of intellectual disability as
a social construct is contextual and relational understanding of such concepts as
competence, incompetence, humanness, and mindedness. For example, Goode (1992)
reported a clinical portrayal of a 50-year-old man with Down syndrome named Bobby
who was placed in a small-scale institution: It described him as “a mental age of
approximately 2.8 years,” “severely mentally retarded with severe brain damage,”
“difficult to communicate with,” and best to maintain “in a protected environment as he
can never function independently” (Goode, 1992, p. 200). Meanwhile, Bobby’s friends at
the institution presented a different view of him, reporting that, as far as they were
concerned, Bobby “had no communication problems and ‘talked fine’” (Goode, 1992, p.
205). Similarly, Bianca, who had been born with rubella syndrome and was deaf and
blind, could clinically be described as “a very low functioning, multihandicapped,
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alingual, and nonambulatory child with poor cognitive, social, and medical prospects”
(Goode, 1994, p. 53). Bianca could even look to the average person on the street as “a
pitiable, hopeless, monstrous child to be feared or resented” (Goode, 1994, p. 53).
However, her family saw Bianca very differently: They regarded their daughter as
knowledgeable and competent. Bianca’s parents proudly explained to Goode, a researcher,
how Bianca was knowledgeable of family routines and how she would monitor whether
they were appropriately carried out – for example, during the bedtime routine, Bianca
would monitor whether the right numbers of blankets were put on, whether the bed rail
was up, and whether her leg braces were stood in the corner of her room. The parents also
advised Goode that Bianca “could teach routines ‘if you let her’” (Goode, 1994, p. 68).
Bogdan and Taylor (1982/1994) told a somewhat similar story that highlighted a
contextual/relational nature of competence/incompetence: Six residents of a large state
institution, who had been defined by institutional staff and professionals as the “worst
cases,” the “most violent,” the “most aggressive,” and the “hardest to manage” (p. 223),
were transferred to an experimental living arrangement, which was a house with support
staff that “emphasized their humanness” and where the residents “were called by their
real names, not by their diagnosis” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 224). After 3
months in the new respectful environment, the researchers witnessed that the residents
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“had changed dramatically” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, p. 224) and were well
involved in activities and day-to-day operation of the house and responding to the
positive expectations of them. Bogdan and Taylor (1982/1994) contended that those
individuals were different not because they had been trained or cured but because “they
had been placed in an environment that expected change, that didn’t define their
problems as ‘retardation’ or any innate condition, but rather defined them as people who
could live and grow” (p. 224).
Melvin, too, dramatically changed after he was adopted by Mary Lou Accetta,
his foster mother, and moved out of an institution in which he had been placed at the age
of 5 for 2 1/2 years (Biklen, 1992). Mary Lou was not the first foster family to take
Melvin: Five different foster homes had been tried before Mary Lou and each of them
sent Melvin back to the institution, complaining of his problem behaviors such as
climbing on the roof in the early morning or putting his hand over a flamed stove (which
was one of the ways he was believed to have been abused by his birth parents). Therefore,
it was probably out of kindness when an administrator of Melvin’s institution
coincidentally saw the mother and the son at a church service 4 months after they had
started living together and warned Mary Lou, “He’s not going to make it….and I just
want you to know it’s all right to send him back” (Biklen, 1992, p. 22). Though Melvin
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had been labeled “severely retarded, severely behavior-disordered, hyperactive, and
epileptic” (Biklen, 1992, p. 24), Mary Lou saw in Melvin competence and promise as she
said, “I always had the sense that there was a bright little kid under there” (Biklen, 1992,
p. 24). As such, Mary Lou was “bewildered as much as furious that other people couldn’t
or wouldn’t see what she saw in Melvin (Biklen, 1992, p. 22).
What she saw was Melvin’s tremendous growth, including but not limited to
learning 200 signs in 3 months, and his need for assurance: “guarantees that he wouldn’t
be returned to the institution, evidence that there was enough food in the house, proof that
he was loved” (Biklen, 1992, p. 23). By attempting to ask such questions as “What is his
world like? How has life treated him? What do people expect of him and how do they
show it? How does she herself behave toward Melvin?” (Biklen, 1992, p. 27), Mary Lou
gradually became able to understand the stories or reasons behind what seemed like
absurd behaviors, such as hoarding food under his mattress and pillow, sleeping under his
bed, running away from school, and becoming furious at the sight of a can of pudding,
which were all related to his experiences of having to survive in an institutional
environment. One day at school, when everyone in Melvin’s class but him was working
on a test, Melvin became upset and started to run around the room, throwing things.
Melvin finally calmed down when his teacher secured a pre-reading level test and
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included him in the activity. Melvin quietly worked on the test, all the time saying to
himself, “same as the kids, same as the kids” (Biklen, 1992, p. 27).
As Biklen (1992) noted, “It’s not as if Melvin suddenly became a different
person. He is the same person, but his life circumstances have changed” (p. 24). All of the
stories – Bobby’s, Bianca’s, that of the six ex-residents of an institution, and Melvin’s –
attest to the fact that contexts matter to an interpretation and a realization of anyone’s
competence, or incompetence for that matter, as opposed to in/competence being an
individual attribute (Biklen, 1992, 2005; Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994; Booth & Booth,
1998; Goode, 1992, 1994; Hayman, 1998; Kliewer, 1998; Linneman, 2001; Steeves,
2006).
Toward a Sociology of Acceptance
Researchers who take the stance to regard in/competence not as biological but as
contextual have sought to identify contexts in which a realization of others’ competence
is promoted, the label of mental retardation is made to be meaningless, and the labeled
person’s humanness is validated. For example, Bogdan and Taylor argued that “we need a
sociology of acceptance” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1987, p. 35) in order to understand how
accepting relationships can be built, in which someone’s demonstrable differences do not
get stigmatized (Bogdan & Taylor, 1987; Taylor & Bogdan, 1989) and rather the beliefs
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in the humanness of the labeled individuals are sustained (Bogdan & Taylor, 1989).
Bogdan and Taylor identified four dimensions in the accepting relationships that could
positively construct labeled individuals’ humanness, or could effectively conduct what
Linneman (2001) called “people-making business” (p. 3), as follows: “(1) attributing
thinking to the other, (2) seeing individuality in the other, (3) viewing the other as
reciprocating, and (4) defining social place for the other” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1989, p.
138).
Kliewer (1998) adopted Bogdan and Taylor’s (1989) above framework to
identify the critical elements in “establishing a recognition of citizenship for students
with Down syndrome in schools” (p. 79) and presented a number of important ideas, such
as “broadening the definition of valued intellect” (p. 80), “believing in a child’s mind” (p.
83), replacing the categorizing attitude with a respectful emphasis on the child’s
individuality and personality that is “hidden under the cloak of incompetence” (p. 85),
rejecting the image of community burden attached to Down syndrome and instead living
by the principle of “human reciprocity” (p. 4), and regarding the “community as a point
of origin” (p. 89) as opposed to making inclusion conditional upon the child’s successful
demonstration of socially defined criteria such as certain IQ scores. To Kliewer, a
democratic community is where “our humanness (or our construed lack thereof)
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emerges” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 5) and is “a web of dynamic, constantly shifting
relationships that encompass the individual with Down syndrome and all other human
beings” (p. 95). He urged: “To eliminate a single person through any form of banishment,
no matter how benevolent the logic, reduces the web and makes the community a less
democratic and less rich place” (pp. 95-96). Kliewer’s vision of democratic community
resonates with the image of co-vivial community, defined by a Japanese philosopher as to
live with others who are different by embracing “relationships in which differences do
not generate discrimination” (Hanasaki, 2007, p. 187). The term was coined to represent a
Japanese word Kyosei by Hanasaki, an important figure in Japanese anti-discrimination
and emancipatory movements.
Steeves (2006), a mother of Matthew who “was born with multiple disabilities”
(p. 105), called such community that Kliewer and Hanasaki advocate for as dialogue
“enacted through imaginative play and improvisation, shaping relational spaces from
which to compose lives” (p. 106). Matthew sought to engage others at his school in such
dialogue through “playful and improvisatory ways to participate, communicate, and
contribute to the world” (p. 107) by bringing his toy cat, Tony. Recognizing this, Steeves
defended Matthew for bringing Tony to school when Matthew’s teachers raised the “issue
of the stuffed cat” as an age-inappropriate behavior for an 11-year-old: “Tony was funny
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and could do things that would make other people laugh, and then Matthew could join in,
too. Matthew wanted more than anything to belong, to have a place. Tony helped him to
do that” (Steeves, 2006, p. 109). Winning the survival of Tony, Matthew, too, survived
the school. Steeves (2006) urges schools to become such environment that promotes
“relational spaces to facilitate the storytelling and dialogue” (p. 107) and the “structures
of participation… that enable expression of [the labeled children’s] embodied personal
practical knowledge” (p. 113).
Linneman (2001), who maintained a focus on “the question of mindedness” (p.
4) in relation to the social and scientific pronouncement of mental retardation, articulated
that “mindedness to a large extent depends on others granting that accession” (p. 228).
That is, we, as a part of others’ “interpretive community” (p. 241), are confronted with, in
Gubrium’s words who studied the construction of mindedness of Alzheimer’s patients,
the “common responsibility” (p. 230) to “recover, discover, preserve, interpret, and, in
effect, realize the mind” (p. 65) of others, particularly those for whom speech is
inaccessible. Similarly, Goode also spoke of “consciousness-granting interpretation”
(Goode, 1994, p. 104) based on his own experiences of working and communicating with
Christina, a 9-year-old girl with deaf-blindness, as well as on observing how the families
of deaf-blind children communicated with their non-speaking child utilizing bodily
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knowledge and expressivity. Goode concluded that his work validated the idea “that
competence – indeed the whole identity of a deaf-blind child – had to do with the social
context in which the child was experienced as well as the role and background of the
person describing or assessing the child” (Goode, 1992, p. 198). Borrowing
anthropological concepts, Goode distinguished clinical approaches to understanding
others and a first-person point of view by the terms “etic” and “emic” perspectives. While
the etic perspective, which is objective, analytic, and clinical, is oriented toward finding
faults in comparison to a set of normative standards, the emic perspective, which attempts
to see the world through the subjective, insider point of view, permits the observers “to
gain a better sense of the rationality, purpose, and efficiency” (Goode, 1992, p. 198) of
others’ behaviors that might look irrational, purposeless, and inefficient to outside
observers.
Just as Linneman could discover “little people who had a name, a mother and a
father, sisters, brothers, uncles and aunts, a face, a voice, a dream, and a story”
(Linneman, 2001, p. 230) out of labeled children about whom he wrote by taking their
mindedness for granted, Biklen advocated that we begin with an attitude of presuming
competence upon meeting others with a label that defines the person as incompetent, look
for it through the emic perspective and if a person’s competence is not yet revealed in an
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expected way, we should “turn inward and ask, ‘What other approach can I try?’” (Biklen,
2005, p. 73). Blatt, whose educability hypothesis that presumes “all people are educable”
(Blatt, 1987, p. 7) strongly influenced Biklen’s idea of presumption of competence, also
put forth that the work of those involved with teaching children with a label of
intellectual disability is “not to judge who can or cannot change, but rather to fulfill the
hope that all people can change; each person can learn” (Blatt, 1977, p. 6). All of these
pioneers highlight the shared responsibilities to nurture humanizing and validating
contexts.
Friendships as a Humanizing Context
As Richardson and Ritchie (1990) noted about friendship in relation to the people
labeled intellectually disabled as “the engagement that friendship brings confirms and
strengthens people’s sense of feeling valued and valuable” (p. 93, cited in Chappell, 1994,
p. 421), friendship is one of the critical elements to nurture humanizing and validating
context. Given the growing trend of normalization and community integration in the field
of intellectual disability, most scholarly efforts on the issue of friendship have been
directed toward relationships between people with the intellectual disability labels and
people without a disability identification, many of which reported limited social networks
and the sense of loneliness experienced by people labeled intellectually disabled (Bigby,
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2008; Chappell, 1994; Knox & Hickson, 2001; Matheson, Olsen & Weisner, 2007;
McVilly, Stancliffe, Parmenter, & Burton-Smith, 2006). Furthermore, adopting a deficit
oriented perspective dominant in the field of intellectual disability, researchers tend to
regard difficulties with developing and maintaining friendships experienced by those with
the intellectual disability labels as primarily caused by their insufficient and immature
social skills, and thus to argue for the importance of a social skill development program.
For example, even in a study that claimed to “consider the concepts and experiences of
friendship from the points of view of the teens [with a label of developmental disabilities]
themselves” (Matheson et al., 2007, p. 319), the researchers’ clinical view framed the
findings as follows:
In fact, such friendships [based on companionship, similarity, and
stability/proximity] are considered in the developmental literature to be less
“mature” than friendships characterized by reciprocity, loyalty, support,
disclosure, and conflict management (Siperstein, Leffert, & Wenz-Gross, 1997).
Doing things together and liking one another are normatively developmentally
early expectations of friendship; our teens continued to use these features to
define friendship. (Matheson et al., 2007, p. 327)
Some other researchers however highlighted environmental, institutional, and
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political barriers for labeled individuals to develop and sustain friendships, such as a lack
of transportation, lack of privacy, lack of resources, and lack of autonomy (Chappell,
1994; Knox & Hickson, 2001; McVilly et al., 2006). For example, based on her
ethnographic investigation into the lives and experiences of people labeled intellectually
disabled who lived in three private residential homes in England, Chappell (1994)
revealed various factors in the informants’ living environments that inhibited their social
relationships, one of which was the organization of staffing. Chappell reported that one of
the three observed homes had only one live-in staff and because she had to prepare her
husband’s meal she tended to arrange residents’ baths early in the evening so her duty to
help the residents take baths did not conflict with her meal-making activity for her own
family. For the residents, this practice meant that they were in their nightwear from about
7 o’clock, which restricted the possibility of them going out later in the evening to
socialize with others.
Chappell (1994) also presented an analysis that, under a goal of normalization
and community integration, friendships between labeled individuals “may even be seen
as evidence of a failure to integrate into the non-disabled community and be described in
such phrases as locked in ‘the confines of mental handicap sub-groups’ (Atkinson, 1983,
p. 20)” (p. 424). Clarifying her own position as “I am not suggesting that disabled people
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should not befriend non-disabled people” (p. 424) and as “I am not advocating a return to
the batch-living of the long-stay institution” (p. 426), Chappell (1994) argued that
“relationships with non-disabled people should not be assumed to be more valuable than
those between disabled people” (p. 425). Furthermore, she firmly distinguished herself
from the advocates of segregated education that congregate labeled children in a
disability-only setting who often rationalize the practice based on a discourse that says
“educational integration may damage the self-esteem of children with learning difficulties,
because they compare themselves unfavourably to their non-disabled peers” (Chappell,
1994, p. 424) or because of the potential bullies by classmates without disability label in
a regular class. Chappell (1994) sensed a devaluing perspective in such arguments that
regard friendships between labeled individuals more “as the protection of feelings of
inferiority, rather than as a positive choice” (p. 424). In other words, Chappell reaffirmed
an untarnished value of friendships between people labeled intellectually disabled.
Given the mainstream trend however, close examination and analysis of
friendships between labeled individuals are not widely available. Although, casual
descriptions of such relationships can sometimes be found, embedded within the accounts
of labeled individuals or of researchers focusing on other legitimate topics. For example,
Goode (1992) noted on some comments made by institutional friends about Bobby, a man
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with Down syndrome who was clinically described as possessing an intellectual level of
2.8 years old and for whom “speech or language therapy is not recommended as
prognosis for improvement is poor” (p. 200). As the fieldwork proceeded, Goode learned
the value of friends’ perspective, according to which Bobby had “no communication
problems” and “talked fine” (Goode, 1992, p. 205).
Murphy’s accounts in the life history research conducted by Bogdan and Taylor
(1982/1994) also included a description of his nonverbal friend, P. J. Tommy, at an
institution as “I’ve watched that guy and I can see in his eyes that he was aware…. When
I was with him and I touched him, I know that he knows (p. 91).” Similar testimony is
provided by Ohgoe (2008), a Japanese nonverbal woman with cerebral palsy who had
been thought of as a non-thinking person until she learned to communicate via writing
and pointing to letters. Ohgoe described nonverbal understanding established between her
and her nonverbal friends at a special school as follows:
Lying on the floor with my classmates of the “class for the multi-disabled
students” at a special school, I had a sense that we could understand each other
via sharing of the eye contacts. It was an experience that could not be explained
by developmental stage theory where understanding occurs linguistically and
intellectually. When our eyes met, something clicked and I knew that the friend
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was thinking, feeling, and communicating. (p. 99)
There is also a case study that specifically inquired into the possibility of
friendship between “two severely retarded institutionalized males whose I.Q.s place them
within the ‘imbecile’ range” (MacAndrew & Edgerton, 1966). Describing the
communication between Lennie and Ricky, the “retarded friends,” the researchers noted:
They talk, observe, interpret and speculate with a contagious gusto, their words
punctuated by bursts of laughter, sweeping gestures and a near total lack of
self-consciousness. Their conversation is memorable: it is virtually without
interruption; it is lively; it is accompanied by dramatic facial expressiveness; and
to the outsider, it is almost completely incomprehensible. (p. 615)
Those accounts of friendships suggest the knowledge, morality, creativity, sensitivity, as
well as humanizing and alternative perspectives that may be enhanced especially within a
marginalized friendship community of people labeled as intellectually disabled.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review on the Methodological Issues Regarding Understanding the
Perspectives of People for Whom Language is Not Accessible or Significantly
Limited
Dehumanization and abuse begin at a casual point where we start to talk about
others over their heads (Linneman, 2001) – at a point where we assume a partiality or a
complete lack of someone’s “mindedness” (Linneman, 2001). Especially when faced with
people for whom language in a conventional sense appears not very accessible or
significantly limited, it tends to feel natural, or even justified, to minimize our efforts to
understand their perspectives, and as a result to speak for them. Such equating of
linguistic abilities and the presence of (or the lack of) a conscious mind has long created a
discriminatory hierarchy between human and non-human as well as within the human
community (Biklen, 2005; Goode, 1994; Linneman, 2001; Rubin et al., 2001).
As such, it is imperative to seek ways to better understand the ignored, abandoned,
and discounted perspectives that are less accessible through language (Lloyd, Gatherer, &
Kalsy, 2006). Among these are the perspectives of people labeled intellectually disabled,
which are the focus of this research. It is imperative to understand these perspectives
because “it allows for an expanded dialogue with prevailing ideas, and as a matter of

63

equality” (Biklen, 2005, p. 5). Indeed, we need those voices to imagine a different world
and to work toward achieving a more just, inclusive, and democratic community. I join
Kliewer (1998) in arguing that “[t]he oppressive silencing of even one voice through any
form of segregation eliminates that set of experiences from our collective conversation
and diminishes the culture of the community” (p. 5).
Understanding through Language
Inaccessibility of language does not completely preclude the possibility of
gaining perspectives through language. In fact, most efforts made so far to understand the
perspectives of people with an intellectual disability label have relied on language as a
primary mode to access their perspectives, utilizing such methods as interviews, focus
groups, narrative analysis, and a life history approach (Lloyd et al., 2006). Reviewing the
body of those pioneering works, I have drawn the following five methodological lessons:
(a) ground the conversations in the informants’ everyday lives; (b) be cautious about
disrupting the informants’ flow of talking; (c) be a flexible, creative and respectful
communicator; (d) strive to understand the informants’ logic; and (e) as a researcher,
challenge my own perspectives.
Ground the conversations in the informants’ everyday lives. Attempting to
analyze the narratives of stroke survivors in a way that is meaningful to and is anchored
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in the everyday practices of the narrators, Faircloth and his colleagues (2004) advocate
energizing the “ordinary” (p. 402). They argue that “familiar, mundane personal
experience is a featured building block for the self-through-time” and that “[o]rdinary
resources are something that are always there and provide the most readily available
source for biographical construction” (Faircloth, Rittman, Boylstein, Young, &
Puymbroeck, 2004, p. 402). They further contend that paying attention to the ordinary, or
“biographical particulars” (p. 403), rather than focusing on whether a story conforms to a
traditional framework of narrative construction, which presumes a pattern of linear
developmental progression, would enable us to recognize “the active and agentic subject”
(p. 410) in those narrated stories.
Energizing and utilizing the interviewees’ ordinary resources have also been
recommended to extract richer responses from individuals deemed to have intellectual
disabilities. For example, Stalker (1998) adopted a strategy in which the researcher
invited her labeled informants to take her on a “guided tour” of the hospital grounds on
which they resided as a way to get to know the informants and to facilitate interactions.
During the tour, the researcher, with the residents’ permission, took photographs of
various locations and people they met, which were later used to further enhance
conversations during the interviews. Discussing the issue of eliciting user perspectives in
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the field of geriatric care, Stalker and her colleagues (Stalker, Gilliard, & Downs, 1999)
introduce other studies that used a similar approach, such as “neighborhood walks,” to
gain the perspectives of elderly people with limited speech and highlight the potential of
such “energetic methods to facilitate conversation” (p. 125).
Similarly, conducting interviews in the respondents’ own living environments or
in their “local context” (Goode, 1992, p. 205) has also been reported as effective by some
researchers (Atkinson & Williams, 1990; Biklen & Moseley, 1988; Cambridge &
Forrester-Jones, 2003). A personal living space contains rich sources of concrete material
such as photo albums and objects that reveal various aspects of the interviewees’ lived
experiences and that could elicit comments about people, events, situations, and future
plans. These stimuli could also trigger “deeper layers of memory” (Atkinson 2004, p.
696) and therefore encourage the interviewees to reflect on their own past, which may not
otherwise emerge during the limited time frame of an interview or may be difficult to
explain without supplemental materials to help a researcher understand their stories.
Grounding the conversations in the informants’ everyday lives also leads to
recognition of the importance of taking time to get to know the person and of combining
interviews with observations of her or his daily practices and surroundings (Angrosino,
1997; Biklen & Moseley, 1988; Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994; Booth & Booth, 1996;
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Lloyd et al., 2006; Mactavish, Mahon, & Lutfiyya, 2000; Owens, 2007). Bogdan and
Taylor (1982/1994), for example, conducted weekly in-depth, unstructured interviews
over a 2-year period to assemble an autobiography of Ed Murphy, who had been labeled
mentally retarded. Meanwhile, Biklen and Moseley (1988) suggest that some of the
interview questions be based upon what has been observed in the informant’s “natural
environment” (p. 160). Furthermore, based on their review of qualitative interview
research with people with expressive language difficulties, Lloyd et al. (2006) highlight
that brief conversational interviews which took place during the observations often
enabled the researcher to obtain richer responses and insights. Observations can also offer
the researcher opportunities to take notes of conversations among various individuals
who are part of the informant’s life, and thus opportunities to learn about the vocabularies,
cultures, and relationships in which the informant’s world is grounded.
Finally, spending time together and becoming more knowledgeable about the
person’s background as well as communicative styles are also important in that this
“allows both the researcher and the informant to become familiar with each other’s
speech as well as any nonverbal cues that aid communication” (Low, 2006, p. 162). Thus
time can enhance the communicative competencies of both parties who are involved in
the construction of an interview.
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Be cautious about disrupting the informants’ flow of talking. A feminist
researcher, Kathryn Anderson, warns of the danger that our listening could become
severely restricted by a research agenda, such as to produce materials that suit particular
purposes and outcome goals (Anderson & Jack, 1991). She painfully speaks of “lost
opportunities” (p. 13) for her female informants to “discuss the complex web of feelings
and contradictions behind their familiar stories” (p. 13) due to her interrupting their
spontaneously flowing reflections. My own experiences of working at a group home for
women with intellectual disability labels in Japan and of listening to those women telling
their stories while we ate, while we watched TV together, when I visited their individual
rooms, or while we cleaned the house together taught me the tremendous value of
naturally occurring “free-talk.” By holding myself back in order to remain nonjudgmental
and to listen attentively to their free-flow talk, I often could learn the narrator’s
perspectives and gain rich insights into her lived realities.
Upon interviewing people with intellectual disability labels, some researchers
have also let the labeled narrators decide what to talk about themselves, keeping the
interview agenda open or only loosely structured (Angrosino, 1997; Bogdan & Taylor,
1982/1994); however, even in structured interviews guided by predetermined questions,
there are ways to recognize, respect, and try not to disrupt the interviewee’s flow of
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conversation as much as possible. Particularly in interviewing people who experience
difficulties with expressing themselves via speech, it is critical not to jump in too quickly
and interrupt the “pause for thought” (Richardson, 2002, p. 51), which would cause the
person “to lose her train of thought” (Low, 2006, p. 162).
Understanding miscommunication as an interactive phenomenon, in which both
the researcher and the informant with speech difficulty play a role, Low (2006) was able
to gain valuable insights from the experiences of interviewing individuals living with
Parkinson’s disease. For example, Low (2006) finds that inserting the word “Right” when
she could not instantly understand what was said by her informants allows her to
acknowledge the statement in a way that does not break the person’s train of thought or to
avoid making the respondent feel awkward by interjecting words that convey a message
that the person’s utterance is not clear enough. Low (2006) finds that it allows “the
natural flow of conversation to continue” (p. 157).
Low (2006) also recognizes the potential value of repeating questions when the
first attempt does not elicit a response on a targeted topic from her interviewees
experiencing Parkinson’s disease. Though some researchers caution that this practice
potentially makes an interview more like an interrogation, Low (2006) concludes that
“repeating or rephrasing questions need not resemble an inquisition” (p. 158), if the
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researcher remains flexible and respectful of the responses that are contributed by the
informant. Refraining from persisting only with her original question and flexibly going
along with the dynamic and unexpected flow of conversation led by the interviewees’
off-the-topic-yet-valuable responses, Low (2006) was able not only to elicit her
informants’ views on the initial question after several attempts at coming back and
repeating the originally intended question, but also to enable the respondents “to express
opinions and beliefs concerning issues of importance” (p. 159) to themselves.
When it comes to interviewing people deemed to have intellectual disabilities,
researchers tend to hesitate to follow the general principle that we should pose
open-ended questions in interviews (e.g., Sigelman, Budd, Winer, Schoenrock, & Martin,
1982). While there may be times when open-ended questions do not instantly allow us to
access the informants’ perspectives, we must not uncritically attribute such difficulties to
the presumed intellectual disabilities, providing us an easy excuse to abandon our efforts
to seek their views and to restrict “the wonderful prospect of answering” (Mukhopadhyay
& Biklen, 2005, p. 134) to a more simplified, closed question. Rather, the difficulty with
answering open-ended questions should be re-examined in the historical context of how
the voices of those labeled intellectually disabled have been discounted, silenced, or even
punished (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994; Richardson, 2002; Rapley & Antaki, 1996). On
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this point, Tito Mukhopadhyay, a man with a label of autism who had once been labeled
also as mentally retarded before he acquired a means to communicate by typing
(Mukhopadhyay & Biklen, 2005), critiques and encourages as follows:
When the prospect of an answer is so narrow and the tendency to escape is more,
how could the person grow and organise his reasons? So although it is difficult to
face an open question, it should be introduced. (p. 134)
Be a flexible, creative and respectful communicator. When interviews are
conceptualized as presentational, social, interactive, and co-constructed (Block, 2000) –
that is, seen as “reflections of how research participants relate to the interview context as
actors” (Block, 2000, p. 758-759) and “how the interviewee constructs the interviewer,
their relationship, and the purpose of the interview” (Block, 2000, p. 758) much more
than as mere “reflections of research participants’ memories of events” (Block, 2000, p.
758) – interviewees’ responses are “not to be taken in isolation” (Rapley & Antaki, 1996,
p. 211). Rather, what an interviewer says and does are also treated as equally active
constituents of the interview, co-producing the resultant accounts and performances of the
interviewees (Owens, 2007).
In particular, some researchers have offered suggestions on how an interviewer
can best utilize her or his own words to enhance the conversations. For example, upon
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interviewing people who experienced speech difficulties due to Parkinson’s disease, Low
(2006) finds that repeating informants’ words or phrases is especially useful in giving
them a chance to confirm or correct the researcher’s understanding of what they have said.
Also, Biklen and Moseley (1988) highlight the value of modifying questions when
needed. For example, when framing a question in a way that demanded an interviewee to
make a comparison only in one’s mind and then to instantly present the result of the
analysis orally (i.e., “How are supervisors different than counselors?”) proved to be an
insufficient approach to gain the interviewee’s perspective, Moseley flexibly modified his
approach and instead asked, “What does the supervisor do?” (p. 158), which successfully
elicited the interviewee’s perceptions of a supervisor.
Being flexible, creative, and even inventive is an important quality for a good
communicator in general; but it is even more so when communication takes place among
people whose communication styles or modes differ from each other, such as people who
speak different languages or for whom language in a traditional sense cannot be taken for
granted as a shared mode of communication. For example, with regard to the inclusion of
informants defined as having learning difficulties in narrative research, Booth and Booth
(1996) recommend the practice of “creative guesswork” (p. 64), in which an interviewer
guesses at what an interviewee tries to communicate and presents her or his guess in a
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form of successive yes-no or brief questions so the interviewee can either reject or
confirm the presented storyline.
Although it may sound too creative or unorthodox especially in a research context,
parents who successfully live inclusive lives with their child with a disability label often
employ such a communication strategy. For example, Biklen (1992) characterizes a
communication practice he observed in one such family as “a bit like playing Twenty
Questions” (p. 31) as the parents tried to guess what their child meant by a particular
word. Biklen (1992) also learns from this family, the Lehrs, another creative
communication strategy that they used with their son, Ben, who had extreme difficulties
with expressing himself via speech to the point of resorting to self-abusive behaviors
such as smashing his head to express his frustrations. Biklen (1992) observed that the
parents sometimes offered an incomplete sentence, such as “You are feeling happy
because…” and hoped that Ben could communicate what was on his mind by filling in
the blank.
Offering potential words at the interviewee’s disposal, or to “loan them the
words” (Booth & Booth, 1996, p. 65) has also been recommended in the context of
interview research with people for whom language has limited utility. Low (2006) for
example reports that she at times find it necessary to offer her informants with
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Parkinson’s disease the candidate words that they might be looking for. Low (2006)
acknowledges the potential usefulness of such a strategy to help her informants “find the
words they were thinking of but could not express at a given moment” (p. 161). Certainly
it must be recognized that this practice could end up “putting words into the interviewee’s
mouth” (Booth & Booth, 1996; Low, 2006), especially if there is not an opportunity and
the kind of atmosphere that enables the informants to reject the interviewer’s choice of
words when needed. However, as a Japanese person who daily experienced language
difficulties myself while living in English speaking countries, I can certainly see a
significant benefit that “such interviewer intervention can ease the experience for the
interviewee by reducing the effort he or she must make to consciously form each word”
(Wenger 2002, cited in Low, 2006, p. 160).
Researchers have also suggested utilizing “imaginative strategies of
communication” (Goodley, 1996, p. 342) or “pluralistic methods” (Owens, 2007, p. 306)
that could complement the limited usability of language. Such creative tools include
visual stimuli such as pictures, drawings, diagrams, videos, a semi-structured
questionnaire, and a visual chart of an informant’s life history (Goodley, 1996; Owens,
2007; Stalker, 1998). Audio- or video-recording of the interviews can also give
researchers opportunities to become more competent at understanding the informants’
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speech as well as opportunities to review and reflect on the interview process (Biklen &
Moseley, 1988; Goode, 1992). In an ethnographic case study with a 50-year-old man with
Down syndrome named Bobby, Goode (1992) finds that “[o]nly on reviewing videotapes
of our interactions with Bobby were his competence and abilities fully revealed to us” (p.
201). Critical review of recorded interactions enabled Goode to recognize the rationales,
logicality, superior knowledge, and efficient strategies behind Bobby’s behaviors, and to
better understand Bobby’s “unintelligible” utterances. Prior to this discovery of Bobby’s
competence, his utterances had been thought to be “nonsensical,” thus the researchers
“largely ignored them” (p. 204).
Among “pluralistic methods” to be employed upon interviewing people deemed
to have learning difficulties, Owens (2007) include an approach to use “the knowledge of
people who know the interviewee well” (p. 306). There are both advantages and
disadvantages (Biklen & Moseley, 1988; Low, 2006; Stalker et al., 1999) to the approach
of incorporating proxy data by inviting the research participant’s significant others or
someone who is thought to know the person well to join the interview or by conducting
separate interviews with those third party persons. The most important issue seems to me
to be the motivation behind our desire to seek input from people who are not the
informants themselves. In regards to interviewing individuals living with Parkinson’s
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disease, Low (2006) finds the presence of third party and her or his nuanced prompts well
informed by the intimate knowledge of the interviewee are “the valuable assistance” (p.
165); asking those who are close to an interviewee to join the interview can certainly be
helpful. Especially their knowledge of factual background information about the
interviewee, such as the names of people and places and specific dates or events, can help
an interviewer better understand the accounts of the interviewee (Biklen & Moseley,
1988; Stalker et al., 1999), reducing the high pressure put on the interviewee to explain
everything to an ignorant interviewer. However, if the desire to seek others’ input is
rooted in a belief, as cautioned by Stalker and her colleagues (1999), that “people’s
opinions should be faithful to some ‘objective truth’” (p. 124), then the proxy data will
end up being used simply to judge the “validity” of the stories told by the “unreliable”
interviewees.
A marked divergence is often found between the views expressed by people who
receive some kinds of social services, including those labeled intellectually disabled, and
the views of people who provide services as well as those of service users’ families
(Biklen & Moseley, 1988; Stalker et al., 1999). If we want to include the excluded voices
as a matter of equality and if we are to learn from those perspectives to build a different
and better future, as set out at the beginning of this chapter, then we must treat such
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divergent views, not as if one is valid and one is invalid, but rather as data that allow us
to learn something about how “each felt about a particular issue and something of the
dynamics of their relationship” (Biklen & Moseley, 1988, p. 159). That is, we must
always be aware that there are “a multiplicity of interconnected narratives that make up
‘the story’” (Low, 2006, p. 166) and must take a critical stance that understands the
interviewee’s accounts as emerged and situated in the web of complex relationships and
multiple subjectivities.
Strive to understand the informants’ logic. Qualitative research does not
assume that there is one objective truth in any phenomena (Lloyd et al., 2006). Rather it
seeks “multiple truths” (Biklen, 2005, p. 3): It believes that “multiple ways of interpreting
experiences are available to each of us through interacting with others, and that it is the
meaning of our experiences that constitutes reality” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003, p. 23). In
order to access the informants’ perspectives and to understand their logic, we must work
within their realities (Lloyd et al., 2006)
One of the women I worked for in a group home for individuals considered to
have intellectual disabilities in Japan, for example, often told me stories in which she
would witness someone being severely reprimanded by another at a store, in a train, on a
street, for buying toys, and so forth. As I listened to her stories again and again, it became
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quite irrelevant to think of whether it actually happened or not. Rather, it poignantly
revealed “some aspect of [the narrator’s] reality and perspective” (Lloyd et al., 2006, p.
1396). In real life situations, she was often the one who got reprimanded or blamed for
her behaviors, or at times out of frustration became angry to the point of shouting and
screaming, a behavior that further branded her as a “difficult-person-to-deal-with.” But in
her stories, she was never rebuked or got angry. She often clarified to me that she was a
mere observer and pronounced “I wouldn’t yell at someone like that.” To me, her stories
were the “stories of survival” (Atkinson, 2004, p. 695) in which “the story-teller becomes
the ‘hero’ who, at least in the telling, challenges authority and fights back against
oppression” (Atkinson, 2004, p. 695). It could have been one of her “coping strategies
that make life possible” (Angrosino, 1997, p. 4). Only by listening and working within
her reality, could I learn something about her experiences and perspectives on the
everyday oppressions as well as about her resistance against authoritative and
disrespectful treatment she received from others.
Though having a benign intention of seeking ways to elicit excluded perspectives
of those with an intellectual disability label, convinced by the socially constructed
definition of intellectual disability and believing in the objective truth, researchers often
get caught in asking “Are they intellectually and/or morally capable of telling the truth?”
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“Can we trust their stories?” Such doubting of the accounts of labeled individuals was
further authorized by a series of influential studies conducted by Sigelman and her
colleagues in 1980s; they concluded that “the validity of answers given by mentally
retarded individuals can never be assumed” (Sigelman et al., 1982, p. 518). Sigelman
especially focused on the issue of acquiescence, “the tendency to respond affirmatively
regardless of a question’s content” (Sigelman et al., 1982, p. 511). Sigelman’s research
and contentions were widely accepted, even generalized to holistically negate the validity
of responses by labeled persons regardless of the question formats, and sometimes used
as a rationale for not including those people in research (Owens, 2007; Rapley & Antaki,
1996).
Understanding a story as negotiated through the complex web of histories,
positionalities, and power-laden relationships, we can move forward and engage with
“the role of critical inquiry” (Biklen, 2005, p. 7), which is to make visible “the contextual
complexity of the discursive community” (Gallagher, 1999, p. 76, cited in Biklen 2005, p.
7). One such invisible factor that contributes to the contextual complexity is the indelible
power differences between the “judged” and the “judges” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1976). Most
labeled individuals have had to endure a history of being tested by professionals and
having to prove their competence (Rubin, 2005). Ed Murphy who was labeled mentally
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retarded and accordingly placed in a state institution elegantly testified about such power
differentials: “One thing that’s hard is that once you’re in it, you can’t convince them
how smart you are. And you’re so weak you can’t convince them how smart you are. And
you’re so weak you can’t really fight back” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, pp. 29-30).
Given the history and the power inequality, any interview can be perceived as threatening
by labeled interviewees (Stalker et al., 1999) including the possibility of having a serious
impact on their lives such as placement or replacement in an institution (Rapley & Antaki,
1996) or deprivation of rights and/or privileges (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994). The fear
could affect interviewees’ performance and may pressure them into responding to
interview questions in such a way as “to foster impressions consistent with professionals’
definitions of appropriate behavior” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, pp. 19-20).
Squarely challenging Sigelman’s notion of acquiescence, Rapely and Antaki
(1996) also argued that such power differences gave interviewers inadvertent authority
not to accept interviewees’ responses and shepherd them into forming answers that were
more acceptable to the interviewers; to frame questions in a way that complexity
expressed in the interviewees’ responses was made to sound more like contradiction; or to
easily blame any miscommunication on the labeled interviewees and use it as evidence to
confirm their presumed incapacity. Rapely and Antaki (1996) contended that such power
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imbalance produced “pseudo-acquiescence” (p. 215).
Taking a broader stance of understanding labeled individuals’ accounts within
historical and cultural contexts, some researchers have recognized strategies employed by
the labeled informants and the wisdom contained in what could be seen as submissive,
incompetent, or invalid responses. An example would be to avoid speaking in the face of
a risk that the respondents’ performance would be perceived in a stigmatizing way more
than it would promote meaningful conversation (Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006;
Yearley & Brewer, 1989), or to give a “don’t know” answer in order to avoid a sensitive
issue (Richardson, 2002). Lucy Blackman, who lives with a label of autism and who
eloquently communicates by typing yet has difficulties communicating by speech,
described a conversational strategy she would employ in situations where the meanings
of others’ speech get lost to her as soon as the speaker turns to her: Blackman explained
that she devised a strategy of making “the answer that experience had taught me made the
exchange worthwhile as a social activity” (Blackman, 2005, p. 161). Thus in those
situations, she managed to “smile and look pleasant, and say ‘Yes,’ or echo” (Blackman,
2005, p. 161), which in appearance would fit Sigelman’s profile of an acquiescent,
retarded interviewee.
As a researcher, challenge my own perspectives. Trying to see things from the
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perspectives of informants necessitates that researchers consciously question, not
informants’ words, but their own perspectives, assumptions, and prejudices (Goodley,
1996). For example, Douglas Biklen (1995), who studied the first-person accounts of
people who have been labeled with autism, reflected on his conscious and continued
efforts as follows:
The qualitative researcher’s role as inquirer about the other person’s perspective
and the other person’s understandings proved to be a workable protective strategy
against imposing my own or, worse yet, the autism field’s dominant
interpretations on events or actions; I will not claim to have avoided this entirely,
but it was a constant goal. (pp. 12-13)
Similarly, Bogdan and Taylor (1982/1994), who interviewed and compiled
autobiographies of two individuals labeled mentally retarded, also reflected on the
process and reported what they needed to do as follows: “We tried to be reflective and to
let our own feelings and reactions to what he told us alert us to the prejudices and
preconceived notions we carried around as transmitters of our culture” (p. 22).
Bogdan (1980) and Gerber (1990) both agreed that this was what was lacking in
Robert Edgerton’s The Cloak of Competence: Stigma in the lives of the mentally retarded
published in 1967. They argued that the lack of self-critical stance upon interpreting and
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analyzing the labeled individuals’ accounts made Edgerton unsuccessful in his attempts to
“see these people through their own eyes” (Edgerton, 1967/1993, p. 6). Recognizing the
importance of Edgerton’s pioneering work, which pushed the field of mental retardation
to seek and to incorporate the voices of labeled individuals, Bogdan and Gerber, with due
respect, sharply critiqued Edgerton’s failure to adopt “enough skepticism about the
validity of the label ‘mentally retarded’” (Gerber, 1990, p. 15) and rather treat the
informants’ stories “from a clinical perspective” (Bogdan, 1990, p. 75). As a result, they
contended, Edgerton dismissively interpreted his informants’ criticisms toward
institutions they had been placed as denial of their mental retardation, as “fictions that
explain away their deficiencies” (Gerber, 1990, p. 16), and as “an excuse, a symptom of
their inability to deal with their ‘mental retardation’” (Bogdan, 1980, p. 75).
As Edgerton used the “study of mental retardation” and the “study of
incompetence” (1967/1993, p. 6) as interchangeable, to him incompetence was a real and
stable characteristic of the “mentally retardates.” Working in this paradigm, Edgerton’s
interest was directed at the issue of how his informants “manage their relative
incompetence” (Edgerton, 1967/1993, p. 7) and “spoiled identity” (Goffman, 1963), to
which he concluded that they had accomplished this mostly by passing for normal,
pretending to be competent, and striving “to cover themselves with a protective cloak of
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competence” (Edgerton, 1967/1993, p. 193).
Working from a different paradigm, which does “not assume that mental
retardation exists” and treats “mental retardation as an administrative category, a
metaphor rather than a tangible phenomenon” (Bogdan, 1980, p. 75), however, “a
different interpretation” (Bogdan, 1980, p. 74) was indeed possible. Based on the
narrative interviews with two individuals who had been labeled mentally retarded and
thus placed in designated institutions, Bogdan (1980) presented an interpretation of the
informants’ statement, “I am not retarded” not as a denial of the reality but as a valid
analysis, as a critique of social inadequacies, and as sophisticated knowledge about
human competences.
What they are denying is not just that they are retarded, their claim is not just for
them, or not just based on misdiagnosis – rather it is grounded in an analysis that
the system used to classify people as retarded or normal is misleading. Based on
the data in their own lives, it is wrong, programmatically, to classify people as
retarded because it does not produce the kinds of services they need most….
Having lived among them and having been called one of them, they have come to
look for and see the intelligence in themselves and in their friends, not the
retardation. (p. 77)
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When we hear the stories of socially discredited people with a serious intent to learn
about their points of views, we must first learn about ourselves (Bogdan & Taylor,
1982/1994) and challenge our own “(often generalized) understandings of the tellers”
(Goodley, 1996, p. 335).
Understanding Through Nonverbal Interactions
Based on two participant observation studies that sought to understand (or to
understand the understanding of) the perspectives of children born with Rubella
Syndrome and who demonstrated no discernible speech, David Goode (1994) concluded
that “[u]nderstanding the world and others begins without the resources of language” (p.
99). Goode’s work suggests that in order to understand the perspectives of labeled
individuals, to learn their logics, and to unmask the masked competence, we must first
abandon “the remedial stance” (Goode, 1994, p. 23), which treats differences as
deviances and focuses on correcting and teaching rather than on listening and learning
about others’ worldviews. We must “burst the ‘bubble’” (Goode, 1992, p. 134) of the
socially privileged “etic perspectives,” which represent “objective, analytic, or clinical
approaches” (Goode, 1992, p. 198) in order to understand others and instead attempt to
adopt subjective “emic perspectives” that require intimate relationships between those
who observe and are observed. Aiming to uncover “the rationality, purpose, and
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efficiency of native behaviors” (Goode, 1992, p. 198), emic perspectives are better
designed to recognize “the value and creativity” (Goode, 1992, p. 198) of what may be
considered as deviant behaviors according to the etic frame of reference.
Similar but perhaps more fundamental principles to understanding nonverbal
others have been submitted by a handful of scholars using various phrases, such as
“presuming competence” (Biklen, 2005, p. 258), “attributing thinking to the other”
(Bogdan & Taylor, 1989, 139), seeing others “as people with whom [we] can have
dialogue” (Biklen, 1992, p. 48), and “taking other’s mind for granted” (Linneman, 2001,
p. 231). When we embrace these principles and employ emic perspectives, we begin to
recognize that the abundant “communicative resources” (Goode, 1994, p. 115) other than
language based on a “mutual membership” and on “being in and sharing a world
together” (Goode, 1994, p. 102) are available to us.
One critical element of such communicative resources is intimate knowledge
about the person whom one aims to understand. Goode (1994), for instance, observed that
a mother could easily understand the meaning of nonverbal sounds and fidgeting that her
daughter, Bianca, had demonstrated at an evening meal, and effectively responded to her
request for milk. The communication was achieved by the mother and the daughter
utilizing the shared knowledge about their daily routine. Participating in the family
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routine himself, Goode (1994) also experienced this way of understanding Bianca, who
was born with rubella syndrome, had no formal language, and had been labeled as
“profoundly retarded.” For example, when Goode failed to apply the knowledge that he
had gained by observing the mother helping Bianca drink her milk, Bianca grabbed his
hand and a saucer, and moved them into the correct position to catch the spilled milk
under her chin. Because he knew what he was supposed to do and yet failed to do, Goode
could understand the instructional value of Bianca’s behavior. As Goode (1994) noted,
“[b]y the use of the shared resource of ‘what goes when’ (and ‘what goes where’), a very
limited set of expressions were allowed to take on an incredible variety of meanings” (p.
71).
Intimate knowledge about the person as a communicative resource should also
extend to the past. Knowing where the person is coming from is a key to understanding
much verbal and nonverbal communication. For example, Biklen (1992) described how
one mother, Mary Lou, could understand her son’s screaming, kicking, stealing, and
trying to run away as signs of wanting to be included, of wanting a regular life, and of
needing assurances. The key to her understanding was to see her son’s current behaviors
in the broader context of his past life and experiences; Melvin, her son, had been placed
in an institution until he was adopted at the age of 7. Melvin would hoard food under his
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mattress and pillow, and become hysterical if they ran out of certain items such as milk.
Melvin would also become furious when he saw a little can of pudding. And Melvin
would quietly cry when he saw the pictures that depicted institutional lives. Despite the
fact that Melvin had only few signs and words, including “big house” which meant the
institution in which he had been placed, Mary Lou could understand the meanings of
these behaviors when she learned about his past experiences in the institution and how he
had been treated there. As Biklen (1992) concludes, “To understand Melvin you have to
understand his history, how he thinks about it, and how he relates what is happening in
his life now to that history” (p. 28).
Another important element of communicative resources is our body itself
(Sanders & Arluke, 1993). For example, Goode (1994) described “a conversation with
our bodies” (p. 111) with Christina, a girl who had no formal speech. Within their bodily
conversations, Goode and Christina used their bodies to communicate with each other by
gesturing, by directly moving each other’s body parts to guide a desired action, and also
by sensing intentions and feelings in each other’s body movements. For example, Goode
(1994) described:
I would greet Christina by placing her hand on my face. She would then gesture
for me to pick up. I would pick her up, and Chris would lock her legs around my
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waist and vigorously bounce up and down, indicating to me that she wanted me
forcefully to throw or lift her up and down with my arms. I would do that often
until my arms tired, which Chris could sense. (p. 111)
In the above exchange, not only had Goode sensed Christina’s wanting to be
thrown in the air or to be lifted up and down in her bouncing actions, Christina too could
sense Goode’s fatigue in his arm movements. Sensing other’s intentions and feelings
through bodily touch and a direct engagement with the other’s moving body is something
that defies quantitative documentation and scientific rationalization; and yet it is very
much a part of the reality of our daily lives – of how we learn, how we teach, how we
dance together, and how we understand each other. For example, regarding his experience
of teaching a girl, Emily, how to use computer software through a hand-over-hand
approach, Linneman (2001) answered a question as to how he knew when Emily was
behaving in a minded manner as follows: “All I had to go by was feeling: I could sense
her movements” (p. 233).
Although Goode (1994) may have romanticized a bit when he called this kind of
understanding “esoteric communication” (p. 118), I agree with Goode that it “can be
substantiated, in any practical sense of the term, only through experience, and then
becomes a kind of knowledge revealed only to those who are practitioners” (Goode, 1994,
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p. 118). This serves as a reminder of the limited ability of language to describe our
everyday communication and understanding, which is a complex phenomenon that is
nuanced, subjective, negotiated, and experienced. The caregivers and concerned others of
people experiencing Alzheimer’s disease have also expressed the dilemma of not being
able to put into words the shared communication with and the experientially gained
understanding of the nonverbal others (Gubrium, 1986). If, as Goode (1994) argued, and I
argue many of us must know experientially, communication is more than language and
understanding is more than communication, it would certainly point to the possibility of
understanding the perspectives of others for whom language serves only limited utility.
At the same time, this also poses a tremendous challenge for researchers who greatly rely
on language to describe, to analyze, and to represent our understandings. Challenging the
traditional approaches of academic writing, for example, Gubrium (1986) observed
caregiver support groups of Alzheimer’s disease patients and found that “the folk poetry
not only reveals how the ultimate structure of mind is envisioned by those concerned, it is
also a way of voicing, by means of words, what words cannot convey” (pp. 46-47).
One thing remains a great challenge to researchers regardless of whether the
informants’ perspectives are sought primarily via language or through bodily
understandings. That is, the challenge of interpreting others. As researchers are inevitably
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“telling our stories of their stories” (Ferguson, Ferguson, & Taylor, 1992, p. 299), there
lies in our hands both responsibilities and possibilities to bring about change when we, as
researchers, tell stories about others (Alcoff, 1995; Kvale 1995). We are always a part of
the story and part of the story-making, regardless of whether we mostly present raw
materials of what the informants themselves have said or we use our own language to
present our understandings gained through bodily conversations and/or verbal and
nonverbal interactions. As Burton Blatt wrote in an article titled How to destroy lives by
telling stories, one way “we can reduce human abuse is to be very careful about the
stories we tell about people” (1981, cited in Linneman, 2001, p. 4). Blatt’s clarification of
the social justice responsibility that researchers hold calls for the kind of validity in
research that Rowan conceptualized. According to Richardson, Rowan (1981) identified
four principles to arrive at a valid understanding, the second of which was that “the
phenomenon should be made maximally reasonable in human terms” and thus
researchers should look for “dignified explanations” (Richardson, 2002, p. 55). Thus,
critical to the integrity of research, we must place researchers’ reflexivity (Alcoff, 1995;
Biklen, 2005; Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994; Goode, 1994; Owens, 2007) and the
commitment to the people we attempt to represent (Goodley, 1996; Reid, Ryan, &
Enderby, 2001) at the heart of all activities throughout the research process.
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Listening as a Critical Means of Understanding Others
We must first learn to stop talking and to listen in order to hear less-privileged
others’ telling of their own stories (Alcoff, 1995). Mere listening, however, may not be
enough. Simone Weil, a 20th century French philosopher, said, “Those who have received
one of those blows that leave a being wriggling on the ground like a worm half crushed,
those people don't have words [emphasis added] to express what is happening to them”
(Weil, 1951). Drawing on Weil, Washida (1999) wrote, “Telling the story of affliction
barely starts, not upon being asked to tell, but upon being listened to passively, as if the
words trickle down as the faintest muttering” (p. 163).
Similarly, based on her own experiences of interviewing women, Kathryn
Anderson reflected on what she had learned about “learning to listen” as follows: “We
need to hear what women implied, suggested, and started to say but didn’t. We need to
interpret their pauses and, when it happens, their unwillingness or inability to respond”
(Anderson & Jack, 1991, p. 17). As Kliewer (1998) suggested, “to enter the dialogue of
citizenship does not require spoken, or indeed outspoken, language. Rather,
communication is built on one’s ability to listen deeply to others” (p. 73). Such deep,
passive listening would communicate back to the storyteller that “You are worth listening
to” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 100). Furthermore, sharing Washida’s notion of “passivity and

92

acceptance” (1999, p. 235), Goode (1994) highlighted the importance of “obedient
passivity” (pp. 117-118) in order to listen to the bodily interactions and learn about the
other through bodily conversations.
In addition to such a critical, deep, and passive listening that prays and waits for
the liberation of others’ nonverbal and verbal “voices,” listening as a critical means for
understanding others requires an engagement in a dialogue where “we listen to the Other
and simultaneously risk confusion and uncertainty both about ourselves and about the
other person we seek to understand” (Schwandt, 1999, p. 458). Douglas Biklen (2005)
expressed this as a researcher’s obligation when he said, “I am obliged to welcome
complexity, even contradictions, as they arise” (p. 3).
That is, we must be willing to be challenged and to change. When we expose
ourselves to such a communicative process, and when we each go on listening and
speaking the interpretations back to the speaker, “we come to hear differently or better,
and this is expressed in a new, amended understanding – a better account” (Schwandt,
1999, p. 456). At this moment, “truth is developed in a communicative process, both
researcher and subjects learning and changing through the dialogue” (Kvale, 1995, p. 32).
In other words, there is no such thing as “empowerment of the researched” or
“emancipatory research” unless researchers themselves go through a transformative
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process (Lengel, 1998). When we acknowledge the agency of those marginalized others
and acknowledge that they, who have the histories of negotiating and resisting the norms,
are “best positioned to create a transformative space” (Lengel, 1998, p. 246), the
expanded dialogue and resulting new understanding will liberate all of us to envision a
different, better future together.
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CHAPTER 3
Methods
The Research Sites and the Informants
The Farm. Forcibly segregating people and being therefore necessarily
oppressive, disability-specific institutions such as special schools, day habilitation
programs, sheltered workshops, group homes, and other residential institutions
nevertheless offer opportunities for the labeled individuals to develop solidarity and
friendships. For example, Larry Bissonnette, an artist with a label of autism, wrote of his
experiences living in an institution as follows: “My pent-up time in tested for learning
patterns of best behavior institution wasn’t entirely greys; it offered personal periods of
great relationships with friends with disabilities” (Bissonnette, 2005, p. 174).
The Farm – a pseudonym – was also such a disability-specific institution. The
Farm offered various services such as day habilitation, supported employment, and
respite for young adults with the intellectual disability labels. Located in the state of New
York, the Farm was founded in the 1980s by a couple who believed that farming and rural
life would offer a therapeutic venue for people with developmental disabilities to grow
and to become independent. The Farm prided itself on the family-like services it provided
based on the principle that “the person comes first, not the disability.” The Farm also
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prided itself on the training and skill development opportunities it offered for labeled
individuals through various activities such as caring for the barn animals, working in the
gardens and greenhouse, engaging in wood-work or crafts, and going out into community
(e.g., shopping, movie, library, gym, etc.).
The labeled individuals, who were the primary informants for this study, were
called “participants” at the Farm. It did not matter to me whether an informant had a
specific kind of disability label, such as Down syndrome or autism, or had a more general
label such as intellectual disability or developmental disability. It also did not matter
whether one had been determined to have a mild, moderate, or severe disability. Thus, I
did not seek to obtain such details as the kinds and severity of disability they were
deemed to have or the intelligence scores that had been recorded on them. For the
purposes of this study, informants only needed to have the experiences of living a life
with a label that had brought them to the Farm as the eligible service recipients.
Since this study was exploratory of an unexplored topic, a close examination of
how various cultural differences (e.g., gender, social class, race or ethnicity, etc.) might
affect a formation of humanizing friendships among labeled individuals was not
conducted. Thus, such factors were also not considered as essential criteria of the
informants in this study. Although age was also not a particularly important factor in this
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study, the Farm primarily served high school graduates; therefore most of the primary
informants were in their late teens or their 20s. Many of them had known each other for a
long time as colleagues at the Farm or at other disability-related organizations. Some also
had been to the same school, or had known each other during childhood. In terms of
communication styles, most had a reasonably good command of verbal language,
although a few communicated more through signs, facial expressions, tones of voice,
gestures, and actions.
While I maintained a primary focus on seeking the perspectives of those with
disability labels, I did not completely abandon the perspectives of those without disability
labels, nor the possibilities and values of accepting relationships that emerged between
the labeled program participants and the non-labeled program staff. I however was
careful not to treat the voices of staff as if they were inherently more credible than that of
disabled informants, or to treat the words of those with disability label as if they were in
need of validation by someone who is not categorized as disabled. The number of
research informants totaled 23 (14 labeled program participants and 9 non-labeled
program staff). Half of the labeled informants were females and half males. Female staff
outnumbered male staff 7 to 2.
Kapu Kapu. I became acquainted with and interested in Kapu Kapu, the
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research site in Japan, through reading a book titled “There is Seiko” (1998) written by
Saishu Satoru, who was one of the key founders of Kapu Kapu. He is a professor of
environmental philosophy whose professional career at Tokyo University, one of the most
prestigious universities in Japan, began (and in some sense ended) with his participation
in radical student activists’ rallies against university authorities and political forces – a
signifying event of the era in Japanese history that aligned with similar
national/international movements of the late 1960s. The youngest daughter of Professor
Saishu, whose name is Seiko, has Down syndrome, is a non-verbal communicator, rarely
walks even with an assistant’s help, is blind, and mostly lies on the floor day and night,
listening to her favorite music. In the book There is Seiko, Saishu describes what he calls
“Free and Hot Space (FHS).” It is a space where everyone can freely and hotly be who
they are and in which “[b]eing there – one’s existence itself – is deemed for everyone
(including a person like Seiko) as a valuable contribution and as a form of meaningful
work” (Saishu, 1998, p. 251). The founding of Kapu Kapu was mentioned in the book as
an embodied example of efforts to create FHS within the society.
As such, although Kapu Kapu, to use an autonym with permission, is a sheltered
workshop under the governmental disability policy framework of Japan, since its
founding it has always aimed to be a place where traditional and discriminative values
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around dis/ability are challenged so alternative possibilities can emerge. Mr. Suzaki, who
has been the director since Kapu Kapu’s inception in 1997, told me at an interview that
one of his core principles was “To not kill the color of each person.” He explained that he
believes that simply by restraining ourselves from judging and problematizing others’
ways of being based on our own narrow conceptions of how things ought to be, we can
emancipate oppressed potentials and as a result change the world, little by little, toward a
different, diverse, and more just one.
Starting as a sheltered workshop in 1997, Kapu Kapu opened a log-house-like
café in 1998 in a small shopping mall that serves 1970s apartment complexes and
residential neighborhoods that increasingly contain a high proportion of elderly people,
most notably those who live alone. It is located in Yokohama city (adjacent to the Tokyo
metropolitan area), although the district in which Kapu Kapu lies is far from the popular
and stylish center of Yokohama that reflects its long history as a leading international
trading port in Japan. Thirty minutes drive from the central area of Yokohama, the district
in which Kapu Kapu is located, developed as a suburb. The district is also unique in that
it contains a large number of disability related institutions, such as sheltered workshops
(including many cafés), residential institutions, and group homes compared to other
districts in Yokohama city, reflecting the active efforts to build disability related services
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within the district.
As in the case with the Farm, many of the labeled workers at Kapu Kapu were in
their 20s, and had come to Kapu Kapu directly after graduation from their high schools,
which were uniformly disability-only special high schools. None went to an inclusive,
regular high school, although several had some inclusive schooling experiences in their
elementary years6. Several were in their 30s, 40s, and 50s, and had started to work at
Kapu Kapu after spending some time at home or working at other places. The oldest
worker among the labeled individuals, a woman who was in her late 50s at the time of my
research, had almost no experience of going to school except one year of being placed in
an institution which purportedly had offered some educational programs. There were 14
labeled workers at Kapu Kapu when I began my research, then 5 new workers joined in
the third year of my fieldwork, for a total of 19 labeled informants (12 female and 7
male) who agreed to participate in my study. Additionally, 5 non-labeled staff (3 female
and 2 male) agreed to be research informants.
Data Collection

6

In 1979 the Japanese government enacted a law that made it compulsory for students considered to have physical,
intellectual, or other disabilities to attend special schools. Under the international pressure to make its education system appear
more inclusive, the Japanese government somewhat loosened the rule and launched a system in 2002, under which students
with disability labels are allowed to enter a regular school upon approved that there is a “special situation” that makes it
appropriate for the student to learn in a regular school. Even though the Japanese government signed in 2007 the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities that requires the signees to ensure an inclusive education system at all levels, it still
defends its segregative law and policy. The education experiences of the informants at Kapu Kapu clearly reflect the national
education policy of Japan.
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My primary data collection method was participant observation (Bogdan &
Biklen, 2003). As an integral aspect of this approach, I visited the research sites and both
observed and participated in the informants’ world. Participant observation over extended
time periods has been recognized as one of the ideal strategies for research involving
individuals with intellectual disabilities (Mactavish, Mahon, & Lutfiyya, 2000) as it
effectively communicates the presumption of credibility for the informants, entails an
appreciation of the informants’ world view, and builds trust and rapport between the
informants and the researcher. In order to not carelessly impose “explanations that
originate in the dominant narrative of the discourse community” (Biklen, 2005, p. 13), as
I continually observed, described, and interpreted, I tried to abide by the notion that
“nothing is trivial, that everything has the potential of being a clue that might unlock a
more comprehensive understanding of what is being studied” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003, p.
5). I also adopted an “emic” perspective, through which Goode (1994) was able to
appreciate an instructional value of Bianca’s behaviors that could have been dismissed as
meaningless, patterned movements of some non-verbal, severely disabled person, or
Bobby’s superior knowledge and prominent skills to survive institutional lives that Goode
(1992) could not see until he repeatedly reviewed video-recorded interview of Bobby
with a clear intension to depart from pathological views and instead to adopt a
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perspective to see a labeled informant as a competent person. In sum, the utmost
challenge of my fieldwork was to be there “not as a person who knows everything, but as
a person who has come to learn” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003, p. 73).
The Farm. I began visiting the Farm on September 14, 2005 and continued
through August 9, 2006, except for a month from December 2005 to January 2006 when I
was home in Japan. During the 10 months, I visited three times per month on average,
resulting in a total of 30 visits to the Farm. During each visit, I generally stayed at the
Farm for about 4-5 hours, from morning to early afternoon.
Typical days at the Farm began with a morning meeting during which the
informants were told what team they had been assigned to, each with a designated
activity and a designated staff person as team leader. After the meeting, each team set out
for the assigned morning work and activities, and then everyone came back together
again for lunch at noon. After the 1-hour lunch break, people once again were broken into
teams to do the afternoon work until close to 3:00 pm, which was the end of the day at
the Farm for the informants. I was allowed to choose and follow whichever team I wished
on a particular day and therefore to observe different relationships in different activity
settings, such as doing the barn work, working in the garden, doing chores, playing
games, cooking, engaging with artwork, going shopping, and going to the library.
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After I left the Farm at the end of the day, it was customary for me to stop by a
coffee shop to reflect on the day and to expand the notes that I jotted down on site so I
could have a record of what I did, what I observed, what I heard, what I felt, and what I
wondered, while the sense of “being there” was still fresh. For some of the visits (12 out
of the 30 visits), these hand-written field notes became the primary data, while for the
other 18 visits, I was able to type up the field notes more fully later. For the latter half of
my visits, I brought a digital camera and took photos at the Farm with informants’
permission. In addition, for the last third of my visits, I obtained a digital voice recorder
and, with permission, carried it with me, enabling me to gather the sounds of life at the
Farm. These visual and auditory records of the observed days as well as the hand-written
field notes that reflected my fresh memories and reflections greatly helped me to
construct the typed field notes when I could do so later.
The participant observation offered me a lot of opportunities to engage in free-talk
conversations with informants, during lunch time, breaks, waiting time in between
activities, as we worked on tasks, and so forth, and to conduct brief, informal interviews
with them. Remembering my research interest, some would also occasionally seek me out
to explain and discuss a friendship with a particular member of the Farm. Additionally, I
also conducted more formal individual interviews at a later stage of my fieldwork when I
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became more familiar with the life at the Farm with four labeled informants who
participated in the respite program that the Farm offered during weekends. Utilizing three
Friday late afternoons (after all other program participants left the Farm at 3:00pm) from
the end of June through mid of July in 2006, I conducted interviews in one of the
bedrooms in the Farm’s respite house. The interviews lasted from 20 to 50 minutes per
person, during which I asked the interviewees to describe two to four colleagues at the
Farm by completing several sentences I presented. The sentences that I asked the
interviewees to complete were as follows:


The funniest memory that I have about her/him is….



The nicest thing that she/he has ever done is….



The smartest thing that I saw her/him doing is….



What I value about her/him is….



She/He is a kind of person who brings….



Time when I think I should learn form her/him is….



What I wish everybody would see in her/him is….
The sentences were presented to the interviewees both orally and as a written text

on a sheet on which the name and photo of a person to be described were also displayed.
All four interviewees were female and could communicate verbally well. A total of 10
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labeled informants, 6 females and 4 males, were described by the interviewees. The
interviewees selected at least one person themselves whom to describe. Interested in how
the interviewees would talk about “less popular” persons or those with whom they had
not been often observed to closely interact during my observations, I chose at least one
person to be described for each interviewee. All individual interviews were voice
recorded with permission and later transcribed. The total number of pages of
single-spaced typed data, including both field notes and the interview transcripts, was
225.
At the beginning of the fieldwork, I sent a letter to each family of the Farm
participants as well as to the staff introducing myself and explaining the purpose of my
research and the anticipated research activities. In order to explain the research to the
labeled informants, I made a pictorial version of an informed consent form, although it in
fact seemed for many of them that the text was as helpful as or even more helpful than
the pictorial icons that were meant to represent the key elements of the presented contents.
Many of the labeled informants were very willing and seemed even excited to have me
study their friendships. They would find me and report that they had signed the consent
letter and dropped it off in the office so I should make sure to pick it up. Following the
advice of the program director at the Farm, I obtained the consent to participate in my
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research from the families of five of the labeled informants, while all the other informants
signed the consent themselves. In regard to the names to be used in this paper, since I did
not take sufficient steps to ensure the preferences of each informant and/or their families,
I use pseudonyms for all research participants as well as for the name of the farm.
Kapu Kapu. The data collection at Kapu Kapu was divided into two periods:
The first period consisted of 4 months, from September 2006 through December 2006.
During this first period, I visited Kapu Kapu as a volunteer 3 to 4 times a week and
conducted participant observation (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003) for approximately 6 hours
per day (e.g., from 10:00am to 4:00pm). The second period started in April 2007 and
continued until August 2009. Relocating myself from the U.S. and moving back to my
home country in early 2007, I began working part-time at Kapu Kapu, once or twice a
week from 10am to 6pm.
A day at Kapu Kapu started at around 10:00am. Although the official, paid,
working hours for the labeled workers were from 10:00am to 4:00pm, many came early,
some as early as 9:30am, and began work on the morning routine of preparing to open the
café. As a workshop, Kapu Kapu had three main sources of income (which was paid back
to the labeled workers according to the total hours of work per month): the café sales, the
cookie sales, and the income gained from selling donated used materials. As such, people
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engaged in a variety of tasks: taking orders; making and serving coffee; entertaining and
thanking the shoppers and customers; baking and packaging the cookies; washing dishes
and cleaning the kitchen; collecting, cleaning, and pricing the donated goods; organizing
the store items; drawing menus and creating decorative signs; and so forth. Labeled
workers could choose what they wanted to do, although they often agreed to help when a
certain task needed more effort. Therefore, everyday was not the same, and often the
morning was chaotic until people settled into their work. An outline of a day’s schedule
included a morning meeting at 10:00am, lunch at noon, tea break at around 3:00pm,
cleaning at 3:30pm, and an end-of-the-day meeting at 4:00pm. The café closed at
6:00pm.
Similar to the fieldwork I did at the Farm, I equipped myself with a digital voice
recorder, a camera, and a memo pad and pen with informants’ permissions during the first
period of my fieldwork. The sound, visual, and descriptive data augmented my memories
and helped me construct field notes after each observation. In addition to the brief,
free-talk informal “interviews” with informants that the participant observation afforded
me during the regular hours of working, I also conducted three individual interviews in
December 2006: two with the labeled informants and one with the director, Mr. Suzaki
who was in his 30s. I selected the two labeled interviewees based on the fact that we
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could rely on speech to sufficiently establish communication as well as on the fact that
the interviewees enjoyed relatively high level of mobility and thus we could arrange to
meet outside on weekends. Each of the two interviews with the labeled informants lasted
about 1 hour and was conducted at a coffee shop. As a rough outline of an interview, I
prepared guiding questions, which were visually and orally presented to the interviewees
as well. The guiding questions were as follows:


Tell me about your life that led you to work at Kapu Kapu.



Describe a typical day at Kapu Kapu.



What do you like about working at Kapu Kapu?



What are the difficulties in relation to working at Kapu Kapu?



Describe a good day at Kapu Kapu.



Describe your colleague at Kapu Kapu with five adjectives and explain why.
Similar to the interviews conducted at the Farm, the interviewees selected at

least one colleague to describe and I picked at least one person to be described. As a
visual aid, I brought a sketch pad and a pen and occasionally jotted down key words from
interviewees’ responses and drew simple pictures or diagrams to capture their stories. As
for the interview with the director, Mr. Suzaki, it lasted about 2 hours and was conducted
in a kitchen of Kapu Kapu after the café was closed. The guiding questions for this
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interview sought to uncover the histories of the following three: (1) Kapu Kapu (e.g., its
inception, its philosophy, the process of diversifying working activities, the potentials and
difficulties of building café in a community), (2) Kapu Kapu workers (e.g., how they
came to be a member of Kapu Kapu, how they have or have not changed since then), and
(3) the director himself (e.g., how he came to be the director of Kapu Kapu, how he has
or has not changed particularly in relation to the concepts of dis/ability). All three
interviews were voice recorded with permission and later transcribed.
I typed field notes in Japanese, my mother tongue, and combining the field notes
and interview transcripts, the singled-spaced, typed data totaled 268 pages. During the
second fieldwork period, I did not carry a voice recorder but primarily used a camera to
capture various moments of daily life at Kapu Kapu. Although typed field notes and full
descriptions of daily observations were not produced during this second period, I instead
wrote occasional notes at home in which I reflected on the past day or two, especially in
relation to the emerging themes (from the Farm data as well as from the Kapu Kapu data
of the first period), and jotted down the developing analysis and newly emerging
questions as well as descriptions of certain scenes that had caught my attention as
possibly relevant to the research questions.
Before I started my fieldwork, the director, Mr. Suzaki invited me to join a
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monthly coffee gathering for the family members of the labeled Kapu Kapu workers. It
gave me an opportune time to introduce myself and to explain my research to several
mothers face to face in an informal atmosphere. I also sent a letter to each family of the
labeled workers as well as to the nonlabeled staff, in which I introduced myself,
summarized the purpose and expected components of the study, and expressed my
intention to invite all of the Kapu Kapu workers, labeled and nonlabeled, to participate in
the study. Explaining the research to the labeled individuals themselves, I again utilized a
pictorial version of the Japanese-translated, informed consent form. After I completed a
round of explaining to each labeled worker, I sent the pictorial information sheet home
and asked their families to review it with their daughter or son. I decided to let each
family decide who would sign the consent, either the research participants themselves or
their family members. Most, 15 out of 19 families, chose to sign the form on behalf of the
labeled persons. The only autonyms that appear with permission in this paper are the
name of the research site (i.e., Kapu Kapu) and of one labeled worker, whose name had
already been published in the book There is Seiko (Saishu, 1998) written by her father.
All other names from Kapu Kapu that appear in this paper are pseudonyms.
Data Analysis
Following data analysis procedures guided by the grounded theory (Bogdan &
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Biklen, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1967), I read through the field notes, both typed and
hand-written, as well as interview transcripts several times and looked for any clues
related to the research questions. As for the Farm data, research questions that guided my
data analysis were as follows:
1.

How do they work and communicate with each other?

2.

How do they negotiate and maintain their friendship community?

3.

How do they validate others and themselves?

4.

How do they resist societal standards that work to invalidate others in the community
or themselves?

5.

And what can the non-disabled others learn from their friendship community in
terms of achieving a more just, inclusive society?
As I read and marked the segments that seemed to be related to any of the

research questions, I tentatively assigned words or phrases to represent key elements of
the marked segments. As I kept reading and re-reading the data, I refined those key words
with intent to form coding categories. Six coding categories were generated for the Farm
data as follows: (a) including (excluding) and validating (discounting) others; (b) care
about each other and sensitivity; (c) mutuality, interdependence, and community; (d)
resistance, claiming, and advocating; (e) doubted, trusted, trying to prove; and (f)
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staff-participants divide.
As I will describe it later, the focus of my research had to be changed at the end
of the fieldwork at the Farm as the primary question became not so much one of multiple
meanings of human value as one of community where human value can be presumed for
anybody. As such, in regards to the Kapu Kapu data, I reviewed and analyzed the data
with a focus on the relationships, interactions, negotiations, communications, and
creativity that seemed to be associated with the development and maintenance, or
hindrance of an inclusive community where human value is presumed and affirmed rather
than questioned. Following thirteen coding categories were generated and used to
categorize Kapu Kapu data: (a) responsible communication; (b) validating others; (c)
expanded meanings of work; (d) blurred boundary/significance of in/competence; (e)
value of incompetence and opportunities for collaborative work; (f) value of inefficiency
and detour; (g) promoting self-changes as well as societal changes; (h) negotiations,
forgiveness, and arts of living with different others; (i) humor; (j) resistance; (k)
sensitiveness and concerns for others; (l) doubts; and (m) power relationships.
Once satisfactory coding categories were established, I re-read the data and
categorized each of the marked segments according to the coding system. Finally, I
examined the relationships among the categories, modified them if needed, and tried to
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gain a (albeit admittedly limited) holistic sense of how the categories related to each other
and how they could be organized so as to capture what I believed to be important
elements of the community that I observed and experienced at the Farm and Kapu Kapu.
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CHAPTER 4
Findings: Community at the Farm
I dare not claim to have understood or to have the ability to represent the fullest
complexities that constitute the community at the Farm. I also do not mean to romanticize
that the community at the Farm is all “good,” as in a utopian dream where everyone is
kind to each other all the time. Although much more relative, temporary, and
non-universal compared to societal exclusions of labeled people, there were moments of
exclusion at the Farm. Nonetheless, there were indeed important lessons to be learned
from the ways the informants went about being, interacting, and working as members of a
community. I discuss them under the following two headings: (1) Valuing
interdependence, incompetence, and relational spaces; and (2) Fighting against
institutionalization.
Valuing Interdependence, Incompetence, and Relational Spaces
Within the framework of utilitarian individualism, products and achievements are
envisioned as being derived “solely from one’s individual utility, intrinsic ability, and
personal performance” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 3). Thus, we are pressured to detach ourselves
from others and to present an appearance of being independent in order to be regarded as
a valid and sole author of production and contribution – or in order not to be disregarded
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as dependent and a “burden to the community” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 3). We indeed have a
fear of appearing to need someone’s help. I myself, even now, still tend to say, “I am
okay” and gently reject helping hands when offered, deeply enslaved by the principle of
independence.
Therefore I was taken aback when Ben proposed an idea that “We can both carry
it together.” The proposal was made in regard to what to do with a bucketful of water to
be carried to the barn for the animals. During the course of working on various tasks at
the Farm, Ben, who is a short, young man with glasses and a friendly smile, often said,
“I’ll help you!” but also often said, “Do you want to do it?” Interestingly, he seemed to
feel no sense of contradiction between these two statements. Now I can see that they
certainly do not have to contradict if we redefine the meaning of “help” broadly and
understand them from the principle of interdependence. However, up until the day when I
had a chance to work closely with Ben in the animal barn, I did not really think about
such logic and tended to regard Ben more as a “dependent person” who liked to ask for
help rather than trying to do a task by himself. I was also inclined to interpret his
preferred style of working, which was to contribute more by talking and making
conversation than by engaging in the physical aspect of work, as “being lazy.” Therefore,
it was a possibly mean-spirited question when I asked Ben, “Do you want to carry it [the
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bucket]? Or do you want me to carry it?” In response, he presented the above-mentioned
alternative solution that my enslaved mind failed to envision.
On the same day, Ben further showed me the power of interdependence when I
was struggling to clean the chicken coop with a shovel, a task that I was unaccustomed to
do. Seeing how I was struggling to scrape off materials stuck on the floor with my tool,
which was a plastic shovel, Ben entered the chicken coop, handed me a different shovel
made of metal with a pointy-head, saying, “I brought you the best shovel,” and took mine
instead. As I had begun to appreciate Ben’s way of work earlier on the day, I did not care much
about whether Ben would participate in physical work of cleaning with the exchanged shovel in
his hand or if he simply stood there to be a part of that time. Ben did start to join us in a literal

sense of cleaning, but once again, he made it into a collaborative, interdependent venture:
Since what needed to be removed from the ground was concentrated in one area, Ben and
I were working in close proximity. Working in the same area and struggling to negotiate
with the small space, Ben proposed that I make little scoops with my smaller and sharper
shovel and put them on his bigger shovel, which then he would throw in the barrel. I
instantly fell in love with the idea, and Ben and I started to work together.
Thanks to Ben’s work ethic as well as leadership that embraced the principle of
interdependence and activated the disconnected human connections, what could have
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been mere hard, isolated work was transformed, and there emerged a relational space that
embodied a radical, communicational, and hopeful possibility of how to co-construct a
world together with other members of the community.
In a place where the principle of interdependence prevails, an act of getting help
becomes a norm rather than a marker of incompetence. As such, help can be rather
casually sought, offered, and appreciated at the Farm among the primary informants. For
example, one day I spent time in a room where only labeled informants were working and
chatting unattended by staff, which did not happen very often at the Farm (I might have
been considered as “sub-staff” by the team-leading staff person who left the room
temporarily). Within the relaxed atmosphere of staff-free space, someone shared her
difficulties with spelling, to which Hailey resonated, saying, “I’m not a good speller” and
openly sought help on writing from Becky who was considered by the women in the
room to be good with spelling.
Publicly admitting one’s difficulties with spelling is not very easy in a society
where literacy is a socially expected skill and where reading/writing skills tend to be
regarded as equal to one’s intellectual capacity or even as a validation of one’s humanity
(Biklen & Kliewer, 2006), much like not being able to speak has long been equated with
not being able to think (Biklen, 2005). Moreover, at a place like the Farm that proudly
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and diligently fulfills the State requirements to work on improving the insufficient skills
of labeled program participants by incorporating certain numbers of skill development
goals into various aspects of lives at the Farm, the pressure to prove one’s competence or
to maintain a competent outlook was visible with real consequences. If one could prove
mastery of targeted skills, a door may open to engage in other activities that potentially
could better match with one’s own preferences and dreams, or even to grasp a paid job
opportunity. Hailey, who casually admitted that she was not good at spelling and asked
for her friend’s help with writing in the staff-free room, was one of the people I had
observed to exhibit the tensions around proving her competence with socially expected
skills. One day I followed Lois’s team as they drove to a store in the community to do
some shopping. As a troop of six persons, we were wandering around in the store, having
finished with the official part of the trip, which involved the shopping skill activities of
reading and finding appropriate items written on the shopping list. At one point while
wandering in the store, Lois asked the troop, “Who can tell me the time?” Hailey was
quick, anxious, and happy to answer. “That would be quarter to 11!” Hailey exclaimed.
As casual as it sounded, I first did not pick up any teaching or testing intentions in how
Lois posed the question, but apparently I was wrong. When Hailey boldly challenged
Lois, asking “Why don’t you look at your watch?”, Lois revealed that it was after all a
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testing question: “I wanted you to tell me the time.” Grasping the nature of the interaction,
Hailey toned down and claimed that “I got the time skill.” She then added in an even
lower tone of voice, “quote and quote,” as if to express her insecurity, diffidence, and also
a hint of resistance about being tested for and having to prove her competence all the time.
Remembering the tightness in Hailey’s responses to the “skill-talk” from that day, the
ease with which she talked about her “insufficient spelling skills” was surprising to me.
She even looked liberated when she laughed and exclaimed, “We are too weird!” Lois,
who once again was the staff leader of the team, came back to the room, heard Hailey’s
statement, and consoled her with, “No you are not.” Hailey’s claim, however, was
positively affirmed and substantiated by Becky, who had previously helped Hailey with
spelling. In the same kind of proud voice that Hailey had exhibited, Becky rejected Lois’
intervention, adding: “I hate to say this but I’m afraid we are!”
McKnight (1987), who warned that “institutionalized systems grow at the expense
of communities” (p. 57), elucidated that “[t]he community environment is constructed
around the recognition of fallibility” (p. 56). Putting aside the fact that I am intrigued by a
word like “fallibility,” which seems to imply that making errors can be regarded as
capability, I would yet expand McKnight’s statement to argue that the community
environment is constructed around the recognition of incompetence. That is, in
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community, fallibility, or I would say incompetence, is recognized not as a reason to be
“labeled, exiled, treated, counseled, advised, and protected” (McKnight, 1987, p. 57) but
rather simply as a part of being human. In other words, the meaning of “incompetence” is
re-constructed and it ceases to be a significant measure that jeopardizes one’s
membership in the human community. Furthermore, as McKnight noted, and as Ben and
Hailey embodied, with a vision of community, fallibility and incompetence are in fact
valued, as they are capable of invoking “a network of relationships involving work,
recreation, friendship, support, and the political power of being a citizen” (McKnight,
1987, p. 57). This contrasts with the institutionalized systems that objectify those with
particular fallibility or incompetence as “the clients and consumers of institutionalized
products” (McKnight, 1987, p. 57). Hailey and Becky’s self-claiming “We are too weird”
seemed to effectively unbound them from such objectifying institutional systems by
proudly recognizing the differences they embody.
As if to agree with McKnight’s argument, Jade, another young man at the Farm,
strategically used “dependency” as a way to create opportunities for interaction and to
mobilize relational spaces. On one day, during the lunch time, Jade kindly shared his
chips that he had brought as a part of his lunch with me, which I gratefully accepted. We
shared a bag of chips together and enjoyed the nice food. When I stood up, finishing
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lunch, Jade casually asked me to throw away his paper plate as well as the paper plate
that we shared as we ate his chips together. It felt natural for me to take the shared plate
and throw it away because I was eating from it too. And then because I would be standing
up and throwing something away anyway, I didn’t really mind throwing away his plates
altogether. Besides, I was closer to the trash box. So Jade’s request did make sense
between him and I, although Sara, a staff, saw it as Jade’s problematic behavior and
rebuked him as, “What is wrong with you, Jade?!”
It was not that Jade was particularly “lazy” (though the staff often interpreted him
that way), as he would be equally willing to do something for others as expect others to
do something for him. Rather, it seemed to me that he had a superior knowledge about
the fact that fallibility, incompetence, or dependency, which are often regarded as
something that lowers human value, actually had invaluable power to invoke
communication and to engage others. It was not that Jade could not do it himself when he
asked me to get some napkins for him on another day – they were right behind him; just
like I enjoyed sharing Jade’s chips not because I was hungry but because it allowed me to
be engaged in a pleasant interaction with someone during lunchtime when otherwise I
might have nothing to talk about or no one to interact with. For Jade, who has Down
syndrome and has limited command of speech, asking someone for help must have
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served him as “an alternative to being left out of ‘normal’ conversations” (Biklen, 2005, p.
50), just like a naming-the-American-states narrative did for Sean Barron who has autism
and has difficulty participating in oral-based conversations. Sean Barron explained, in his
autobiographical account, There’s a boy in here (Barron & Barron, 1992) that he
co-authored with his mother, how he strategically used his knowledge of American states’
names in order to join conversations that otherwise left him excluded; at every
opportunity, he would ask his parents’ friends whether they had ever visited particular
states. Though admitting that the listing-the-states narrative was “fragmented and
disjointed” and that it “led nowhere” (cited in Biklen, 2005, p. 49), Barron also explained
that it was nevertheless valuable as it enabled him to feel a sense of normality and control.
Similarly, asking others for a small favor could place Jade at risk of being seeing as lazy,
but nonetheless, he must have valued the strategy as it also enabled him to engage in
pleasant interactions with others, in which someone would receive Jade’s smiley
thank-you and a blown kiss.
Communication was valued at the Farm not as a mere means of exchanging
information or achieving a goal but more as a way to establish a relational and inclusive
space, or to access what McKnight (1987) referred to as “the forum within which
citizenship can be expressed” (p. 57). Alden, for example, would grab any opportunity to
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find an audience to listen to his story and instantly build a stage around himself to put on
a show, of which I was a big fan. He would often approach me and start with such a line
as “You won’t believe what happened, Maho.” And I could not resist asking “What?
What happened?” wanting to hear his story. Alden’s story often consisted of several lines
that described key events, and each sentence was often repeated more than once (and in
fact, the entire story was also repeated more than once). It also seemed that Alden tended
to omit transitional details from one key event to a next one, which might have made his
story “incomplete,” “immature,” or “incoherent.” Or, it might have been me who was not
able to understand all of what he said and picked up only major lines. Either way, it was
not very important in terms of understanding and enjoying Alden’s story.
The first line of Alden’s story of one day, for example, was, “We went to an
animal hospital.” And he mumbled something about “my dog.” The next line I could
understand was “I got off the (examination) table.” A bit confused with the story
development, I asked him, “What, you (rather than his dog) were on the table??” Alden
did not answer my question but proceeded to a critical part of his story: “I brought up
my dog.” Alden placed a prolonged emphasis on the word “dog” as he dramatically
acted out the movement of picking up his dog from the floor and holding him up in his
arms. Then the concluding or climax scene came next. Alden continued, “And I ran,”
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with a significant emphasis placed on the word “ran.” Unable to understand the
emphasized word, I tentatively repeated it, “raaan,” which caused Alden to put his face
closer to mine to correct my enunciation as, “ran.” Ah! Ran! Seeing that I finally
understood the most important part of his story, Alden repeated the last line one more
time with acting movements, beginning from a posture of “holding” his dog in his arms,
looking intently to his right, slightly swinging his arms and his body toward his left,
storing an energy that was soon to be released in the action of “run.” He coordinated the
oral aspect of his performance so that the word “ran” synchronized with his last action
of mimicking the beginning of a running motion. Completing his story, he quickly
looked to me and smiled satisfactorily (and ready to do it a few more times!).
It was relationship that mattered to Alden, and he always tried to build relational
spaces that “facilitate the storytelling and dialogue” (Steeves, 2006, p. 107) and where he
could “author his own life” (Steeves, 2006, p. 107). In fact, building relational spaces
seemed to be of utmost importance to him. At a place like the Farm where people were
expected to move at an institutional pace according to the predetermined schedule,
Alden’s story-telling was often seen, treated, and managed as a deviant behavior that
caused disturbances to the scheduled order of the institution. Thus I was frequently
instructed by staff, “Don’t listen to him” or “Just ignore him” as I stopped and was drawn
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into Alden’s story-telling and his relational spaces. One day, for example, Lois, a staff
who saw Alden telling me his story of the day, told Alden that he needed to stop
“bothering Maho.” Lois said to Alden, “Alden, Maho is very busy. You can’t keep talking
to people like that.” She also told me that I needed to stop listening to him and to move
forward, then left us to enter the bathroom. A few minutes later, Lois came out of the
bathroom. As soon as she saw us still continuing what she had told us to stop, Lois
interrupted us, and this time, she told me in a more straightforward, forceful way, “Maho,
you’ve gotta tell him good-bye sooner or later.” Out of respect for Lois, I tried to show
that I did listen to her at least to some extent by hesitantly and slowly moving my body
away from Alden. Recognizing that I was still wanting to hear his story, however, Alden
continued on telling his story with a somewhat urgently raised pitch and he even
mentioned one element that I could not quite understand, which was about a “nurse.” As
soon as he said something about a “nurse,” I stopped my moving-away motion and turned
back to him and asked, “So, there was a nurse?” At this time, I could sense that Lois gave
up on us, which released me from a restraining order that I felt like I was given.
At the Farm, as people passed and left him behind, Alden would often call out,
“Don’t go!” “This is important!” He seemed to have understood that in order for us to
build a just, inclusive community, “[e]ach of us need connections to others so that we
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have a setting and audience to express unique aspects of our personality” (McMillan,
1996, p. 315) and thus we must fight for it.
Fighting against Institutionalization
The Farm was an institution, in the sense that, as a New York State Office of
Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (NYS-OMRDD) funded program, it
was organized as “a structure of control” that delivered a “service” rather than “care”
(McKnight, 1987, p. 57). Complying with the rules dictated by the State, the Farm did
their best (and prided themselves in regard to this effort) to incorporate a certain number
of skill development goals into each aspect of life at the Farm. Sometimes the labeled
informants’ wishes were turned down because what they wanted to do might or might not
address one of goals that had been identified for them. Lisa, who was vocal about her
frustration with the program and the staff, once cried out, “Goals suck!” and angrily put
her face down on the table when her desire to work on her book-making project was at
risk of being rejected on the grounds that it might not be related to the goals defined in
her service plan. Lisa’s anger sharply resonates with how Michael Kennedy, a long-time
self-advocate and a former resident of an institution, critiqued the disability service
system based on his own experiences. In an article, The Disability Blanket, Kennedy
(1994) revealed his critical analysis from a service-recipient perspective that the
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disability service system often invaded privacy, ignored personal goals, and degraded the
meanings of life. Kennedy (1994) critiques as follows:
Third, under the disability blanket everything you do must be part of a
“program” rather than just living your life. It’s like everything that you want to
try to do for yourself has to be labeled, or logged, or decided by professionals….
When I first started working at Syracuse University, Medicaid said my job had to
be written up as a program, with goals and objectives, verbal prompts, and all. I
had to report what I did during my workdays, and these reports were brought to
my team meeting so they could make sure my goals and objectives were being
met. It made my job feel like it was just a program, and it made me feel like they
thought I wasn’t responsible. Finally, I just refused to do it. I didn’t care what the
consequences were. (p. 75)
Staff at the Farm often reminded, rewarded, or reprimanded the labeled
informants using the language of “such-and-such skills” that they were supposed to be
working on during a certain activity, such as time skills, money skills, computer skills,
number skills, safety skills, shopping skills, directional skills, being-flexible-skills, and
the like. Furthermore, based on this skill-oriented, developmental perspective, staff often
perceived interdependency as laziness or incompetence, and imaginative, playful or
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non-verbal communication as inappropriate and immature.
There was a time and place, however, where staff could liberate themselves from
the developmental perspective and from the rule-enforcing role of the institution, and
could enjoy the interdependent, inclusive, and responsive relational space with the
labeled informants. Although, as Steeves observed with teachers and therapists, such
liberation occurred primarily in “small one-to-one ‘secret’ places” where the staff felt
“safe enough to improvise and play” (Steeves, 2006, p. 110), such as in a car or in the
community where they were free from other staff’s scrutiny regarding their fidelity and
ability to maintain order and to enforce the institutional rules on the labeled informants.
For example, in the car on our way to a large craft shop 30 minutes away, Mary, one of
the team leaders, was more relaxed and less rigid in terms of executing her role as staff.
Jade, who has Down syndrome and whose speech is limited, employed an array of
impressively creative strategies to engage others and to build relational spaces, one of
which involved making fun of someone’s “smelly feet.” Typically, however, this strategy
did not work well with staff at the Farm and often resulted in a reprimand to him about
how it was not a nice thing to say to other people. Mary, who sat across from Jade in the
car, initially took the regular staff position and replied as such, but soon she decided to let
it go and, instead, to have fun with it: Mary began making fun of Jade for “liking my
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smelly feet” and even challenged that his feet were possibly smellier than hers.
Mary knew, however, that she could do this only because she was outside of the
Farm and no one was judging her ability to successfully control the labeled participants.
On our way back, therefore, Mary needed to return to her formal role as a staff member
accompanying participants who obeyed her order and demonstrated good behaviors. This
sudden transformation was first directed toward Jade when he and I were playing “Hang
Man.” The challenge word I came up with was “Smelly Feet,” which Jade marvelously
figured out with a good laugh. At this point, Mary decided to put on her “staff voice” and
reminded Jade that he needed to calm down as we were getting closer to the Farm. Mary
went on to say that when we were out in the community, people, including herself she
admitted, tended to get excited, relax, and act sillier. But we could not be acting silly and
distracting people when we got back to the Farm as people would be properly and quietly
eating lunch in the dining room. Mary added that this applied to everyone, not just Jade,
after which she effectively executed a warning and reprimanded Lisa to stop tickling
Tailor and to “Hands off” from him. At a lunch table, Lisa angrily expressed her
frustration saying, “Girls get caught for murders, and boys don’t!” thus pointing out an
injustice in blaming only one person for a collaborative act.
As such, the Farm, as a site for operating disability programs that were designed
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to provide services rather than care, was an institutionalized system that McKnight
(1987) warned as growing “at the expense of communities” (p. 57). The labeled
informants (as well as the non-labeled staff), therefore, needed to fight against such
institutionalization in order to protect their community. One of the ways they did so was
through claiming and validating themselves. Suzanne, for example, who was well known
for and sometimes seen as annoying for her routine questions such as “What did you do
last night?” or “What are you going to eat tonight?” , occasionally made sudden, assertive
announcements such as, “We are working!” or “I am busy!” When I first heard her make
this statement, we were wandering around in a store after having completed the official
shopping activity. Thus, this wandering seemed to be a rather aimless activity, at least
from my perspective. However, Suzanne, as if to challenge my view that did not find
much meaning and value in what she was doing, looked into the face of another team
member and validated their activities with the assertion, “We are working!”
Suzanne also sometimes claimed which group she wanted to be a part of, even
though she had a perfect knowledge of the Farm’s rule that the labeled participants had to
stay in an assigned team during the day and work on assigned tasks. One day, for
example, Suzanne boldly asked to be allowed to change her assigned team and instead
work with Lauren. She was a staff person who seemed to employ Goode’s (1992) “emic
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perspectives” (i.e., trying to assume a perspective of others by putting oneself in their
shoes) more than “etic perspective” (i.e., seeing non-standard behaviors as deviants and
abnormal) and was therefore liked by many of my labeled informants – especially by the
ones who less relied on speech for communication and thus had to employ a variety of
non-traditional strategies to communicate with others, such as Suzanne, Jade, and Alden.
Suzanne inquired of her assigned team leader, “Can I work with Lauren?” Even when
rejected, she did not simply give up but rather followed up with a very reasonable
question: “Why not?” On a different day, Suzanne’s team was making cookies in the
kitchen, and Lauren’s team had an art teacher to work on drawing in the adjacent dining
room. After having finished the cookie baking, serving the cookies to people in the dining
area, and receiving compliments from the guests, Suzanne then decided that she should
attempt to join Lauren’s team and paint. Seeing an open easel on one of the dining tables,
Suzanne approached Karen, the art teacher, and claimed, “I paint. Can I paint?” To me, it
was a bold statement in the sense that it broke the boundary artificially set by staff
regarding which group to stay with and what activities to do, while being completely
knowledgeable about the dynamics of those institutional systems (Suzanne often recited
the Farm rules, such as “I am not supposed to repeat questions”). Karen, being an
outsider and therefore less bound by the institutional rules like myself, was simply
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pleased that Suzanne showed a voluntary interest in art and welcomed her.
Despite its out-of-context appearance, Alden’s story also often contained an
element of claiming and validating. For example, at the same store where Suzanne made
the validating statement of “We are working,” Alden too, all of a sudden, looked into my
face with a very serious expression and said, “Do I look like a monkey? I am not an
animal. I am a person.” Hit by such a fundamental declaration, I replied with the same
seriousness that Alden had displayed, “Yes, you are a person. You are not a monkey.”
Not only claiming and validating their own existence, people at the Farm also
often validated others. For example, Alford, who was a tall man with black hair and big
black eyes, validated Jade’s silliness with, “You are being funny.” Jade, as I introduced
him earlier, had a limited command of speech and thus often strategically used creative
and playful means of communication, such as asking someone for help; playing games;
making funny faces; expressing himself in a lively manner through a combination of
signs, words, non-words, howling, dramatic tones of voice, and mimicking sounds; and
making physical contact such as touching, shaking hands, and giving hugs to people. It
was quite an impressive repertoire of communication that Jade employed but most of
these strategies, except signs, words, and “appropriate” hand shaking, were often
disregarded, reprimanded, and prohibited as inappropriate behaviors by staff, which was
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very sad to see.
So I became anxious when Jade started to “act silly” with Alford, touching his
hair and head. I was anxious first because I was worried that Jade might be in trouble
again if the staff saw him doing it, but also because an ingrained “special education”
habit in myself began to doubt whether Jade could control himself so that things did not
get too wild. Hating to act like staff or a teacher, I did my best to sound light and like a
peer when I finally expressed my concerns, “Let him alone, Jade!” In response, Alford
gently rejected my intervention by presenting a sharply different interpretation of Jade’s
behavior as “You are being funny.” In other words, Alford resisted the devaluing
meanings imposed on Jade’s behavior using “the foreign language of studies and
reports…that ignores their own capacities and insights” (McKnight, 1987, p. 58) and
validated Jade’s way of being and contributing as a member of the community.
“Being funny,” which could easily be regarded as an irrelevant or inappropriate
quality at a site of work or training, was frequently acknowledged and expressed as a
valued human quality at the Farm by the labeled informants. For example, Ben, who
taught me the power of interdependence and whose preferred working style was by
making conversations more than by actively participating in the physical aspect of
completing the task, was positively recognized during an interview by his fellow worker,
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Lucy, as “A good worker” and “Funny.” Being funny and having fun blurred “[t]he line
between work and play” (McKnight, 1987, p. 58) and helped to transform the
institutionalized space into a community. As McKnight (1987) stated, “[y]ou will know
that you are in community if you often hear laughter and singing” (p. 58). In such
relational space, a boring and simple task like folding and taping a pile of newsletters
could become enjoyable, vibrant, multifold, and inclusive: Thanks to Ben, who created a
significant amount of conversation in a conference room while he took the newsletters I
or someone else had folded, made them into a neat pile, and placed them in front of
others who taped the newsletters, even staff were relaxed and enjoyed the conversation.
Alden, who would be likely to be excluded or marginalized as a non-contributing burden
if the meaning of work was defined narrowly, was also able to be a valuable part of the
folding-the-newsletters task by contributing some of his jokes and bringing laughter to
the community. The best of Alden’s jokes on that day was, “What does a dog say to a new
sand paper?” “(In a really dog-like voice) Rough!” Alden’s joke even encouraged Lindsey,
who was shy and soft-spoken, to offer her specialty joke, which was later repeated (or
stolen!) by Alden. Alden seemed to be especially happy: He was jumpy with a smiley
face and giggles, and he needed to run a little, almost driving himself out of the room.
Another example of validating others could be observed around Dean, who was
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mostly quiet but often succinctly responded “Yeah” in his low, attractive voice to people’s
questions. Dean wore thick glasses, had Down syndrome, and loved cars and girls. Lisa,
who considered herself as talkative and who recognized that this sometimes got her in
trouble with staff or with her colleagues at the Farm and at another work program she
attended, expressed in an interview how she admired a person like Dean. She said, “I can
learn a lot from him. The way he acts. I can learn the quietness from him.” For Lisa,
Dean’s less talking was a commendable character rather than a speech defect caused by
his disability. Similarly, Lisa saw it as an expression of his preference and decision
making when Dean quietly slid pens and a paper to the next person without adding
anything to the “Farm Book” – a project that Ben proudly initiated, creating a “Who Is
Who” book about the Farm. Lisa interpreted and explained that “He doesn’t like that kind
of thing.” In a situation where Dean’s actions could have been interpreted simply as
passiveness or incompetence, Lisa recognized and validated Dean’s agency.
The labeled informants at the Farm fought against institutionalization also by
resisting and challenging institutional rules, values, and relationships. For example, Lisa,
who did not hesitate to express her frustration with the staff’s prioritizing program goals
over her wishes to work on her book-making project, also did not hesitate to challenge
the power differences that existed between staff and the labeled informants. This occurred
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when Malik returned from outside after he threw out some garbage before lunch. Mary, a
young staff member, asked Malik if he had washed his hands, and when Malik said no
while looking troubled for being questioned over such a matter, Mary told him to go back
and wash his hands before eating his lunch. This was when Lisa’s sharp comment was
thrown into the air: “Look who’s the boss!” Understandably, this comment was not easy
for Mary to take in. She said, with a hint of defensiveness in her voice, “I am not a boss!
I’m just giving him a… helpful suggestion!” Lisa did not back up but further asserted
how she saw it. “No, you are the boss.”
Being as vocal as Lisa, one might think that it must be easy for persons like her
to express objections toward staff or that she is just a problem-causing rebel by the nature
of her disability, which I believe was not the case. For a less institutionalized outsider like
me, the authoritative power that the staff held over the program participants was
significant and felt overwhelming. Staff often spoke in sentences that designated them as
agents and decision makers and placed the program participants in passive positions, such
as “We allow them to take the phone,” “We allow them to drive the vehicle,” or “We let
them sit wherever they like with whomever they like so they can have time to socialize
on their own [during lunch]”. From the start of my fieldwork, I was painfully made to
realize the significant power differences between the staff and program participants as
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well as the different positions occupied by labeled informants and myself. For example,
when a team leader, Lois, temporarily left the craft room and there were insufficient
materials for the assigned task (sanding wood plates), I felt free to roam around the room
and search the shelves for more materials, while three labeled informants including Lisa
just remained in their seats. Such “restrained-ness” was particularly evident in Lisa. After
a while of sanding small pieces of wood plates, Sandra (one of the labeled participants on
the team) started to draw on paper with markers – a choice Lois offered her with
necessary materials before she had left the room. Seeing Sandra doing it motivated Lisa
to draw as well. Lisa claimed that she didn’t like markers and she could only draw with
pencils. So she wondered if there were any pencils available in the room. I wondered that
too. And I saw Lisa unmoving, frozen in her seat, despite the fact that it had appeared that
pencils might have been on the long table along the wall that was only two steps from
where she was sitting. My quick first instinct was to see it as “laziness.” But then when I
got up off my seat, walked around the semi-circle table, and freely wandered around the
room and examined what was on the long table when our supervisor was absent, I could
not help realizing the privilege contained in the “freeness” that I had taken for granted. I
wrote in my field notes as follows:
I don’t know if [Lisa] saw my act as evidence of the ultimate different positions
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we each occupy at the Farm or saw it as a brave act or what. It was a concrete
moment when I experienced our differences: I did not see the barrier that was
holding Lisa back and restraining her. I did not have to deal with it. It was like
she was on a different side of an invisible cage. (field notes #1, Sep 14, 2005, p.
13)

When I finally found a pencil and paper for Lisa to draw with, she tentatively took them,
saying “I hope Lois doesn’t mind me drawing (instead of sanding as she was initially
instructed to do).” When Lois came back to the room, without much thought, I joyfully
shared Lisa’s beautiful drawing with Lois. Lisa seemed startled by my reckless act and
quickly said, “Oh NO!” But then she was comforted by Lois’s bright smile and
enthusiasm for her artwork. Happy for her, I also felt bad that I had acted carelessly
without getting Lisa’s consent. I just did not think about it. I did not understand how it
might startle Lisa. I did not understand how the societal and institutional divide had been
working on the labeled individuals, violently regulating and oppressing their bodies and
actions.
As such, Lisa was as conscious, afraid, and affected by the staff-participants divide
as any other program participants at the Farm. There was in fact once a conversation on
“Who is Maho?” among the labeled informants. It happened in the afternoon when
program participants were gathered to watch a movie and the only staff in charge of the
room temporarily left the room, seeing that I was there. As soon as the staff left, Lisa
whispered excitedly, “No staff!” Then Tailor, a large young man, pointed out that there
was still Maho in the room, to which Malik who sat in a wheelchair parked right next to
me immediately jumped in and responded, “Oh Maho is not staff. She’s a volunteer,” and
asked me for a confirmation. When I agreed that I was not staff, Lisa, as if to advocate for
me, concluded that “No, she’s not a staff! She doesn’t keep an eye on us. She’s good.”
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Understanding the authoritative power that staff had over program participants, it must
not have been easy for Lisa (or anyone) to challenge the imposed boundary and to
express her resistance against the institutional system. Lisa, therefore, was indeed proud
of herself: She once stated, “I know I am bad. And I am proud of it!”
Jade, who was disadvantaged in terms of orally resisting and talking back, also
seemed proud to express his resistance by action whenever possible. For example, when
Lisa saw Jade inviting me to exchange our chips and cautioned him that it was against the
rules, Jade, with a challenging look on his face, did not stop and continued to invite me.
Joining his resistance and appreciating his way of creating community, I too did not stop
and accepted his offer.
Although it does not lessen the reality that the nature and degree of the
consequences caused by the power differences significantly differ for staff and for labeled
program participants, the institutional systems also put strains on staff as well. At one
time or another, many staff were observed to demonstrate conscious or unconscious acts
that could be interpreted as frustration or resistance against institutionalization. Lauren,
introduced earlier as a staff member who was well liked by many program participants,
was the type of staff member who seemed to question the validity of institutional systems
much more than the behaviors of the program participants. For example, when her team
was playing Uno and Suzanne asked for help getting a card from the stack, Lauren did
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not adopt a dominant, institutionalized interpretation that defined Suzanne’s frequent
requests for help as inappropriate dependence requiring encouragement and redirection to
get her back on task. When Malik, a male program participant, said to Suzanne, “No, you
do it,” mimicking what staff usually said to Suzanne, Lauren stopped Malik, interrupting
the institutional pattern, and instead validated it as a legitimate call for help with, “She
can’t reach them.” Lauren then pushed the card stack toward Suzanne. Malik said “Oh,”
to the alternative interpretation of Suzanne’s behavior that Lauren had presented, and
took one card and gave it to Suzanne.
In contrast to Lauren, Lois was the type of staff person who strongly believed in
the validity and effectiveness of understanding the labeled program participants’
behaviors from the developmental point of view. She faithfully devoted herself to
training the labeled program participants to follow the Farm rules, improve their
insufficient skills, and develop independence. As Lois herself once described the Farm-“It is kind of a family business”-- her husband as well as her daughter also worked for
different parts of the Farm such as the respite program. Lois was a long time staff
member at the Farm, and devoted herself enough to go beyond her formal job
requirements, sometimes inviting or accepting a program participant who, for instance,
needed a place to stay, into her own house. Her bright personality as well as compassion
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for the labeled program participants were probably part of the reason why Lois was also
well-liked and trusted by many program participants, even though she was rather strict
about rules and skill development training. As this type of person, Lois sometimes
seemed frustrated by, or even jealous of, an outsider like myself who was not
constrained by an institutional staff role and was not very concerned with or worried
about rules. For instance, when I resumed my visits to the Farm after a 1-month absence,
I decided to break the rule of “No hug for Jade,” which appeared to have been created to
teach socially appropriate personal space to Jade who loved people and who relied on
both verbal (albeit limited) and non-verbal communication tools, including physical
contacts. Having greeted everyone in the morning with a hug, I felt it was appropriate to
do the same with Jade to celebrate our reunion.

As I moved to get closer to Jade and hugged him, I saw a glimpse of Lois’ smile,
as she was standing next to me. This smile was immediately contradicted,
though, by her command of, “Jade, no more hugs! You know the rule. Only hand
shaking!” (field notes #9, April 12, 2006, p. 83)

At the time, I was too confused by the contradiction – the smile and the reprimand
– and failed to recognize until later that Lois did allow this one-time hug accompanied by
a generous smile. She did break the rule, in other words. She let it go for a second and
allowed Jade to do what was forbidden. She, in fact, even looked as if she was happy for
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us and enjoyed seeing the human-to-human moment in which we were able to connect
and exchange appreciation of one another. In a sense, Lois at this moment acted as herself,
resisting being defined by the institutional system. However, after only a brief instant of
freeing herself from the institutional role, Lois again returned to being a faithful staff
member. She even declared, jokingly, as if to make the community-to-institution
transition as light as possible, that “Yes, I’ll be a law enforcer!”
Alden, whose stories were often regarded as a disturbance to the scheduled pace
of the institution and who was always instructed to pick up his pace so he could move
along with others, one day protested to a staff, Sara, “Why do you pull my hand? You
don’t have to pull my hand.” Trying to get him to move and to sit at the dining table for
lunch, Sara justified her act with, “Because you are resisting!” to which Alden explained
his perspective, “I’m not resisting,” implying that he would in fact sit if she would only
let him move at his own pace.
Alden tended to be seen as stubborn and resistant, and thus as a “big task” to be
assigned to work with. Staff often wished “Good luck” to someone who had gotten Alden
on her or his team for a day. However, Alden in fact negotiated as much as he resisted and
claimed. For example, one day, I was with the same team as Alden and we were out
shopping. When it was time to leave the store and go back to the van, Alden stalled,
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seemingly stuck, and could not move. After we had remained in the same spot for about
10-15 minutes, during which I occasionally begged Alden to move, Tasha, a team leader,
came to let us know that everybody was now in the van and ready to go. It was time to
increase the seriousness of my begging. I pleaded, “Let’s go Alden! I need to go! I am
freeeeeeezing!” Alden quickly looked into my eyes with what seemed like a
compassionate gaze. But this did not result in any movement by him. Thinking he might
need physical prompts to initiate a body movement, I touched the side of his hip and gave
him pressure so his hip would turn toward the store exit. Alden’s hip turned a bit but his
feet did not. His feet looked as though they were glued to the floor. Alden then proposed
a different workable plan, “Can I go this way too?” looking the opposite direction of the
way I was pushing him. So I said, “Sure.” Alden was finally able to move and we all left
the store.
As such, Alden moved on and allowed others to move on, but only after he was
also listened to and after his needs were given a fair consideration and negotiation. He
was resistant against simply being imposed on by others’ demands. In a sense, through
his way of being, Alden “interrupt[s] a smooth landscape” (Steeves, 2006, p. 113) and
reminds, demands, and helps us to resist institutional structures within which some
control others, and to change them into community structures where people come
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together to communicate, to negotiate, and to build creative solutions and consensus.
Conclusion
I initiated this study in order to seek alternative ways to conceptualize human
value that would not put people into a hierarchical order based on the narrowly defined
utility value. However, as I spent more time at the Farm, I gradually realized that the
question of human value might be rather irrelevant or unimportant in the community that
was being woven and fought for by the labeled informants of the Farm. For example, in
my effort to discover what counted as contributions from the perspectives of labeled
informants, I asked during an interview with Becky about Alford (whom Becky identified
as one of her friends at the Farm) and, in particular, what she thought was the nicest thing
that he had ever done. After a few seconds of thinking, Becky then formed her answer as,
“Just being himself!” It seems that my question was rather foreign to Becky’s conception
of what people bring to the community: Becky’s response seemed to clarify that it was
not what people did or did not do that made them valuable. Rather, it was the unique
existence of each person that was most important, meaningful, and valuable beyond
question. The radical insight contained in Becky’s statement coincides with what Judith
Snow (n.d.) wrote: “Our presence is the fundamental gift that we bring to the human
community. Presence is the foundation of all other opportunities and interactions, of
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everything that is meaningful” (“Gifts,” para. 11) It is a radical argument that presumes,
not questions or argues for, anyone’s value, just like Biklen’s notion of “presumption of
competence” (Biklen, 2005) and Mutsuharu Shinohara’s notion of “presumption of
humanness” (Shinohara, 1986).
Thus, the research focus had to be changed. The question became not so much
one of re-conceptualizing human value as one of community where human value can be
presumed for anybody. As illustrated in the previous section, what mattered most in the
friendship community of the labeled informants at the Farm was relationship. Based on
the principle of interdependence and on valuing of “incompetence,” people at the Farm
fought against disconnection and institutionalization, and instead sought to establish
relational spaces, in which people could claim, validate, resist, negotiate, and respond to
each other.
In other words, it can be said that Levinas’s idea of ethics prevailed in the
friendship community of labeled informants at the Farm, which began with “answering
the call of responsibility from the face of the Other” (Arnett, 2003, p. 39). Levinas, a
Lithuania-born French philosopher, reframed the self “from a willful agent to a
responsive creation, moving from a traditional focus on autonomy and independent
agency to interhuman responsive action responsible for the Other” (Arnett, 2003, p. 39).
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Responsible communication exhibited by Sandra and Jade embodied such ethics. Sandra
and Jade, who both have Down syndrome and a limited command of speech, often
communicated with each other via a combination of speech, gestures, facial expressions –
most notably making funny faces and returning dramatic reactions to each other – and
babbling, nonunderstandable (to my ears) tones of voice. They also enjoyed
conversations in which they imitated and made fun of a staff person’s bossiness, such as
giving them orders and telling them what to do or what not to do. One day, as usual,
Sandra and Jade were conversing in a creative, imaginative, and playful way in the dining
hall. Their excited talk, however, drew the staff’s attention, causing them to be
reprimanded for engaging in inappropriate behavior and even to be separated. Sandra was
ordered to leave Jade and move to a different table. Sandra, with a rather blank
expression on her face, got up and started to leave Jade. As she walked away, Jade
howled at her, “Auuuu! Auuuuu!” Though still moving further away from him, Sandra
howled back at him. She looked as though she just could not ignore and had to respond to
Jade’s howling as she stopped her movement, a bit awkwardly turned her head and chest
toward Jade, and howled back to him across the hallway. At that instant, Sandra might
have acted on her understanding that she had an obligation beyond her will, an obligation
to be responsive to the Other, as Levinas would say. She might have understood that
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“[t]he ‘I’ finds identity in response to the Other” (Arnett, 2003, p. 39, emphasis added).
When there is a responsive and responsible relationship, a mindful and hopeful
response could emerge and alter the world. On one day, for example, Jade asked Mary,
his team leader, using signs, whether he could listen to his own CD in a car during the
going-out-to-the-community-task. Mary, who had skillfully understood his signs, could
have dismissed this request immediately exercising staff’s power over the participants.
But she did not. Posing a moment with a thoughtful look, Mary said, “Wait a minute,”
and turned around to go back to the dining room to ask Tasha (a little more experienced
staff) for her opinion. Meanwhile, Jade proceeded to his locker in the hallway, opened his
backpack, and was about to grab his CD player out of his bag when Mary came back with
the “no” news. Mary told Jade that, because not everyone had a CD player, it was better
if he did not bring his own CD player either. Jade did not seem to mind the rejection. He
only said, “Oh,” and put his CD player back into his backpack. Going out of the door,
Jade even threw “Thank you, Mary!” to her back. Mary looked a little surprised (or
pleasantly troubled) that she received a thank-you from Jade after she had rejected his
request, returned him a thank-you, and added “That was kind of you to ask.”
Mary’s troubled look demonstrated that Jade’s reaction betrayed her expectation.
In her logic, it probably did not make much sense that he thanked her even though he did
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not achieve what he wanted. But for Jade, it must have been relationship and what he
could gain through the process of communicating that mattered more than merely
obtaining a tangible outcome. And Jade certainly gained a lot: He was heard, validated,
taken seriously, and received a response. In a way, human connections that contribute
toward building community were restored and strengthened. Through such connections
and a responsive relationship, Jade’s logic could in turn touch on and bring about a
change in Mary’s logic as well. When Mary thanked Jade saying, “It was kind of you to
ask,” she neither used the institutional language of “good job” nor sounded as though she
was merely giving him positive reinforcement for “desirable” behavior. Rather, Mary’s
response sounded genuine and personal as if to express that she was touched by and
appreciated Jade’s kindness - his kindness, generosity, and maturity to forgive her for
turning down his small wish with no good reason, and even to gracefully thank her for
taking his communication seriously enough to listen and consider the possibility.
Thus, it is in this relational space, in which such a mindful response emerged,
that we can find hope that “[a] unique way of seeing the world is shared and the world is
altered” (Steeves, 2006, p. 113); that is, the hope that we can indeed change the world.
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CHAPTER 5
Findings: Community at Kapu Kapu
“Kurambon laughed ‘Kapu kapu.’”
A verse from “Yamanashi (A Wild Pear)” by Kenji Miyazawa, 1923.
In an attempt to understand, capture, and represent the construction of an
inclusive community that I experienced at Kapu Kapu, I identified and chose to delineate
it by the following four themes: (1) Affirm, respond, and maintain relationships with
others, (2) The art of living with different others, (3) Cultivate alternative meanings, and
(4) Open to vulnerability.
Affirm, Respond, and Maintain Relationships with Others
When Kapu Kapu first opened the café in the local shopping mall in 1998, other
storeowners were not very welcoming; they were concerned and defensive. Mr. Suzaki,
the director, recalled how Shiori, a woman with Down syndrome and one of Kapu Kapu’s
original members from its early days, would drop by each store every morning on her
way to Kapu Kapu and personally greet the shop owners one by one. Mr. Suzaki
attributed the good relationships with the neighbors that Kapu Kapu now enjoys to such
acts that gradually melted prejudicial defensiveness and cultivated a foundation on which
to develop more personalized and less categorized relationships.
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As such, approaching, greeting, and expressing interest in others, was an
important way for Kapu Kapu workers to build an inclusive community. In a sense, it
both demanded and invited others to be responsive and get involved. Seiko, for example,
who was blind and mostly lied on the floor when she was at Kapu Kapu, actively sought
out others. She often changed her body position so that she was closer to somebody,
sometimes even burying her face in someone’s lap. Such actions never failed to evoke
responses, and the called-on person often responded to her by tapping her back or talking
to her.
Similarly, Yuji, who mostly communicated not via speech but through his actions,
often built relational space around himself by physically approaching and directing
actions toward others. For example, one day when I was sitting at the edge of a flat,
raised working space at the end of the café area, Yuji walked toward me smiling, so I
invited him to sit with me. Yuji accepted my invitation and sat on a step. Then after a
while, all of a sudden, Yuji threw his right hand up in the air, landed his friendly hand on
my thigh, and leaned his body slightly on mine, making me feel included and thus
affirmed. Responding to Yuji’s initiation, I too bodily communicated my affirmation of
him by jointly maintaining our bonded and interdependent posture.
Interests and concerns for others were frequently expressed, even for someone
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who was not there on a particular day. An important part of the morning meeting at Kapu
Kapu was to announce the names of people who were absent for the day, to report the
whereabouts of those who had been absent for a while, and to celebrate the return of
those who had not been at Kapu Kapu on a previous day or days. This kind of
information was important for Kapu Kapu workers; there was often someone who told
me as soon as I arrived about another worker who was absent or another who had
returned. Similar conversations were also often repeated throughout the day as if they
could not ignore and just move on like nobody was missing; absence had to be mentioned
and recognized. It seemed that in this way Kapu Kapu workers reaffirmed the
membership of individuals who were absent and thereby strengthened their community
by expressing recognition of and concern for the missing members. For example, Mrs.
Saishu, the mother of Seiko, directed a genuinely happy and appreciative smile at Fujii, a
kind young man who was also often described as noisy or wild, every time he astutely
observed that only Mrs. Saishu came, wondered about her daughter, and asked, “Where is
Seiko?”
Thinking about and missing others not only affirmed the community
membership for those who were missed, but also could promote “the habit of inclusion”
in the community, as opposed to “the habit of exclusion” (Paley, 1993,) and thereby
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secure places for everyone including the person who expressed the concern for others.
For example, one day Mariko, a soft-spoken woman with short hair, glasses, and a bright
smile, was getting ready to leave for an assigned half-day shift at a small café that Kapu
Kapu operated in a nearby community care center. Miwa, a short and thin woman,
half-jokingly and half-seriously told Mariko, “I’ll miss you, Mariko” then pleaded
dramatically, “Please do not go!” clinging and almost collapsing on Mariko. It was only a
half-day shift, so Mariko would return to Kapu Kapu after a few hours. But it
nevertheless was a chance for Miwa to express and send a message that she wanted
Mariko to exist. Mariko, too, happily smiled, looking pleased to receive Miwa’s
humorously dramatic affirmation of her existence, welcomed her bodily contact, and
responded Miwa by mutually affirming statement, “I’ll miss you too!”
As such, affirming others by approaching, greeting, and expressing concerns and
interests was one thing: Responding to those expressions and interactions was a
complementary element. The labeled workers at Kapu Kapu seemed to understand the
importance of responsiveness so much that they sometimes even seemed as if they were
obliged to respond; this reminded me of interactions that I observed between Sandra and
Jade at the Farm. For example, Shiori, the person who every morning diligently greeted
each of the store owners of the local shopping mall in Kapu Kapu’s early history, looked
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as if she had to get up and chase after Hime when she suddenly dashed off of a bench at a
bus stop. It was at the end of the day and both Shiori and Hime were waiting for their bus
to come. Shiori and I were engaged in a lively conversation and Hime was rather quiet.
Then suddenly (or so it seemed to me), Hime dashed off the bench. Shiori immediately
ran after Hime as she called her name, caught her, gently put her arm around Hime’s
shoulder, and came back to the bench together. It was not new; it had happened before, I
was told. I myself saw this rather “patterned scene” several times. Perhaps it was me who
made Hime feel left out as I must have disturbed the typical balance of Shiori’s
distribution of her attention among her friends and others who shared the same bus. It
could have been dismissed as a mere attention-seeking behavior that one must extinguish.
Shiori, however, did not see it that way. Shiori never doubted its validity as a
communicative behavior that required a response; She faithfully got up and ran after
Hime every time she dashed away. As Shiori and Hime walked together back to the bus
stop, Shiori would further assure Hime by telling her, “You are sweet,” then sometimes
even added a light kiss on Hime’s cheek, at which Hime screamed with a delighted smile.
Patterned behaviors or utterances are often regarded as socially inappropriate
and as such discouraged and prohibited, as was the case at the Farm: Suzanne’s “routine
questions” and Alden’s “story-telling” were often silenced based on institutional rules. At
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Kapu Kapu, institutional power did not define patterned behaviors and utterances as
inappropriate, and therefore people at Kapu Kapu could safely employ them as part of a
creative communication system. For example, Shiori, who had superb conversational
skills despite a limited vocabulary that could be understood by others, often involved
others in conversations by posing her favorite questions such as “Do you like…?” and
“Where did you buy…?” Both questions often worked excellently in terms of evoking
responses on original as well as on derivative topics and expanding the circle of
conversation. One day, for example, during a monthly sewing club with an invited
instructor, Shiori created lively conversation by posing a series of “Do you like…?”
questions, to which various people participated and responded with personal opinions or
further questions. At one point, I thought she asked, “Do you like celery?” so I took up
the question and offered my experiences of eating celery with a dip of peanut butter in the
U.S. (which is not customary in Japan). After quite a period of excited talking, someone
with a better ear informed me that Shiori had in fact asked “Do you like jello?”
Miwa, who was often shy at initial encounters but in fact, betraying a quiet
image that her thin and pale outlook presented, could be quite talkative, albeit
disadvantaged in speech, also frequently utilized patterns of witty questions and
statements in order to create conversation and to engage others. One of her best
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conversational tools was to claim that a particular person resembled somebody else or
something. It could launch lively conversations and in fact was sometimes adopted by
other members of Kapu Kapu as well. For example, during the monthly sewing club
described above, Hime was the first one to employ this tool. She claimed, in her
distinctive way of talking with some stuttering and musicality, “Yukiko, you look like a
bear!” This occurred after Yukiko had been asking me whether there were bears in
Canada. Yukiko was the only wheelchair user at Kapu Kapu and presented a “hairy”
image as she had dark short hair, dark thick eyebrows, and round black eyes with thick
eyelashes that outlined her eyes. So Hime’s statement was right on target and led to a lot
of laughter, followed by more claims of this kind. Shiori claimed Miwa looked like
Suneo, who is a well-known character in a popular Japanese animation called Doraemon;
Suneo did somewhat resemble Miwa in the sense that both Suneo and Miwa had a thin
chin and narrow eyes. Then Miwa claimed that Hime looked like Giant, another character
in Doraemon, and once again Hime did somewhat look like Giant. Because the claims
were made subjectively and there were no right or wrong answers, it depended more on
the listeners’ imagination to find the resemblance between the claimed pairs as well as to
appreciate the amusing quality of each statement.
As such, to a large extent, it was the responsive relationships that determined the
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quality of communication, rather than, for example, whether the conversations were
grammatically sophisticated or not. One day, for instance, six of us were working in the
kitchen making cookie dough and shaping it into small balls, and while doing so, we
enjoyed quality conversation that might be considered as immature and meaningless
based on societal standards. The six people present in the kitchen included Shiori (who
used to greet the mall store owners every morning), Hime (who dashed away at the bus
stop), Mariko (who was happy to be asked to stay at Kapu Kapu by Miwa), Yuji (who had
placed a friendly hand on my thigh), Mrs. Watanabe, a long-time staff in her 60s, and
myself.

Shiori: My home, my home (*One of her favorite phrases; a title of Japanese
animation)
Mariko: Re-re-re no sweeping man. Ge-ge-ge no Kitaro. (*Both are titles of
popular Japanese animation.)
Maho: Re-re-re no Kitaro. Ge-ge-ge no sweeping man. (*I switched the latter
parts of the two animation titles)
Shiori: Mariko Grandma. (*An improvised rhyming phrase)
Mariko: Then Shiori is a Grandpa!
Shiori: Hime is a doggy!
Mariko: Then Shiori is….
Shiori: A piggy!
Mariko: I am a cat!
Maho: Then Mariko is a cat and Shiori is a piggy.
Mrs. Watanuki: I want to be something too!
Mariko: You are… a rabbit!
Mrs. Watanabe: Wow. I have to jump then! Shiori, what do you think I am?
Shiori: I don’t know. Maybe a koala panda?
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Mrs. Watanabe: Then what about Mr. Suzaki?
Shiori: A big fox.
Mariko: I think Mr. Suzaki is…. a koala panda!
Maho: That would be too cute for him!
Mariko: Then he is a panda…. This is fun!
Maho: Yuji is….Hmm. What do you think he is?
Mariko: He is Monk Ikkyu! (*Name of a main character in Japanese animation)
Shiori: Maho is a house painter! (*I was wearing overalls.)
Hime: Ke…Kenji is him. (*Kenji is a very popular part-time staff in his early 20s.
Hime pointed to a handsome man in her comic book and claimed that Kenji
looked like him.)
Shiori: I want to go to the sea. I will go.
Maho: I love the sea too.
Shiori: I will go by train, tomorrow….. With my priest.
Maho: Shiori, you are thinking of going on a date with the priest of your dreams,
aren’t you? You are blushing!
Shiori: You can’t come!
Maho: Oh, you are in love.
Shiori: I used to be! (Everybody laughs)

As Mariko said, it was a lot of fun. Conversations were initiated, responded to,
expanded, and carried on. Everyone was encouraged and energized by the responsive
relationships and the mundane task of making cookies was transformed into quality time
and space in which a community emerged. Everybody laughed when Shiori said, “I used
to be!” not because it was out of context but because this well-known phrase of Shiori’s
had been said and heard so many times in this community at Kapu Kapu that it now had a
certain persuasiveness that made people laugh – or the Kapu Kapu workers had
developed a shared sensibility to “get” the humor and to laugh beyond reason at Shiori’s
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punch line.
Kapu Kapu was indeed not a utopia. There were conflicts, quarrels, and intense
moments. For example, Ms. Noda, who in her late 50s was the oldest among the labeled
workers, often complained about some of the younger Kapu Kapu workers. She was short,
round, and fit in the traditional image of a Japanese mother. Busily moving her hands to
knit or sew, Ms. Noda continuously muttered about something or loudly gave others
sought or unsought advice. Upon my interviewing of her, for example, Ms. Noda
complained a lot about Fujii, the young man who was kind but also tended to be regarded
as noisy or wild partially due to his loud voice – as loud as Ms. Noda’s. Ms. Noda kept on
complaining that Fujii was too loud, impolite to the elders, and did not listen to what she
told him to do. Finally, I felt an urge to ask her, “Do you hate him?” Her face
immediately changed and looked uneasy. Ms. Noda uncomfortably denied that she hated
him. “It’s just he’s a bit disrespectful to the elders,” she added as if to make an excuse or
to correct my misunderstanding. Surprised by Ms. Noda’s uneasy reaction, I further asked
her, “So you do not hate him?” Then Ms. Noda replied, “No, I do not hate him. I would
never hate anybody.” “Why not?” I inquired. Ms. Noda answered, with an increasingly
assertive tone of voice, “Because we are all the same – we are all humans. No?” Ms.
Noda seemed to declare her commitment not to deny anybody in an absolute sense and
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not to dishonor the existential value that should be equally accorded to all members of the
human community, no matter how well she got along with them or not.
Similarly, Mr. Suzaki (the director) explained to me how Shiori, the long-time
worker of Kapu Kapu with Down syndrome, once admonished him not to exclude
someone. It was a story from early days and Kapu Kapu workers had a day off to enjoy a
bus trip to Tokyo. One of the members started to have a problem with another member
and he began shouting violently at her in the bus. Mr. Suzaki stopped the bus, got off with
the male member, and tried to calm him down, but he continued to be violent, yelling and
pushing Mr. Suzaki. People on the bus including labeled workers of Kapu Kapu as well
as some family members, staff, and volunteers watched the two, mostly sympathetic
toward Mr. Suzaki. The problem was solved when another staff member arrived on the
scene with his own car and drove the male member separately to the destination. When
Mr. Suzaki got back on the bus, people were relieved that the problem had been solved
and now the trip could resume without the male member. Shiori, however, sitting alone in
the furthest back row, looked at Mr. Suzaki and succinctly stated, “No fighting, Mr.
Suzaki.” Amid an atmosphere in the bus that overwhelmingly supported and justified the
exclusion of the male member, Shiori’s admonishment was, to Mr. Suzaki, a call to not
abandon hope and commitment to stick with and live with others despite discomfort or
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conflicts that might arise.
The Art of Living with Others
Ms. Noda, the oldest of the labeled workers at Kapu Kapu, was originally from
Miyazaki prefecture, which is located in the southern region of Japan. It is often said that
people born in this area tend to be wild and talk roughly; Ms. Noda was not an exception.
She had epilepsy and could not go to school in her childhood, except one year of being
placed in an institution that supposedly provided some educational programs. All through
her childhood and adulthood, Ms. Noda mostly stayed home and helped at a small
Chinese diner that her mother ran. At Kapu Kapu, Ms. Noda often recalled, sometimes
fondly and sometimes angrily, how her deceased mother, who was a widow, was tough on
her. As if to follow the model of her own mother, Ms. Noda tended to be or sound tough
toward others, which was not always easy or pleasant to deal with. Sometimes it resulted
in conflicts or created tensions, but not always. Many Kapu Kapu workers seemed to
have developed a way to get through potentially harsh interactions with Ms. Noda, and
they often did so without denying her existence.
For example, Miwa utilized her superb sense of humor. Miwa was talkative
(albeit disadvantaged in speech), largely because she simply loved people and loved
talking, but also because talking was her way of participation and contribution, given that
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many physical tasks were hard for her to execute. However, according to the perspective
that Ms. Noda had learned from her mother as well as from the society, talking without
engaging in some kind of tangible jobs was regarded as lazy, and therefore something for
which to be reprimanded. Ms. Noda often confronted Miwa and preached, “Stop talking
and move your hands!” or “Stop wandering and get to work!” One day, for example,
Miwa and I were talking as I rearranged the used items that were sold outside of the café
to make them more appealing to the customers, Ms. Noda came outside to call us in for
the morning meeting. When Ms. Noda saw Miwa wandering and talking, she approached
Miwa and let out her irritation at the sight of Miwa’s laziness (from her perspective) by
howling at her and pretending to bite her. The humorous quality of Ms. Noda’s action
might have helped Miwa to not take it seriously and to respond with humor as well.
Howled at by Ms. Noda, Miwa overdramatically screamed and staggered. Ms. Noda,
seemingly satisfied as if she expected exactly this, loudly laughed and went back inside.
Miwa then turned to me and exclaimed, “Ms. Noda is like a weird mother!” We laughed
together. It seemed that Miwa’s artful way to manage potentially stressful interactions
was by turning them into a joke that people could openly laugh about or make fun of
rather than a serious problem that led to exclusion of the unpleasant person.
Sense of humor was an invaluable art for living with others and its usage was
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critical in maintaining and enriching the inclusive community at Kapu Kapu. One day, for
example, I was given the task of walking around the old residential complexes in Kapu
Kapu’s neighborhood with three labeled workers to distribute flyers in mailboxes. The
people who shared the task with me that day were Shiori, Yuji, and Mr. Higashino. Mr.
Higashino, who had Down syndrome and was in his 50s, was one of the two older labeled
workers at Kapu Kapu. He was a rather new member though; he had been
institutionalized, had worked at a different sheltered workshop, and then had stayed home
for a long time with his parents after he left the last workshop prior to joining Kapu Kapu
in the same year I started my fieldwork. Mr. Higashino came to Kapu Kapu only three
times a week as he had to go to the hospital every other day to receive dialysis treatments.
Shiori, as a veteran worker and as someone who loved doing things for others, wanted to
take care of Mr. Higashino as we walked around various complexes and inserted flyers
into mailboxes. Shiori would try to hold Mr. Higashino’s hands and guide him through
the procedure step by step by showing which way to go, which compartment to go in,
which mailbox to insert a flyer and which flyer to insert. At first Mr. Higashino accepted
Shiori’s help without much resistance but I could see it was gradually becoming annoying
to him. At one point, Mr. Higashino suddenly increased his walking speed, as he
comically raised his shoulders and put his hands on his hips, so he could avoid Shiori’s
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physical management of his body. Thanks to his comical form of resistance, however, we
all laughed including Shiori who nevertheless tried to catch up with him and continued to
offer him her help.
We finished distributing all the flyers so it was time to go back. As soon as we
started walking, Shiori quickly positioned herself to the left side of Mr. Higashino and
tried to hold his hand. Mr. Higashino, on the other hand, randomly moved his left hand
and tried to avoid being held. Shiori did not give up though; she was determined to catch
and hold his hand. Then Mr. Higashino adopted a creative way to alter the situation,
grabbing my left hand and resting his head on my shoulder as he continued to randomly
move his left hand to escape from Shiori’s grasp. Once again, Mr. Higashino’s humorous
and non-blaming way of protesting brought us laughter. I was impressed. I never thought
of such a way of expressing one’s protest. Yet, I also wondered if there was an excluding
potential to this approach. That is, as long as Mr. Higashino attempted to escape from and
reject Shiori’s hands, it could result in excluding her. Just when I started to think about
this, Mr. Higashino took further action to dramatically change the dynamics of the
situation: He stopped moving his left hand away from Shiori’s intervention and instead
raised it high and put it around Shiori’s shoulder, holding her closer to himself! Impressed
by Mr. Higashino’s bold and embracing act, I followed his lead and held Yuji’s left arm,
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inviting him to join the line that the four of us now created together. As a leader and the
initiator of this movement, Mr. Higashino leaned forward, picked up our walking speed,
and moved us forward, making lilting strides. Feeling the lilting rhythm myself, I
improvised a chant, “Zundoko zundoko.” At first, Shiori tried to escape from Mr.
Higashino’s embracing shoulder to regain control. But soon, the enjoyment of making
lilting strides all together seemed to win the day. Shiori laughed, called out “Team,
team!”, and joined my chanting, which gradually became the tune of “Jingle Bells.”
Shiori sang, Yuji laughed, and Mr. Higashino, who mostly communicated by gesture and
actions, added a Santa-like “Ho!” at the climax of the song.
It is inevitable to encounter unpleasant interactions or unwanted interventions
sometimes when we live with others. Therefore, it is critical for all of us to develop skills
to deal with those moments in non-exclusive ways. The approach practiced by people like
Miwa and Mr. Higashino seemed mundane at first, but gradually helped me to imagine
hopeful alternatives to an approach that pointed fingers, condemned, tried to correct, or
excluded others as wrongdoers.
When conflicts do arise, relationships must be restored. And the art of living
with others practiced by Kapu Kapu workers could be observed in this regard as well. For
example, one day a conflict arose between Shiori and Mariko on the driving way back to

164

Kapu Kapu after distributing flyers in a residential complex. In the van, Shiori and
Mariko sat together in the middle-row seat. At one point, Mariko cried out, “No, Shiori!”
Apparently, Shiori, who liked to keep things with her, had grabbed some of the remaining
flyers from Mariko’s paper bag and put them in her own bag. Mariko, who also liked to
keep things with her, tried to get the flyers back, but Shiori adamantly resisted Mariko’s
attempt and hid the flyers between her body and the door, adding a justifying explanation
as, “It’s okay. It’s okay. I can carry these for you.” It was not assuring for Mariko,
however. A soft-spoken person, Mariko raised her voice and objected, “That sucks,
Shiori!”
It was only flyers, but Shiori’s sudden action, without consent, was quite
unpleasant for Mariko. I myself had experienced a similar situation with Shiori so I
sympathized with Mariko. Not knowing what to say, I remained quiet in the back row
seat with two other Kapu Kapu workers. A young staff that was driving the van
recognized the conflict and tried to mediate the situation by telling Shiori that we would
have more flyers tomorrow. Mariko looked straight ahead quietly and Shiori worriedly
watched the side of Mariko’s discontented face. Miwa, who sat in the front passenger seat,
turned back and, half-jokingly, said something in reference to Shiori’s misbehavior.
Shiori nervously responded, “Stop, stop! Be quiet, be quiet.” Interestingly, however, this
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broke the silence and gave Shiori a chance to act: She put her arm around Mariko’s
shoulder and moved her closer while looking at her with a concerned gaze. What was
puzzling to me, at this instant, was the fact that Mariko did not reject Shiori’s consolation
– an act that could be regarded as leaving the matter vague and unresolved. To my
surprise, however, as if she heard and accepted Shiori’s action as a statement of regret
and perhaps even apology, Mariko quietly rested her head on Shiori’s shoulder. Shiori
then gently rubbed Mariko’s cheek with her fingers. The conflict had passed.
This resolution did not make sense to me inasmuch as it did not follow my own
familiar scenario of reaching reconciliation, in which the wrong-doer admitted the
infraction and apologized for the misconduct, followed by the aggrieved person openly
accepting an apology and forgiving the person. Rather, just as Miwa did not blame Ms.
Noda as an utterly undesirable person but instead made it a joke to laugh about, and just
as Mr. Higashino did not attack Shiori’s unsought help as a problem and instead managed
to create a space where everyone could share and live, to Mariko as well, so it seemed,
Shiori’s behavior was not an act that called for punishment or correction, but rather was a
part of who Shiori was and something to be negotiated in order to maintain an inclusive
community.
Cultivate Alternative Meanings
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Despite their disability labels that grossly stigmatized them as intellectually
incompetent, Kapu Kapu workers were undoubtedly competent in various ways.
Particularly, their localized knowledge reflecting their history and experiences at Kapu
Kapu was, not surprisingly, far superior to mine. For example, Fujii, the one who tended
to be seen as wild and noisy, posed an astute question as to how Yukiko would return to
Kapu Kapu from the café that Kapu Kapu operated in a nearby community care center.
Typically, those assigned a half-day-shift at the café, including Yukiko, who was the only
wheelchair user at Kapu Kapu, were driven to and from the café by a staff member. It was
rare, therefore, that Yukiko drove her own electric wheelchair directly to the café because
she was late for work in the morning and decided that she had no time to stop by Kapu
Kapu to change to her manual wheelchair. In this situation, Fujii expressed concern that
Yukiko could not ride on the van if she had her non-foldable electric wheelchair – a
question that did not come to my lay mind.
Similarly, Shiori, the veteran Kapu Kapu worker with Down syndrome,
demonstrated superior memory skill one day. It was when the families of labeled workers
were attending a monthly coffee gathering. There were about 10 family members jammed
in the café and taking their orders was chaotic. Shiori stood by the large wooden table in
the center of the room with an order sheet and a pen in her hand. As the customers rather
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randomly called out what they each wanted, Shiori held the order sheet close to her face
and carefully marked them down. Just in case she mistook notes, I stood near Shiori, tried
to count the orders, and jotted them down on my own order sheet. Soon after all of the
orders were taken, drinks were ready to be served. First up were a few cups of hot coffee.
When Shiori brought the coffee to the table, I once again accompanied her in case she
needed my help. But when we reached the table, I suddenly realized that I did not
remember who ordered hot coffee. My mind went blank and it did not even occur to me
to ask the customers who should get the hot coffee. While I was frozen, however, Shiori
proceeded to serve the coffee saying, “Mrs. Hot Coffee, there you go.” It turned out that
Shiori did not count the orders but instead remembered who wanted what.
Not only was the meaning of competence challenged, diversified, and grounded
on the everyday realities and experiences; the meaning of incompetence also was
deconstructed and reconstructed at Kapu Kapu. Miwa, for instance, who was thin and
physically unstable and thus often required others’ assistance, humorously and radically
redefined a situation where she needed to be held and supported to walk up and down the
stairs: She exclaimed, “It’s like we are dating!” thus providing a positive angle to this.
Miwa also often contested a dominant conception of competence/incompetence, by
which labeled individuals were doomed to be identified as inherent possessors of
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incompetence and thus as the ones who were solely responsible for failure. For example,
when someone could not understand what Miwa said, she often dramatically expressed
her disbelief by saying something like “Oh boy” and raising her shoulders, effectively
resisting the idea that incompetence was located within her. Or, when she needed
someone’s help to perform a task, she would comically act bossy and give others
permission to help her by saying things like, “Yes, you may!”
Furthermore, what could be referred to as “the value of incompetence” was also
suggested; that is, it was not necessarily a negative matter to be unable to do or to
comprehend something. Kapu Kapu workers often demonstrated that a phenomenon
called “incompetence” could in fact engage others, motivate collaboration, and enrich
relational space. One day, for example, trying to reorganize a cluttered fabric box outside,
I requested Miwa, one of labeled Kapu Kapu workers who was busy with entertaining a
customer enjoying her morning coffee (e.g., Making her laugh by posing such question as
“Do I look like a puppy?”), to get me a rubber band:

Seeing that Miwa was busy, I interrupted and asked her to get me a rubber band.
Miwa, however, did not move as if she did not hear me. Thinking that she might
need some cheering, I clapped my hands and chanted, “Rubber band! Rubber
band!” Being a jovial person, Miwa soon joined me in chanting and cheerfully
called out, “Rubber band! Rubber band!” also clapping her hands. Miwa’s comical
stooging-like performance made me want to act as a straight person, and I said to
her, “Hey, bring me a rubber band! Don’t just chant!” Watching and enjoying our
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comedy performance, the guest laughed and a young staff, who recognized our
comical interaction, found a rubber band from somewhere and gave it to Miwa so
she could hand it to me. Laughter brought; and even a mission completed. Perfect,
I thought. (field notes #28, p. 4, November 15, 2006)

It was unclear and not important whether Miwa did not understand the word
“rubber band,” or could not comprehend my verbal instruction, or pretended that she
could not understand me. The point was that, while Miwa could not or did not simply
execute what I asked her to do, we were able to transform a simple following-an-order
type of interaction into a performative act that entertained others, mobilized local
resources, and critically blurred and challenged the monolithic boundary of
in/competence.
Under the mission of Kapu Kapu to diversify the meaning of valuable work, the
labeled workers sought and tactically crafted various ways to participate and contribute.
For example, when people were busy bringing out used items from storage to sell or from
inside the store to display outside in the morning, Miwa, for whom such physically
demanding work was not a best match, often invented a way to participate and took on
the role of cheering others. One day, for example, tactfully capturing the style of cheering
at the Volleyball World Championship when fans cheered the Japanese teams on TV,
Miwa drifted among those who busily moved around to do the physical work and cheered
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them on with, “Go, Japan! Go Japan!”
Fujii too, who had paralysis on the left side of his body and needed physical
assistance, often found a way to participate and demanded that others include him in a
process that could exclude him. For example, one day Fujii was sitting at a table outside
tending the shop for the flea market customers; this was his specialized job every
Tuesday when various items were displayed in front of the café. A female customer was
wondering whether she should buy a kimono coat that she found. Rearranging the shop
items, I told her it was one of my recommended items. Inspecting the coat further, the
customer decided to buy it so I moved on to find an appropriate bag to put it in. It was
then that Fujii called me and asked, “Can I help?” Once asked, and belatedly realizing
that there was indeed something Fujii could do, I modified my initial plan, handed him
the coat, and he put it in the paper bag while I held it open. As I apologized for nearly
excluding him and thanked him for his help, the customer asked us, “Should I pay him?”
to which I answered yes. The customer handed him the change, which he handed to me
and I went back inside the store to put the money in the cashbox. Then I came back
outside with the change, which again was handed from me to Fujii, then from Fujii to the
customer. Finally, the purchased item in the bag took the same route and reached the
customer’s hands. As if enjoying the detour, which could be devalued as inefficient, and
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appreciating the service Fujii offered, the customer thanked us in a tender and relaxed
voice.
There were some key words that Kapu Kapu workers often said to each other,
one of which was “Yoroshikune,” which is difficult to translate into English. It is basically
a word that recognizes interdependence. It was often exchanged by people who shared
mutual expectations and responsibilities to make a good time together. The word was
exchanged most often between two labeled workers who were assigned to share the same
half-day shift of work at the café operated in the nearby community center. I too was
offered this call for interdependence when I shared the same bus after work with a few
labeled workers. For a while, it did not make much sense to me as I could not understand
the need to make such a significant call for collaboration upon simply leaving Kapu Kapu
for a half day or riding on the same bus. It felt overly dramatic and I hesitatingly repeated
the word and gave the person a superficial reply. Gradually, however, as I became
immersed in the culture and the interdependent way of life at Kapu Kapu, this expression
entered into my vocabulary as well. Kapu Kapu workers seemed to share the
understanding that work, as well as life itself, was a collaborative venture.
Resisting definitions or declarations based on the dominant perspectives and
cultivating alternative meanings seemed to be motivated and empowered at least partially
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by the labeled workers’ experiences of being discriminated against. Ms. Noda, who had
been institutionalized and deprived of educational opportunities in her childhood, for
example, refused to discard Fujii – she said she did not hate him even though she
admitted that he was often annoying to her. Similarly, Ms. Noda also resisted the
opportunity to abandon Miwa and insult her human potential. When several workers were
being asked by a young staff member to write down a “Happy New Year” message on
paper as a logo to be used for a holiday card, Miwa was exempted from this work as she
could not write, or was thought to be unable to write. Nevertheless, Miwa wanted to try it
along with everybody else. She exclaimed, “Maho, I want to write it too!” Ms. Noda
nearly instinctively shouted, “You can’t write!” but before she completed her
pronouncement, she halted, swallowed her words, and quickly added a humble question,
withholding her judgment to negate Miwa’s potential, saying “…or can you?” When I
proposed to Miwa that she and I try to write together, Ms. Noda, who herself had
difficulties with reading and writing and yearned for learning opportunities, nodded
approvingly and cheered Miwa, “Do your best!” to which Miwa responded “Got it!”
Open to Vulnerability
Being at Kapu Kapu, I often felt vulnerable as my own prejudices and
discriminatory patterns of thoughts and behaviors were painfully exposed. There were
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also times when things did not make much sense to me and I therefore felt uneasy and
disturbed. In other words, being at Kapu Kapu challenged my existing framework and
confronted me with an imperative for change.
I particularly remember how I used to get nervous every time I encountered a
situation where I felt I was presented with “evidence of intellectual disability.” Especially
when I witnessed someone seemingly unable to write, read, or comprehend a simple
verbal instruction, though I might display no visible evidence of discomfort, I winced
inside. No matter how naturally I felt otherwise with the labeled workers, when my
monolithic and prejudicial expectations regarding competence were triggered, I had a
passing fear that I was starting to see labeled individuals as Others. For example, Shiori,
whom I had regarded as having a good general knowledge of dates, days, and the weather
forecast, once said, “It is Friday today” when it in fact was Wednesday. It turned out that
it was actually an error on my part as Shiori had in fact said, correctly announcing
important information for workers, “It is payday today.” At the instant, however, when I
thought I had just witnessed her incompetence that I carelessly associated with her Down
syndrome and presumed intellectual disability, I winced and felt an urge to doubt, after all,
the validity of Shiori’s performance that I had once trusted, without or beyond prejudice.
Engaging with Kapu Kapu workers who continuously sought and demonstrated
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diverse ways of being competent as well as the value of “incompetence” surely affected
my existing framework and the world started to look differently to me. In a way, the
matter of in/competence gradually ceased to be a focus of my attention as it became more
detached from the societal function to rank or divide human beings. Rather, phenomena
that could be described with the terms “competence” and “incompetence” began to
resolve as part of a mundane and complex local landscape, and began to bear a new, more
fluid meaning that reflected histories, contexts, relationships, and emotions that formed a
particular moment of individual lives. For instance, when Shiori looked at parts of
drawings done by various Kapu Kapu workers to decorate the cookie packages, and
named the artist of each drawing, Kapu Kapu workers, including the non-labeled staff,
generally trusted her statements, and more importantly, highly admired her experiential
knowledge of Kapu Kapu. Even at times when her argument sounded questionable, there
was a general attitude not to easily doubt Shiori’s expertise, and people often considered
the possibility that they could be wrong and she might be right. Furthermore, when part
or all of her information turned out to be incorrect, it still did not taint the fact that
Shiori’s local knowledge was celebrated and appreciated, or that she had her own logics
on which her statement was based.
I was certainly not the only one restrained by socially constructed concepts and
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values. Kapu Kapu workers, labeled or not, were also bound by them to various degrees,
which meant that they too were vulnerable in the sense that they had to negotiate with a
need to change in order to cultivate the inclusive community. For example, some or many
still adopted a narrow definition of “work” as engaging in tangible tasks and producing
outcomes or achieving set goals. Many labeled workers had been reprimanded, remedied,
disciplined, and oppressed by such narrow standards of being a worthwhile citizen; and
yet some also felt proud in working hard, “overcoming” their “deficits,” and acquiring
“better” working skills compared to other labeled individuals. For those who managed to
conform to societal standards and were therefore bound by them even more deeply,
nontraditional ways of working that various Kapu Kapu workers crafted could seem
useless, meaningless, or even annoying. Kaoru, a short young woman who was
considered as one of the most skilled and efficient workers especially in regard to the
cookie-making, for example, tended to devalue Fujii, who talked loudly, and contributed
mostly by goofing around, saying silly things, and laughing.
Having palsy on the left side of his body and needing much physical assistance,
Fujii valued and made best use of oral participation despite difficulties in speaking and
being understood. It was therefore a perfect match for Fujii to sit outside at a table and do
the job of attracting and entertaining the flea market customers each Tuesday. He was
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loud, funny, and bold. Fujii diligently called out refrains such as “May I help you?”,
which gradually began to sound like “Big hit!” as if he were at a baseball stadium, and
“Do you want curried rice?”, something that is not served at Kapu Kapu. He was key to
the successful business of the weekly Kapu Kapu flea market. Many shoppers and
passers-by were drawn into Fujii’s performance, unknowingly chuckling or leaving with
a comment such as “You are funny!” He also contributed to vitalizing the rather quiet and
inactive shopping mall, of which Kapu Kapu was a part. Other mall shop owners missed
Fujii when he was not present at the weekly Kapu Kapu flea market.
Fujii’s performance and his way of working were, nevertheless, nontraditional
and could be seen as simply goofing-around. Therefore, in order that Fujii’s
improvisational working style could stimulate the reconstruction of the meaning of work,
it had to be verbalized and explicitly recognized and appreciated as valuable work. Kaoru
seemed rigid, however, often making comments that implied she saw Fujii’s performance
mostly as noise making that could not be considered as valuable work. But, this did not
mean that she was entirely closed to the possibility for change and incapable of renewing
her existing framework. At a morning meeting one day in December, for example, Mr.
Suzaki announced that some people would be working at a one-day lottery station for the
Christmas sale at the local shopping mall and helping to make the event lively and festive.
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Given his expertise at entertaining the flea market every Tuesday, it was no surprise that
Mr. Suzaki particularly enlisted Fujii as part of the merry-making team, although Fujii
played the clown and acted as if he was surprised by the request. It was then that Kaoru
embraced Fujii using the language that she or other Kapu Kapu workers often used to
embrace those who were to depart for their assigned half-day shift at the nearby café. She
encouraged him with, “Go for it, Fujii!” Fujii smiled as if he was pleased that his
performative way of work had been validated and his call for change in existing
frameworks had been answered.
Conclusion
Very similar to the Farm, responsive relationships and relational space, in which
the constituting members of the community mutually responded and validated each other,
were the essential mechanisms in developing and maintaining a validating community at
Kapu Kapu. Based on such an affirmative foundation as well as on a commitment not to
exclude others, people interacted and negotiated every day, crafting the art of living with
others. Additionally, as in the community observed at the Farm, the elements of resistance
against imposition of the dominant value system were also prominent at Kapu Kapu:
Questioning of taken-for-granted concepts was promoted, including the radical
deconstruction and reconstruction of the meaning of in/competence, which was also
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suggested by the Farm data.
Compared to the Farm, however, where there seemed a lot of need to direct
resistance toward fighting against institutionalization, at Kapu Kapu, which clearly aimed
to promote alternative space where traditional and discriminative values around
dis/ability are challenged, resistant energy could be fueled more directly into the
cultivation of alternative meanings and possibilities. The validating community at Kapu
Kapu was maintained and enriched on a daily basis by creative, improvisational, and
thoughtful communication, which was also supported by Kapu Kapu workers’ sharpened
sensitivity and ability to listen to each other. Moreover, the resistant energy of the Kapu
Kapu community exposed their own inner discrimination, encouraging the community
itself to become vulnerable, fluid, and squarely open to an emancipatory call for change.
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CHAPTER 6
Discussion: A Manner of Life Toward Co-Viviality
In search of practices that work to emancipate all living things from various
kinds of discrimination, violence, and oppression, Hanasaki Kohei, a Japanese writer and
philosopher, met, had dialogue with, and worked alongside many oppressed people since
the 1960s, particularly indigenous people in Japan as well as in a wider Asian region.
Looking back at the history of anti-discrimination and emancipatory movements in Japan,
Hanasaki recognizes that those efforts have managed to push minorities’ issues on a
political agenda and have helped to grow prayers amongst citizens for an alternative
culture that celebrates diversity and interdependent way of life. Hanasaki also recognizes
what is needed beyond fighting against oppression for a single cause:
In the days ahead, we will need to try to derive a manner of life [emphasis
added] that is necessary to actualize co-viviality, or living together with
validating each others’ differences, in the concrete day-to-day living practices
from those experiences of various movements. (Hanasaki, 1993, p. 158)
He speaks of this as an ethics or philosophy of co-viviality.
In this chapter, I use Hanasaki’s challenge as a framework and try to derive a
manner of life from the observed examples of validating community, or co-vivial
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community, to use Hanasaki’s term. He coined this term to represent a Japanese word
Kyosei, which he defined as to live with others who are different by embracing
“relationships in which differences do not generate discrimination” (Hanasaki, 2007, p.
187). The co-vivial community that Hanasaki imagines resonates with the accepting
relationships that Taylor and Bogdan focused as a key to develop the “sociology of
acceptance” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1987, p. 35). The researchers clarified that “[a]ccepting
relationships are not based on a denial of the disability or difference, but rather on the
absence of impugning the disabled person’s moral character because of the disability”
(Taylor & Bogdan, 1989, p. 27).
Stay Connected
In the bus where the exclusion of one “trouble-making” person was largely
welcomed as a necessary and justified measure to be taken in order to handle a problem
and to restore peace, Shiori, a veteran Kapu Kapu worker with Down syndrome,
succinctly expressed her protest as, “No fighting, Mr. Suzaki!” Similarly, Ms. Noda, one
of older workers at Kapu Kapu, urgently negated my suspicion that she might hate Fujii,
about whom Ms. Noda had frequently complained. Stated as a life principle that she had
adopted not just with Fujii but with everybody, Ms. Noda, in spite of her continuous
complaints about others, declared that “I would never hate anybody” because, in her
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words, “we are all humans.”
Living among and with others necessitates that each of us develop “competence
and habits – such as thoughtful consideration for human relationships, empathy and
imagination, and physical/linguistic abilities for conflict-solving” (Hanasaki, 1993, p.
158) so we can deal with difficult situations and disagreements in a way that does not
deny a place for others: In other words, we must develop the competence and habits for
co-viviality. However, as Hanasaki warns, “we have been losing abilities to care for and
to sustain pluralistic and nonhierarchical relationships with others, to untangle conflicts,
to compromise and to reach a mutually agreeable solution, and to strengthen
associations” (1993, p. 158).
Fujita Shozo (1985/1997), a Japanese thinker and political scientist, agrees with
Hanasaki and raised concern about a worrisome trend observed in postwar Japan, which
he termed Anraku-syugi (the doctrine of a pain-free, trouble-free, discomfort-free society).
By this, Fujita refers to a strong, enslaving desire to eliminate every potential cause for
discomfort so that there is not even a need to avoid difficult situations and that one does
not need to struggle with mastering the competence and habits for co-viviality. Fujita
(1985/1997) passionately critiqued such a mind-set:
[T]he mind-set that wishes the total elimination (i.e., eradication) of the source
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of discomfort itself will not grapple with the pain, distress, or discomfort that
should vary in outlook and degree depending on each individual circumstance.
Rather, it wants nonexistence of opportunity to encounter discomfort…. Within
such a mind-set, there is no space for negotiations with unpleasant matters, and
what is more, there dominates a lust for the eradication of every things and
phenomenon that might possibly make one uncomfortable. I must say it is
appallingly egocentric barbarity. (pp. 30-31)
Fujita predicts that pursuit of the discomfort-free life will result in a “fatal loss” (Fujita,
1985/1997, p. 41). As life processes are bulldozed and all the bumps and detours are
straightened out, a life gets so flattened that it is deprived of fulfilling experiences – the
sources of enjoyment, patience, ingenuity, perseverance, and intrinsic satisfaction. In turn,
Fujita foresees, the meaning of enjoyment becomes pathologically altered and people will
begin to seek a competitive satisfaction of defeating and demeaning others. Fujita
theorizes that such a mind-set is deeply and structurally embedded within an overarching
social organization of mass-production and mass-consumption that demands efficiency,
competitiveness, and obedience. Especially during the time when alternative social
structure has not yet been envisioned, Fujita urges, joining Hanasaki’s call to develop
competence and habits for co-viviality, that each individual vigilantly overcome the fear
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of facing discomfort and be open to differences at every opportunity arises in their
everyday lives. Fujita finds his only hope in such daily practices and personal decisions
of individual citizens: He believes this is the only way to restore the rhythm of life as
well as the sense of fulfillment and to resist the structural deterioration of human
connections.
Indeed, the community I observed and experienced at the Farm and Kapu Kapu
embodied the hope that Fujita strived for: The informants did not stop communicating,
did not abandon a relationship, and did not wish for (or actively resisted) the eradication
of any existence. Rather, they daily crafted the art of living with different (and potentially
unpleasant) others, and ingeniously (and often humorously too) devised way to deal with
relational tensions and unwanted interventions from others. For example, Miwa at Kapu
Kapu turned a situation where she was at a risk of being reprimanded into a shared joke
(“Ms. Noda is like a weird mother!”) and wittily protected both herself and the “attacker”
(Ms. Noda). Meanwhile, Mr. Higashino embraced Shiori, instead of attempting to escape
from her annoying intervention and to exclude her, and led a lilting troop that sang a
jingle-bell song as we all headed back together to Kapu Kapu.
In other words, the informants were committed to stay connected and were not
afraid to be “enmeshed in the relationships with others” (Washida, 2001, p. 219).
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Washida Kiyokazu, a professor and president at Osaka University who coined a term
“Clinical Philosophy” to describe his fieldwork project that aimed to apply philosophical
insights to actual everyday lives, visited and interviewed people who were working at
various sites of caring for others, such as a woman who was both a Buddhist nun and a
nurse; an architect who deconstructed and constructed a fluid concept of family with his
clients; an owner of a small gay bar in Shinjuku, Tokyo; and an 82-year-old flower
arrangement artist who described the heart of arranging flowers as involving oneself with
the life of a flower in a way that opens the artist himself to be disturbed by the flower’s
turbulent response to his interaction. At the end of his journey to meet these people,
Washida identified a commonality among his interviewees, which was that they were not
afraid of being enmeshed in the relationships with others. Providing further explanation,
Washida wrote:
Those were the people who either voluntarily or involuntarily stepped into a
relationship and became enmeshed in the relationships with others: They
trembled, wobbled, or even collapsed at times in the relationships, and yet stayed
connected. Struggling to find a way, sometimes on the verge of giving up or
sometimes blaming oneself, they did not leave the relationships. (Washida, 2001,
p. 219)
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Just as Fujita found his only hope in individual everyday decisions to stay involved and
connected with others rather than enslaved by the fearful mind-set to seek an egocentric
discomfort-free life, Washida saw a hopeful vision in the stories of those who are deeply
involved with others and called the sceneries depicted by the interviewees’ stories as
“hospitable landscape” (Washida, 2001, p. 174). The competence and habits for
co-viviality that Hanasaki urged us to develop must be nurtured in such a hospitable
landscape.
For the relationships to remain intact and withstand conflict, the community
requires a practice of relational restoration. For example, Shiori and Mariko, the Kapu
Kapu workers, had mended a temporal rift and restored their relationship in a way that
left me rather perplexed: Shiori took away Mariko’s flyers, Mariko got upset, but in the
end, they somehow unsteeled the contentious atmosphere and restored a relationship
when Shiori (the “wrong-doer”) put her arm around Mariko’s shoulder and Mariko rested
her head on Shiori’s shoulder. It was perplexing, and even disturbing to me because it did
not follow a familiar scenario of reconciliation and justice, in which a “wrong-doer” had
to admit and apologize for her sin and a “victim” had to accept the apology and forgive
the sinner, sometimes given that the offender will face a certain penalty.
As this scene lingered in my mind and as I mentally replayed it repeatedly, I was
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reminded that I had been perplexed and disturbed in a quite similar way before. It was
when I finished watching a documentary film, In Rwanda we say... The family that does
not speak dies (Aghion, 2004), on the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide that occurred
in 1994. The film focused on the release of and return to the community of one genocide
perpetrator – one of 16,000 prisoners who was released after having been detained for
nearly a decade awaiting trial by national courts or the international tribunal. Confessed
to have participated in the genocide, those offenders were released in 2003 to be judged
by a government-promoted new system of citizen-based justice called Gacaca (meaning,
“judgment on the grass”), which originally was an indigenous way to moderate disputes
and achieve reconciliation at an open community meeting literally “on the grass”
convened by the elders of the community. In its traditional form, Gacaca can be
considered as a model of restorative justice whose goals are “to repair the harm, heal the
victims and community, and restore offenders to a healthy relationship with the
community” (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 60), thus differentiated from a modern retributive
approach to justice in which legal professionals determine charges and appropriate
punitive measures. In the film, the camera shot a scene from Gacaca trying the freed
offender in a small hillside village: The survivors told stories of how their beloved family
members were killed by the man and challenged him to tell the truth. Despite the
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government-led campaign for forgiveness and reconciliation, the film production team
noted that “reactions to this imposed co-existence reel from numb acceptance to
repressed rage” (Gacaca Productions, n.d., p. 3). According to the director of the film,
Anne Aghion, it took nearly a year for the survivors and the offender to begin to have a
real dialogue about what had happened and how to live together. Close to the end of the
film, there was a scene where neighbors, including the offender, gathered at a local bar
and shared a drink. The director reveals that the gathering was in fact suggested by one of
the younger surviving community members who challenged the director to call a meeting
with everyone whom she had interviewed so they could have a talk with their killer. The
production team noted about this meeting: “Over the course of four hours, in this
emotionally charged place, they began to negotiate how they would talk about the past
and the future” (Gacaca Productions, n.d., p. 4). One such scene included an old woman,
who after speaking about her anger and fear of living with a killer, recalled how she used
to change the diaper of the accused killer when he was a baby. In other words, she began
to speak of the killer as a child of the community – one of them.
I remember, watching the film, it felt disturbingly anticlimactic as I expected
something much more dramatic. It did not make much sense to me, just like the scene of
reconciliation between Shiori and Mariko did not make sense to me initially. Essentially,
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I wondered how they could forgive others, or at least begin to speak with or about others
in a forgiving manner, that easily (compared to the scale and degree of pain inflicted).
My logic, indoctrinated in a retribution-based justice approach that would expect an
apology and payment of a certain price before a wrong-doer can be forgiven, had been
both betrayed and challenged by the demeanor of the Rwandan woman who began to
speak of the genocide perpetrator as someone whom she had known well; and in a similar
way, my logic was once again severely challenged by the demeanor of Mariko who had
accepted the consoling hands of Shiori without further accusing her or seeking to
penalize her, and rested her head on Shiori’s shoulder.
Their perspective-altering demeanor resonates with a conclusion reached by
Ogata Masato, a Japanese fisherman who was made ill by industrial pollution that
contaminated the Minamawa Bay and the Shiranui Sea (located in a southern region of
Japan) with deadly toxic chemicals in the 1950s and became one of the leaders of the
Minamata Disease Patients’ Movement in the 1970s. In 1985, Mr. Ogata decided to leave
the movement and to withdraw his application for official recognition as a Minamata
Disease patient (a necessary condition to receive compensatory payment as part of the
reconciliation process). Accused by other members of the movement as a betrayer who
abandoned an important battle, Mr. Ogata squarely posed himself a difficult question of
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what, if not money, could bring reconciliation. Frantically struggling for 3 months, Mr.
Ogata finally reached the conclusion that “To take responsibility for one’s own conduct is
to share the other’s pain that it has caused” (Ogata, 1996, p. 166). Mr. Ogata also
questioned a binary polarization of “perpetrators” and “victims,” coming to see his own
role in constructing and benefiting from the modern, industrialized, and anthropocentric
way of living. Leaving the “victims’” movement, Mr. Ogata accepted the responsibility
that he himself bears and called out to others – both “perpetrators” and “victims” – to
reunite and restore their humanity.
Returning to the scene of reconciliation between the two Kapu Kapu workers,
when Shiori, who took away flyers from Mariko’s paper bag, put her arm around
Mariko’s shoulder and gently rubbed her cheek, Shiori might have been trying to feel and
share the pain of Mariko that she had inflicted. And when Mariko accepted Shiori’s
consolation and rested her head on Shiori’s shoulder – or when the Rwandan woman
started to speak of the killer as a child of the community – their demeanor seemed to
overlap with Mr. Ogata’s prayer for the restoration of humanity both for himself and for
the offending others.
In a philosophical analysis offered by Hanasaki, the embodied demeanor of
Mariko, the Rwandan woman, and Mr. Ogata can also be regarded as a humane act of
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caring and hospitality toward others. As a fundamental spirit needed to realize
co-viviality, Hanasaki (1981/2009) once defined yasashisa, a Japanese word that means
“kindness” in a rather literal English translation, as follows:
The first emotion emerged after the true realization that both the wall
distinguished oneself from the others and the scale that hierarchically ordered
people by assumed competence or incompetence are illusion, and that we are all
simply a collective of atoms only differing in shape and size – That emotion is
probably the one that we can name yasashisa. (p. 10)
Or, Washida might regard their demeanor as embodied examples of hospitality –
especially the kind that expects nothing in return, which Washida (1999) described as
“reaching out to others who stand at a point where sympathy seems impossible” and
“facing someone who may lose his or her humanity and who is at risk of becoming a
‘non-human,’ and nevertheless trying to touch the person” (p. 258).
The informants of this study often tried to touch others, nevertheless. For
example, Jade, a labeled worker with Down syndrome at the Farm, did not stop inviting
me to share his chips or inviting others, including staff, to interact with him by asking
them to do something for him, even though he knew that there was a high risk of being
reprimanded by staff as being lazy or as breaking the institutional rules. Alden, too, never
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gave up inviting others to listen to his stories, sometimes even calling out, “Don’t go!
This is important!,” even though the institutional rules forbade him to do so. In another
example of such a hospitable landscape, Shinobu, a labeled worker at Kapu Kapu, did not
give up on one mother who intentionally ignored Shinobu’s greeting due to some
relational tensions between Shinobu and the mother’s daughter who was also a worker at
Kapu Kapu. On another day, Shinobu again welcomed the mother by approaching and
greeting her. The commitment to stay connected with others no matter what and the
hospitality of the informants served to revitalize the co-viviality of the observed
communities.
See Others as Irreplaceable Individuals
In a study of relationships between people with and without disabilities, Bogdan
and Taylor (1989) identified “seeing individuality in the other” (p. 141) as one of four
dimensions through which the humanness of nonspeaking others was validated. Similarly,
members of the observed communities, labeled or not, mostly regarded each other as
individuals with distinctive personalities, tastes, styles, background, and history. For
example, when Dean, who has Down syndrome and who rarely talks, quietly pushed pens
and a paper over to the next person without adding anything to the Farm “Who’s Who”
book, Lisa saw it not as a sign of incompetence or passiveness but rather as an expression
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of Dean’s individuality and explained to me that “He doesn’t like that kind of thing.”
Shiori, at Kapu Kapu, also was attuned to and respected the individual artistic styles of
other Kapu Kapu workers: She was proud to give visitors a lecture on which drawing was
done by which artist.
Shiori also valued individualized person-to-person relationships. In the early
history of Kapu Kapu, she would greet the store owners in the mall in which Kapu Kapu
was located one by one every morning on her way to Kapu Kapu. Shiori was known by
name to people in the community, for example those who shared the same bus or bus stop
with her, thanks to her daily practice of introducing herself and greeting them.
Furthermore, even taking orders could not be reduced to counting numbers for Shiori:
She paid attention to and remembered who ordered what, instead of merely counting how
many cups of hot coffee had been ordered. Hanae, a Kapu Kapu worker with a label of
autism, too, personalized the orders as much as possible by remembering the individual
preferences of familiar guests, such as no spoon for one guest or two sugars for another.
In rural Uganda, “to be a person is to have a place in a nexus of kinship
relations” (Whyte, 1998, p. 154). Similarly, in Inuit communities, “the naming of a child
confers upon it the status of a social person” (Nuttall, 1998, p. 188). Douglas Biklen
(1992), in his efforts to derive lessons for school inclusion, studied families who came to
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appreciate their children with disabilities as “ordinary people” (p. 8) with names, interests,
habits, and abilities and who succeeded in achieving regular lives in which the child with
disability was a full participant well known by her or his own name. Japanese culture too,
the significance of naming and calling someone not by a label or a social category but by
her or his own name in relation to the construction of humanness has been recognized.
For instance, Washida (1999) argued that calling others by their names was essentially
“to accept the other as an individual” (p. 238), to resist against objectifying others as
classifiable elements, and to respectfully recognize the irreplaceability of the person’s
existence (pp. 238-239). Tsurumi Shunsuke (1999), one of Japan’s most distinguished
philosophers, also expressed how the individuality and irreplaceability of each person is
fundamentally affirmed by the practice of giving and calling people by their names as
follows:
At home, everyone is famous, or has a good name. We were all born as babies,
were given names, and well-known at home. Very famous, indeed. No one is
anonymous or nameless. The fact that one is well-known by her or his own name
gives the person a tremendous satisfaction. I think it is wrong for us to desire
more fame than this. To cherish the assuring feeling that “I have a name” as
one’s own asset is what I think is important. (p. 26)
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As if to know that calling out to others by their names validates the
irreplaceability of each existence and prevents their being marginalized to anonymous
invisibility, Ms. Noda once called out to Seiko, “Why don’t you come over here and draw
with us?” The existence or humanness of Seiko, a non-speaking and non-walking person
whose lenses had been removed from both of her eyes in her childhood, was established
and reaffirmed in such everyday interactions at Kapu Kapu. At the same time, Seiko too
initiated interaction and called out to others (and thus validated their existence) via her
action: She would often change her body position, while lying on the floor, so she could
present herself in proximity to others and did so in a way that could evoke responses such
as pushing her head against the other’s leg, crawling up and burying her face in another
person’s lap, or dramatically standing up amid others’ gasping and warnings not to fall.
Be Responsive to Others
Responsiveness in relationships was prominent in the observed communities.
Indeed, it sometimes even seemed as if some of the informants had to respond to others
beyond reason: Shiori at Kapu Kapu faithfully got up and ran after Hime every time she
dashed away from the bench at the bus stop. While it could have been dismissed and
discouraged as an immature attention-seeking behavior, Shiori nevertheless treated it as a
valid, communicative behavior and responded each time with sincerity by chasing after
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Hime and gently affirming her both verbally and physically. Similarly, at the Farm, even
after reluctantly leaving Jade following an order given by a staff person to stop the “silly”
interaction and to sit separately, Sandra could not ignore Jade’s farewell howling at her.
As she moved away, she awkwardly turned her body and head toward Jade and howled
back at him across the hallway, as if she could not betray and abandon her responsibility
to respond to his call. In a sense, Sandra and Jade valued “dialogue enacted through
imaginative play and improvisation, shaping relational spaces from which to compose
lives” (Steeves, 2006, p. 106).
The informants worked hard to build relational spaces that “facilitate the
storytelling and dialogue” (Steeves, 2006, p. 107) in order to enrich their community and
to fight against institutionalization. Alden, for example, often urged others not to ignore
him, to resist the institutionalized pace, and to stop to listen to his story by calling out,
“Don’t go!” “This is important!” McKnight (1987) agrees with Alden that it is indeed
important to build and to ensure access to such relational spaces, or “the forum within
which citizenship can be expressed” (p. 57).
Linneman (2001) called such relational and validating space as “interpretive
community” (p. 241), within which members share “common responsibility” (p. 230) to
“recover, discover, preserve, interpret, and, in effect, realize” (p. 65) the mindedness, or
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the humanness, of someone. MacKay (2003), a person with aphasia, also talked about
“collective responsibility for making sense” (p. 824) based on his research in which he
interviewed people with aphasia and on his own experiences. In the communities I
observed, a responsibility was surely shared among the members of the interpretive
community to make sense, to carry on conversations, and to make them convivial. As
McKnight (1987) asserted, in a community “[t]he line between work and play is blurred
and the human nature of every-day life becomes part of the way of work” and “[y]ou will
know that you are in community if you often hear laughter and singing” (p. 58). On that
day in a conference room at the Farm, convivial conversations were abundant and people
shared much laughter, especially Alden who contributed to the community by offering
his specialty joke (e.g., “What does a dog say to a new sand paper?” “Rough!”) while we
engaged in the monotonous task of folding and taping a pile of newsletters. Similarly, on
another day in a kitchen at Kapu Kapu, as six of us made cookies, we together
constructed and enjoyed conversations, which could have sounded rather meaningless to
outsiders, by responding to each other’s chanting of favorite phrases and animation titles.
When everyone in the kitchen laughed at Shiori’s punch line of “I used to!” (A response
that could be regarded as out of context from an outsider’s perspective), we might have
together established “a new structure of language” (MacKay, 2003, p. 824) that goes
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against conventional rules of conversation and yet is empowering and brings “collective
strength” (MacKay, 2003, p. 824) to the community.
Be Open to an Interdependent Way of Life with Others
As Washida (2001) suggested that “‘weakness’ evokes concerns and care” (p.
181), what could be termed the value of “incompetence” or the value of “dependence” in
involving others and building relational spaces was suggested both by the Farm data and
by the Kapu Kapu data. For example, at the Farm, my incompetence to skillfully handle a
shovel to do the barn work encouraged Ben to get involved and motivated his creative
problem solving: Ben first brought me a different shovel from the one that I was using –
the one that Ben considered as “the best shovel” – and then he conceived of a different,
collaborative approach and suggested that we worked together (i.e., I used a smaller
shovel to scoop a small amount onto Ben’s bigger shovel, and when his shovel was full,
he dumped it all off). Jade, another worker at the Farm, also understood that asking
someone for help, such as to get something or to throw something away for him, did not
have to be devalued as a sign of incompetence or dependency but rather could be used as
a valuable tool to create opportunities for interaction and conversation. Risking himself to
be labeled and reprimanded as dependent or lazy, Jade nevertheless often utilized the tool
probably because the institutionally approved means of communication via speech or

198

sign language were not sufficient for his abundant desire and willingness to communicate
with others.
At Kapu Kapu, too, Miwa demonstrated how “incompetence” could engage
others, motivate collaboration, and enrich relational space when she could not or did not
follow my verbal request to get a rubber band: Miwa stood still, not initiating a move to
search for the requested item, and instead joined me in clapping and chanting cheerfully,
“Rubber band! Rubber band!” Our comedy-like performance entertained the guest who
was enjoying her morning coffee and, furthermore, mobilized a local resource resulting in
my need for a rubber band being successfully met by another member of the community
who observed our interaction.
In his book titled Yowasa-no-chikara (The value of “weakness”), Washida
(2001) wrote of Endo Shigeru, a Japanese man with cerebral palsy who arranges for
himself around the clock (24 hours per day, 7 days a week) personal assistance to live in
his own apartment in the community. Washida cites a line from Mr. Endo’s diary in
which he revealed how he had struggled, in his twenties, to decide to participate in a
demonstration for the students’ activism movement while distressed by a thought of
possibly causing trouble to his friends. Several months after the demonstration, Mr. Endo
put a concluding thought in his diary as follows: “Causing trouble to others – It is
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something that is badly needed” (cited in Washida, 2001, p. 179).
Continuing his analysis, Washida (2001) further introduced a documentary film
about Mr. Endo titled Entoko (Ise, 1999). Entoko was how his apartment was called by
his friends and helpers. Entoko also meant “a place where people meet.” Washida (2001)
described how various people, both professional care workers and lay part-timers
including high school students, college students, seasonal workers, a musician living by
the river in a tent, and foreigners such as a Chinese student, gathered at Entoko and took
turns filling the shifts to take care of Mr. Endo. Washida particularly notes how helping
Mr. Endo’s stiff body paradoxically loosened the helpers as if they were liberated from a
silencing pressure while they helped Mr. Endo by his bed, and how it empowered them to
voice personal concerns. Based on his analysis, Washida (2001) reached the following
conclusion: “At Entoko, there is an open landscape in which exposing oneself to others to
the point of vulnerability paradoxically helps those in a helping position to open
themselves and unbind their minds from enslaving armor” (p. 178). The film informs the
viewers that Mr. Endo’s vulnerable dependence had drawn over a thousand people to
Entoko during his first decade of living in the community, inviting them into the
interdependently fulfilling relationships.
As Mr. Endo had once hesitated to ask for help so he could participate in a
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demonstration, asking for help and possibly inconveniencing others cannot be easy in a
society that places a monolithic value on the illusory concept of independence, which
simplistically means, “You take care of your own needs,” and that devalues and penalizes
“dependency that is an essential quality of being a human” (Saishu, 1996, p. 97). Burke,
who lives with a label of autism and who types to communicate, also confessed that “I
rarely, if ever, ask for that accommodation [that he feels reasonable and fair for his
learning at school], as it screams of disabled” (Biklen & Burke, 2006, p. 4). Washida
(2001) therefore not only calls for reconsideration of the meanings of various concepts
used to hierarchically determine the existential value of lives, including
weakness/strength, in/dependence, and in/competence, but also advocates for the
importance of relationship in which “causing trouble” is not something that requires an
apology. Illustrating such a relationship, Washida (2001) draws on a favorite phrase or
living motto of one comedian, Tako Hachiro, who had once been a professional boxer
and Japanese champion and had died in 1985 from a heart attack when swimming in the
sea while he was drunk: Tako Hachiro often said to others, “I caused you troubles, and I
thank you for that.” Washida (2001) interpreted this as follows:
I must have made you miserable; even inflicted pain and suffering. But I will not
say “Sorry,” for you never abandoned a trouble-maker like myself. I will not
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turn my back, act like a stranger and aloofly apologize to you, who keep
including and embracing me. If possible, I would rather die in your embracing
arms, telling you “Thank you.” (p. 181)
“Yoroshikune” – Kapu Kapu workers often exchanged this phrase, a Japanese word that
recognizes the interdependent and collaborative nature of a joint venture, such as when
they were assigned as a team to work at the café in the nearby community center, or to
make cookies together in the kitchen, or even when they shared the same bus to go home.
When the Kapu Kapu workers exchanged this phrase, they might have been mutually
assuring each other that they were on a same boat and that they shared responsibility to
jointly build a validating community where “causing trouble” is not something to
apologize for but rather reflects the strength of the community and thus warrants
appreciation.
Affirm Every Existence Unconditionally
In addition to challenging the socially assigned values of incompetence and
dependence, the informants often performed in a way to blur the boundary of
in/competence, such as Miwa’s performative and unconventional response to my verbal
request for a rubber band; or her overdramatic expression of disbelief (i.e., raising her
shoulders, making a hand gesture as if she were an American, and saying “Oh boy”)
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when someone could not understand her speech; or her radical redefinition of a situation
where she required assistance to walk up and down the stairs as, “It’s like we are dating!”
Meanwhile, a call has been submitted by several researchers to reconsider the hegemonic
and economical campaign to promote independence and to shift our focus more toward
“supporting individuals’ exercising agency” (Broderick & Kasa-Hendrickson, 2006,
p.185, emphasis in original). As a mother of a son, Matthew, who was “born with
multiple disabilities that challenge him, particularly in the expressive domain” (Steeves,
2006, p. 105), Steeves has also come to recognize how “Matthew was continually trying
to author his own life” (p. 107) and hopes for the re-imagination of education as “mindful
and facilitative of the continual identity formation and agency of children with disabilities
and their families” (p. 113).
The informants of this study exercised their own agency or “leadership”
(McKnight, 1987, p. 56) (in addition to responding to others’ agency and leadership) in
various ways. At the Farm, for example, Alden literally authored his own stories and
created a stage around himself that proceeded according to his own pace. Suzanne also
sometimes challenged an institutional rule to not change an assigned team in the middle
of the day and asserted her desire to work with another team. Even after her request was
turned down by staff, being reminded that it was against the rules, Suzanne tactically
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approached an art teacher, who was less bound by the institutional rules as someone who
only came to the Farm a few days a week and who happened to work with the team to
which Suzanne wanted to convert, and announced, “I paint. Can I paint?” Pleased with
Suzanne’s voluntary interest in art, Karen, the art teacher welcomed her.
Just like Ben’s leadership while he and I worked together in an animal barn
altered my views, the leadership of Mr. Higashino, one of two older workers at Kapu
Kapu with Down syndrome, helped arrogant myself to become a little more humble:
After a few humorous attempts to avoid Shiori’s “annoying” control of his body (such as
to comically walk fast while raising his shoulders and putting his hands on his hips or to
dramatically rest his head on my left shoulder while randomly moving his left hand so
Shiori could not hold it), Mr. Higashino eventually invited Shiori to walk with him by
putting his embracing left arm around Shiori’s shoulders. Mr. Higashino also invited me
in by putting his right arm around my shoulders, which motivated me to invite Yuji into
the line that the four of us created together. Mr. Higashino led the troop by leaning
forward, picking up our walking speed, and adding a lilting rhythm to it, from which the
chanting of “Zundoko, zundoko” emerged and gradually evolved into the convivial
singing of “Jingle Bells.”
Being a non-walking, non-speaking, blind person, Seiko’s agency and leadership
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was also prominent at Kapu Kapu. It was always Seiko herself who decided whether or
not to follow others’ requests to stand up, to walk, or to drink. If Seiko decided not to
respond to requests, there was nothing others could do except wait until she felt like
doing it. On one day, Seiko was lying face-down on the floor, and I tried to get her to
stand up so I could carry her on my back to the kitchen where everyone gathered for an
end-of-a-day meeting. Seiko decided that it was not a good time, or perhaps the way I
talked to her was not very appealing. So I waited, occasionally tapping on her back and
begging her to stand up. Another staff came, seeing that Seiko was still on the floor, and
said, “Oh you are taking your time to get ready, Seiko?” As casual as it sounded, it was,
to me, nevertheless one of the “stories of hope” (Linneman, 2001, p. 240) as her words
essentially recognized Seiko’s intention and agency in what could seem like mere
inactiveness or incompetence. In other words, there emerged an “interpretive
community” (Linneman, 2001, p. 241) that employed what Goode (1992) called an “emic
perspective,” which presumes and tries to uncover “the rationality, purpose, and
efficiency of native behaviors” (Goode, 1992, p. 198) no matter how incomprehensible or
meaningless that behavior may appear: Such an interpretive community works based on
what Linneman (2001) calls “[t]he assumption of mindedness” (p. 240) and on what
Biklen (2005) referred to as “the presumption of competence” (p. 1, emphasis in original).
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Shinohara Mutsuharu is a Japanese psychologist and a long time critic of
mainstream ideology in the Japanese special education system that advocates for and
justifies specialized education for students with disabilities in separate, specialized
settings in order to meet their “special needs” and to protect their “human rights for
development.” Shinohara sharply rejects a theory of hierarchical human development, in
which humanity is deemed as something to be learned and earned, and therefore those
who are considered “uneducable” can be written off as “non-human.” Rejecting this
ideology as oppressive, Shinohara (1980) articulated a “presumption of humanness” (p.
182), according to which humanness is presumed, not trained or earned.
Refusing to set any prerequisites for being a human, Shinohara questions the
emancipatory power of radical discourses that aim to deconstruct the modern, monolithic
concept of “competence” as follows:
To counteract those mainstream ideas about competence, we could argue that,
even though intellectual tests may not capture it, competence can be observed in
close relationships and say to a skeptic that “You are not close enough to this
person.” But then I pause and think why would we need to bother to keep
emphasizing “competence,” as in the efforts to re-conceptualize competence as
something to be co-constructed in relationships, and to perpetuate the discourse
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that negates “incompetence.” To say it more boldly, why do we need to be
“competent”? (Takeuchi & Shinohara, 2008, p. 281)
Shinohara certainly does not accept a modern and individualistic conceptualization of
in/competence nor advocate leaving it unchallenged. But at the same time, he calls for
reexamination of our focus, with a liberation from the societal obsession with
competence as well as the fear of incompetence, and urges a shift in the arguments for
humanity more toward the chaotic reality of living together itself (Takeuchi & Shinohara,
2008, p. 284).
As I struggle with the difficult question of whether we could really advocate for
competence for each and every human being without devaluing the essential human
quality of incompetence, I think about the significance of one scene I observed at the
Farm: It was in a staff-free craft room where several women chatted as they worked on
assigned tasks. At one point, one of them shared her difficulties with spelling, and in
response another woman, Hailey, vigorously resonated with, “I am not a good speller”
and sought help with writing from Becky who was considered to be good with spelling
among the women in the room. Considering that whether or not one could write often
gets linked to the question of humanity (Biklen & Kliewer, 2006), the fact that there was
a space in this community where casual admission of inadequacy in one’s writing skills
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and a frank request for others’ assistance were possible without risking devaluation
should offer us important insights and encourage us to conceive of a different world.
Another scene lingers in my mind: It was at Kapu Kapu on a day when many of
the workers were engaged in writing a message for a New Year’s card. Miwa, who was
thought to be not a person of letters and therefore exempted from this task, nevertheless
demanded that she be given a chance to try. Hearing Miwa’s request, Ms. Noda, who
herself experienced difficulties with writing and yearned for learning opportunities that
she had been deprived of in her childhood, instinctively shouted, “You can’t write!” but
before finalizing her pronouncement, she halted, swallowed her words, and quickly added
a humbling question, “…or can you?”
The matter of competence and incompetence was indeed a part of everyday lives
at the observed communities: adopting traditional concepts in feeling good about oneself
or determining relationships with others; challenging conventional images and
embodying diverse meanings and the co-constructed nature of the concepts; blurring the
boundary as well as cultural significance given to the concepts; fighting with
authoritative and oppressive declarations of incompetence; resisting dishonor of others’
human potentials, and so forth. By dissolving the matter of competence and
incompetence as part of the everyday realities of community lives that are fluid, complex,

208

contradictory, interdependent, and convivial, the informants in this study may have been
working to shift in the arguments for humanity more toward the chaotic reality of living
together itself as Shinohara called for.
In his book, Idiots: Stories about Mindedness and Mental Retardation,
Linneman (2001) cites a story from a book, The Mask of Dementia: Images of
“Demented Residents” in a Nursing Ward, written by Hava Golander and Aviad E. Raz
(1986). It is a story about an old man named Shimon who had been admitted to a hospital
by his wife. In the hospital, Shimon wandered aimlessly, entered other patients’ rooms
and sat on their beds for long periods of time in wet pajamas, talked loudly and
incoherently, walked about with no pants on, and periodically disappeared, only to be
found cold, wet, and even more disoriented by the police or other authorities. The
hospital staff speculated about potential reasons for Shimon’s behaviors, but were soon
convinced that he was simply a confused, deteriorated patient with senile dementia.
Meanwhile, Linneman points out, other residents saw Shimon quite differently from how
the hospital staff saw him and spoke in respectful terms about Shimon. Linneman (2001)
shares a strikingly different image of Shimon constructed by his fellow residents:
He was an early settler, a Halutz, a respected breaker of the soil, a giant of the
earth in Israel. His distaste for confined spaces was predictable and reasonable….
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The never-finished tasks of a farmer – milking and selling of cattle, breaking and
harrowing of the land – accounted for his behavior (at least to the other
residents), who exalted and humanized Shimon, despite his wet pajamas. (p. 66,
emphasis in original)
MacKay (2003) too cites a story from a book Recovery with Aphasia (1972)
written by Scott Moss, an academic who had aphasia. In the story below, recounted by
Moss’s wife, he had just been taken to the hospital and phoned his wife:
[The nurse] apparently gave Scott the phone and he uttered a sound but that’s all
it was. I could not make head or tail out of what he was trying to say to me….
[His wife asked] ‘Do you have any children?’ He’d indicated that he did. Then I
say, ‘how many children do you have?’ Sometime he’d indicate four and
sometimes five (we actually have three). And I never knew exactly but I still
think that he didn’t lose his sense of humor, because we’ve played that way with
each other. I think he was displaying a sense of humor, which is incredible! I
knew perfectly well he knew how many children he had. He was just playing
with me. (Moss, 1972, p. 23, cited in MacKay, 2003, p. 824)
The above stories serve as a reminder that humanness of others is validated and
reaffirmed by those who know, share, or are humble enough to stretch their imagination
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to others’ living histories – the experiences, the time, the relationships – and who can
recognize others’ stories as “knowledgeable” (Steeves, 2006, p. 107). When one
witnesses, realizes, or imagines the knowledgeability of someone, one is awed by the
preciousness and irreplaceability of the person’s existence, or what I would like to
tentatively call the “idiosyncratic authority” of each presence: Shiori’s respectful
attention to individuality that made a mundane activity like taking orders a matter of
listening to individual voices and that made her want to recognize and name each creator
of the small drawings; a discreet act of Dean, a mostly non-speaking (or “quiet” from the
perspective of Lisa who respected his quietness) man with thick glasses with a low,
attractive voice, to move one of the chairs at his table to make space for his
wheelchair-using colleague looking for a space to have his lunch, only to return the chair
to its original position, unnoticed by anyone, when the colleague found a space at a
different table; and Mariko’s thoughtfulness to place a cup of tea at a particular spot on a
table, the reason for which was soon revealed to me when Yukiko came into the kitchen,
parked her wheelchair at the table near the entrance, and easily reached her tea cup on the
table without special notice.
Overwhelmed by the “idiosyncratic authority” or the knowledgeability and
history embodied through each existence, there emerges a feeling that “I want you to
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exist,” strongly resonating with the following remark written by Christopher Kliewer
(1998). Kliewer notes: “Community membership [of alienated people with Down
syndrome] would be seen as essential to the evolving completeness of society as a whole”
(p. 7) and that “[t]he oppressive silencing of even one voice through any form of
segregation eliminates that set of experiences from our collective conversation and
diminishes the culture of the community” (p. 5). Similarly, Judith Snow, a Canadian
disability rights activist, insightfully stated: “Our presence is the fundamental gift that we
bring to the human community. Presence is the foundation of all other opportunities and
interactions, of everything that is meaningful” (Snow, n.d.). Washida (1999) also joins
them when he asserts, “’Being present’ is not zero. It is wrong to think that you have to
do something in order to make it a plus value” (p. 206).
Because every existence is invaluable and irreplaceable, the informants often
thought about others who were not present at a particular moment. For example, at the
Farm Jade expended significant energy, with finger spelling, speech, hand gestures, and
facial expressions, expressing concern for Jamieson, who had been absent for a while. It
took him a few minutes to get his message across but nonetheless his concern for
Jamieson persevered. At Kapu Kapu, morning greetings often contained news about
someone who was absent for the day, which was to be announced again officially at the

212

morning meeting. At the morning meetings, the whereabouts of those who had been
absent for a while were reported and the return of someone who had been absent on a
previous day or days was also celebrated. Within such a culture, Fujii astutely recognized
when only a mother came, wondered about her daughter, and asked the mother, “Where is
Seiko?” Or Ms. Noda immediately linked a request to use a vacuum cleaner to clean the
floor space in the morning with the existence of Seiko and talked to herself, “That’s right,
today is a day Seiko comes. I should have known better.”
When there are “reciprocal relationships in which people give each other their
presence as gifts” (Washida, 2001, p. 202) through an act of caring about and for others,
responding to others, and exposing themselves to be vulnerable and allow others to care
for them, each existence is “affirmed, unconditionally” (Washida, 1999, p. 252).
Co-vivial living with others by unconditionally affirming each existence, by negotiating
with each other’s differences, disagreements, discomforts, and deficiencies, and by
realizing each other’s humanity within the chaotic reality of living together is a vision
that Fujita (1985/1997) urged us to strive for in order to be freed from the Anraku-syugi
(the doctrine of a pain-free, trouble-free, discomfort-free society). The observed
communities of the Farm and Kapu Kapu helped me to see beyond “a limited vision of
human potential and what the world may become” (Blatt, 1977, p. 5) and to imagine a
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different world.
Conclusion
In the Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I reviewed literature and drew
methodological lessons on researching with and understanding the perspectives of people
for whom language is not accessible or significantly limited. In my own fieldwork, I tried
to apply various lessons that those pioneer studies offered. Now, at the end of the journey,
what I found the most difficult throughout the course of doing a research project was to
look for “dignified explanations” (Richardson, 2002, p. 55) by abandoning “the remedial
stance” (Goode, 1994, p. 23) and instead adopting an “emic perspective” that aims to
uncover “the rationality, purpose, and efficiency of naïve behaviors” (Goode, 1992, p.
198), even though this was something that the training I received before entering the field
had most emphasized and therefore about which I knew very well its importance. For
example, when Becky, one of the informants at the Farm, looked troubled by my question,
asking her to identify “the nicest thing” that one of her colleagues whom she named as
her friend had ever done, and replied as “Just being himself!” I was instinctively
disappointed by what sounded as a rather immature, childish, and out-of-context response.
I was disappointed that I could not obtain something more deep, something more
important, and something more thoughtful. I was so disappointed that I nearly dismissed
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her response. Similarly, when Mariko rested her head on Shiori’s shoulder in Kapu
Kapu’s van after a quarrel over who should hold a paper bag of flyers, I initially
interpreted it as Mariko’s incompetence to keep her anger or her tendency to be easily
evaded due to her deemed intellectual disability.
Honestly, I feel like it was only the matter of luck that I managed to not dismiss
those responses of the labeled informants as meaningless; I was so close to the situation
that I might have been unable to gain perspective, so I cannot say clearly what stopped
me, except to say that I did not ignore the inside feeling of being confused.
Retrospectively, by not discarding the feeling of confusion that arose in myself and by
withholding my initial judgments, I could begin to engage myself in a dialogue where
“we listen to the Other and simultaneously risk confusion and uncertainty both about
ourselves and about the other person we seek to understand” (Schwandt, 1999, p. 458).
Douglas Biklen (2005) expressed this as a researcher’s obligation when he said, “I am
obliged to welcome complexity, even contradictions, as they arise” (p. 3).
So Becky’s response emancipated my initial mind-set that one has to be (or be
regarded as) competent, contributing, and valuable in order for the person to entitle a
valid membership within a community (or a society); thus the focus of my observations
shifted, allowing me to recognize how the informants not only resisted current standards.
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I began to consider much broader meanings of participation and competence. I stopped
questioning who should or should not be the valid members of the community and
resisted giving significant authority to the concepts of competence and utility in relation
to human worth, for that is what I observed the community members doing. In her
soft-spoken voice, Becky successfully defied the line of reasoning that says one is
valuable because one does something to prove her or his utility. Becky’s emancipative
response reflects the kind of community that the informants of this study strived to
cultivate – a community where each person is considered valuable without explanation;
thus no one has to prove him or herself deserving of membership. Certainly some people
got along better with particular people than others; dominant or institutional standards
were sometimes used to admire or disapprove of others, or to determine individual
relationships to some degree. However, those standards of competence and utility were
never given a status that would question anyone’s existential value or undermine
membership in the human community. In a sense, the observed communities were
comparable to the school examples of community that Kliewer (1998) studied where
citizenship of students with differences called Down syndrome had been realized and
where community was “reconceptualized as a web of relationships that shifts and extends
to encompass the experiences of all its members” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 132) instead of being
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imagined as a “privileged location” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 132) that one has to meet certain
standards to gain valid membership.
The community cultivated by the informants was characterized as “co-vivial,” a
term coined by Hanasaki to represent a Japanese word Kyosei defined as living with
different others by embracing “relationships in which differences do not generate
discrimination” (Hanasaki, 2007, p. 187). The concept of co-viviality resonates with the
idea of “accepting relationships” that Bogdan and Taylor (1987) highlighted in regards to
the relationships in which a person “with a deviant attribute” (p. 35) is accepted without
having his or her difference denied or stigmatized. Responding to Hanasaki’s challenge to
derive a manner of life toward co-viviality so we can choose to adopt co-vivial ways of
conduct in the concrete day-to-day living practices, hopefully this dissertation serves as a
starting point to deepen our understanding of the concept of co-viviality.
A prominent feature of the observed co-vivial communities was that everyone
was recognized as “knowledgeable,” or, to say it differently, everyone developed mutual
sensitivity and respect toward each other’s knowledge. When five of us in the
cookie-making team on one day at Kapu Kapu laughed at Shiori’s punch line, “I used to
be!,” we laughed not because it was out of context but rather we had heard this
well-known phrase of Shiori many times enough to develop a shared sensibility to get
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Shiori’s humor that skillfully punctuated the lively conversations we had created together.
This way of communicating and of creating community was similar to how Steeves
(2006) came to interpret her son Matthew, through stories derived from living with him,
as “knowledgeable” (p. 107); or as Linneman (2001) wrote of “common responsibility”
(p. 229) shared in an interpretive community “to recover, discover, preserve, interpret,
and in effect, realize” (p. 65) the mind of others, including that of an Alzheimer’s patient.
In other words, there was a realization of “human reciprocity” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 5) as the
co-vivial community was cultivated and maintained in relationships “in which the
experiences that form our individuality are recognized as communally valuable” and “we
are nourished by the experiences of others” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 5).
The informants of this study also daily crafted and demonstrated the artful arts of
living with different (and potentially unpleasant) others and of maintaining the co-vivial
community. For example, when a humorous attempt made by Mr. Higashino at Kapu
Kapu to avoid Shiori’s helping hands that tried to manage his body did not work
marvelously and when I just started to worry that his humorous yet avoiding attempt
could end up excluding Shiori, Mr. Higashino dramatically changed his approach: He
held Shiori’s shoulder with his embracing arm and invited her to walk with him. Mr.
Higashino inviting two more members (including myself) to join the troop and adding a
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lilting rhythm by his own walking movements, Shiori, who initially tried to regain control,
could not help joining and enjoying the jingle bells song that we sang together. Miwa, too,
did not accuse Ms. Noda who tended to be hard on other younger Kapu Kapu workers,
following the model of her deceased mother. When Ms. Noda became irritated at the
sight of Miwa “not doing any work but talking” and howled at her, Miwa mobilized her
sense of humor and turned the situation into something that could be openly laughed
about (i.e., After Ms. Noda left, Miwa turned to me and exclaimed, “Ms. Noda is like a
weird mother!”). I was also deeply confused and challenged by how Mariko and Shiori
mended a temporal rift when Mariko, who got upset toward Shiori grabbing Mariko’s
work materials without her consent, quietly accepted the consoling hands of Shiori
without seeking an apology from or a penalty on Shiori. Similarly, Mary – one of young
staff at the Farm – seemed troubled and challenged by how Jade graciously thanked Mary
who had just turned down his small wish (i.e., playing one of his music CDs in a van
upon going out) based on an institutional rule for her considering a possibility and
checking with a senior staff. Furthermore, just like Jade and Alden at the Farm were
persistent in creating relational spaces and opportunities for interactions – Jade inviting
others to share lunch together or asking others for a small favor (both of which risk him
to be reprimanded or blamed as “lazy” by institutional staff) and Alden inviting others to
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stop being dragged by institutional pace and to listen to his stories – Shinobu at Kapu
Kapu also showed her persistency in inviting and cultivating relationships with others
when she approached and greeted one of Kapu Kapu workers’ mothers who had
intentionally ignored (due to some relational tensions between her daughter and Shinobu)
her greeting the day before. In sum, all the stories I observed and experienced in the field
(and hopefully I did a fair job of representing throughout this paper) illuminate subtlety,
agency, reflection, and persistent spirit in how the informants interacted with others and
how they cultivated a co-vivial community. The complexity revealed by each labeled
informant bears little resemblance to the stereotyping pessimism of official definitions to
which they have been subject.
Within such communities of idiosyncratic bodies, where all are respected and
imagined as “knowledgeable,” embodying idiosyncratic histories, experiences,
relationships, competencies, agency, and responsibility to others, the matter of
competence and incompetence become resolved as a part of the “chaotic reality of living
together” (Takeuchi & Shinohara, 2008, p. 284). Free (albeit not completely) from
categorizing labels and pressure to keep an independent outlook, individuals could relate
to one another by mutually seeking help and could synergize an interdependent
community. The staff-free room at the Farm on one day was such space where Hailey,
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who had anxiously presented a competent outlook in response to a skill-testing question
posed by one of the staff on another day, was able to casually seek out other women for
help on spelling. When Hailey proudly exclaimed “We are too weird!”, which was
negated by a consoling staff and yet positively affirmed by another woman informant in
the room, her statement sounded as if it were a claim of idiosyncratic knowledgeability of
herself as well as of the friendship community.
Another characteristic of the observed communities was that they were
hospitable. Warning that “institutionalized systems grow at the expense of communities”
(p. 57) and that “[o]ur essential problem is weak communities” (p. 58) much more than
the ineffectiveness or insufficiencies of human services, McKnight (1987) advocates for a
“community vision” whose goal is “ ‘recommunalization’ of exiled and labeled
individuals” (p. 57). Spending time in the observed communities, I always felt welcomed
with genuine hospitality. In fact, I have often felt and feel now that I have been the one
who was “recommunalized” into their hospitable, co-vivial community.
Washida (1999), in a book titled (translated in English) The power of
“listening”: A tentative theory of clinical philosophy, introduces a French philosopher,
René Schérer, and cites his idea of “hospitality,” according to which hospitality does not
mean hegemonic assimilation of others: Rather, hospitality necessitates that one who
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intends to welcome and include idiosyncratic others be challenged, de-stabilized,
de-categorized, and vulnerable. That is, “to embrace others is to be embraced by
something inconceivable” (Washida, 1999, p. 136); or to express it differently, “to be a
guest of the guest” (Washida, 1999, p. 147). When Mary, a young staff of the Farm,
replied to Jade with a surprised look on her face, “That was kind of you to ask” after Jade
graciously thanked her for taking his request seriously to play his CD in the van (even
though the modest request was turned down based on institutional rules), Mary might
have sensed that she was challenged, forgiven, and embraced by Jade. Or when Keiko, a
soft-spoken worker at Kapu Kapu, cared about a customer at the flea market, who seemed
to feel pressured to hurry up and find her purse quickly, and gently told the customer,
“Please take your time,” we, the majority oppressors and discriminators of the
fast-processing society might have been challenged, forgiven, and embraced by her.
Hanasaki (1993), who urged us to weave each other’s experiences of fighting
against various kinds of oppression into the ethics for co-viviality, reveals that to
overcome discrimination we each must be self-reflective and self-critical at the moments
of discriminating against others (p. 168). Similarly, according to Biklen and Kliewer
(2006), Burton Blatt, who inspired many Americans to act against institutional abuse of
people labeled mentally retarded through his publication of Christmas in Purgatory (Blatt
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& Kaplan, 1966), understood and argued that “looking for others to change their ways
was not sufficient,” which would be “a kind of artful dodge from personal responsibility”
(Biklen & Kliewer, 2006, p. 175). That is, I must be challenged and change in order to
work toward a different world. Only when one faces different others with such
self-reflective, self-critical hospitality, can one gain what Kurihara Akira, a Japanese
political sociologist and a representative of Minamata Forum, calls “active healing”
(Kurihara, 1999, p. 176). Kurihara differentiates “active healing” from “passive healing,”
which commodifies healing and regenerates pain, suffering, and oppression. In turn,
Kurihara (1999) clarifies, active healing “transforms the oppressive structures and
relationships” (p. 176), leads to “sustainable relational recovery and emancipation” (p.
177), and moreover, entails “bodily movements to change the self, to change others, and
to change the world” (p. 177).
Finally, Ogata Masato, a Japanese fisherman and a survivor of Minamata disease
caused by industrial pollution who left the “victims’ movement,” addressed this point as
follows:
There is a way of saying that “the experiences of oppressed and discriminated
people will make the society better” or that “there is a key to end oppression in
the experiences of the oppressed,” but I disagree. Keys are not in the people of
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Minamata, nor in the discriminated buraku people [descendants of outcast
communities of the feudal era in Japan]. Unless you see it as your own problem
[emphasis added], you won’t find any keys. (Ogata, 1996, p. 187)
In the year of 2014, more than eight years after my first visit to Kapu Kapu, I
remain to this day a part of the Kapu Kapu community as a part-time worker. I must not
dismiss the fact that Kapu Kapu is a social institution that artificially and discriminatory
divides community members into two groups based on whether one has a disability label
or not; hence, even though the labeled workers of Kapu Kapu seem generally happy to
work at Kapu Kapu, it still serves a social organization that segregates and deprives those
with a disability label of various life opportunities. No matter how clearly its policy states
that Kapu Kapu aims to resist against the traditional and discriminatory concepts around
dis/ability and to build an alternative working place where multiple and more just
meanings of human worth can be constructed, that does not exempt Kapu Kapu from
being an oppressive social organization: There is indeed quite power differences between
the labeled workers and non-labeled staff, just like Murphy, the informant in the life
history research of Bogdan and Taylor (1982/1994), once stated as “One thing that’s hard
is that once you’re in it, you can’t convince them how smart you are…. And you’re so
weak you can’t really fight back” (Bogdan & Taylor, 1982/1994, pp. 29-30).”
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Thus I do not mean to advocate for “good” or “radical” (albeit segregated)
disability-only institutions. Kapu Kapu cannot be “the different world.” As a paid staff of
a disability-only institution, it is even more critical for me to be conscious of how it is
easy to exert authoritative power on other labeled workers and justify my conducts or
interpretations that may undermine their dignity. It is even more critical for me to keep
the important lessons from pioneers to my heart, such as Biklen’s (2005) presumption of
competence, Goode’s (1992) emic perspective, Bogdan and Taylor’s (1987) sociology of
acceptance, Linneman’s (2001) mindedness, Kliewer’s (1998) human reciprocity,
Shinohara’s presumption of humanness, and Steeves’(2006) knowledgeability, and
anchor my daily practices to those principles. As Mr. Suzaki (Kapu Kapu’s director) had
told me once that he believed “simply by restraining ourselves from judging and
problematizing others’ ways of being based on our own narrow conceptions of how
things ought to be, we can emancipate oppressed potentials and as a result change the
world, little by little,” I too believe that even a disability-only institution can be a site of
social change by heightening self-critical attitude and by fighting against my own
prejudices that oppress those with “differences that matter” (Kliewer, 1998, p. 3).
Working toward “active healing” that Kurihara (1999) clarifies as “transforms the
oppressive structures and relationships” (p. 176) and entails “bodily movements to
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change the self, to change others, and to change the world” (p. 177), instead of
complacent “passive healing,” which commodifies healing and regenerates pain,
suffering, and oppression, I do feel that I am a little more able to merge myself within
relationships where the concept of intellectual dis/ability has little meaning and relevance
and where I share responsibilities to cultivate and maintain the co-vivial, hospitable
community by mutually respecting the complexity, subtlety, knowledgeability and agency
of each other. In other words, I have developed a stronger feeling that making the society
better by developing its competence and habits for co-viviality is now my own problem.
In this dissertation, I have presented my learnings from the experiences of being
welcomed into the observed hospitable communities and my analysis on the manner of
life toward co-viviality; but hopefully this narrative does so in a way that does not
consume and exploit the experiences of informants and end with passive healing. So the
keys for hope are in myself, in ourselves. I must act; I must change; I must forgive and be
forgiven. Furthermore, I must be committed to overcome the “limited vision of human
potential and what the world may become” (Blatt, 1977, p. 5), become an even better
observer of myself and others so as to improve my skills of interaction and appreciation,
and work as an agent to aim for a different world – a co-vivial world.
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